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GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)
The GICHD is an expert organisation working to reduce the impact of mines, 
cluster munitions and other explosive hazards, in close partnership with mine 
action organisations and other human security organisations. We support the 
ultimate goal of mine action: saving lives, returning land to productive use and 
promoting development. Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD 
employs around 55 staff members from over 15 different countries. This makes 
the GICHD a unique and international centre of mine action expertise and 
knowledge. Our work is made possible by core contributions, project funding 
and in-kind support from more than 20 governments and organisations.
IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT UNIT, CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS 
(ISU CCM)
The mandate of the ISU CCM is to support the States Parties to the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions on the implementation of the Convention through the 
CCM’s implementation machinery, office holders and thematic working groups; 
to provide advice and technical support to individual States Parties through 
the development of a resource base of relevant expertise and practices on 
the implementation of the Convention; to keep record of formal and informal 
meetings under the CCM and other relevant knowledge products, expertise 
and information pertaining to the implementation of the CCM; to facilitate 
communication amongst States Parties and other relevant actors; and serve 
as an interface between the States Parties and the international community on 
issues related to the implementation of the CCM.
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FOREWORD
The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) entered into force in 2010. Since 
then, tremendous progress has been made by both States Parties and other 
affected States toward ridding the world of these indiscriminate weapons and 
in universalising the Convention. It prohibits all use, production, transfer and 
stockpiling of cluster munitions. There is a framework established within the 
Convention to ensure adequate risk education as well as care and rehabilitation 
to survivors and their communities. It also addresses questions of the clearance 
of contaminated areas and the destruction of stockpiles.
By mid-April 2016, 119 States had joined the Convention: 100 as States Parties 
and 19 as Signatories. During this period, since the CCM entered into force, much 
expertise has been acquired by States Parties and partner organisations. This 
expertise addresses challenges in treaty compliance and best practices that have 
been developed within the sector to support effective and efficient implementation 
of the Convention. This new edition of A Guide to Cluster Munitions features 
updated information on the Convention’s key obligations such as stockpile 
destruction and cluster munitions clearance. It features comprehensive 
descriptions and illustrations of the types of cluster munitions in contaminated 
areas. It also explores good practices in risk education and victim assistance, as 
well as other critical elements such as information management systems. The 
guide is completed by a close look at the legal framework of the Convention, 
providing clear guidance for the ratification of the Treaty.
In particular, the third edition will be useful for new States Parties, or States 
considering accession to the Convention, who may be seeking further information, 
including specific responsibilities of State Parties. For those requiring more in 
depth information or technical data, this edition also provides several valuable 
links to resource websites. 
I would like to thank the Government of Italy for their financial contribution to this 
important publication and the GICHD for supporting the Implementation Support 
Unit in producing this third edition. 
Sheila N. Mweemba 
Director
Implementation Support Unit of the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
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2015 marked a major milestone in our common efforts to put an end to the 
suffering caused by cluster munitions. The Convention’s First Review Conference 
took place in Dubrovnik, Croatia. As the sole international instrument on 
cluster munitions, the Convention has succeeded, in a relatively short time, in 
strengthening the argument against the use of these weapons and contributed 
towards their global stigmatisation. 
However, challenges remain in ensuring that the Convention is effective in saving 
lives and improving livelihoods. Respecting the Convention’s deadlines must 
remain a priority, including with regard to challenges posed by conflicts and new 
conflict forms. The GICHD maintains its support to affected countries as part of a 
long-term contribution to ensuring human security and enabling development. The 
Centre assists States in meeting their deadlines for completion of their obligations. 
GICHD’s collaboration with the Convention developed significantly in 2015. As 
per the hosting agreement for the Convention’s Implementation Support Unit 
(ISU CCM), agreed upon between the States Parties and the GICHD, the Centre 
now provides infrastructure and administrative support for ISU operations. As an 
observer delegation at Meetings of the States Parties, the GICHD also actively 
participates in the work of the Convention.
In light of this, the GICHD and the ISU CCM are releasing this updated third edition 
of the Guide to Cluster Munitions. The first and second editions were published by 
the Centre in 2007 and 2009 respectively.
I would like to thank the ISU CCM for the fruitful collaboration in producing this 
new edition. The GICHD looks forward to continuing cooperation with the ISU 
CCM, as well as with affected States, the UN and civil society, towards achieving 
the noble and joint goals enshrined in the Convention.
Ambassador Stefano Toscano 
Director
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
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GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS
Cluster munitions, as covered by this publication, are conventional munitions, each 
of which is designed to disperse or release multiple submunitions (in some cases 
called ‘bomblets’) over an area that may extend to several hundred square metres.1 
The general definition of this explosive weapon describes both the container (also 
called a dispenser or ‘parent munition’) and the submunitions it holds. 
Cluster munitions (CM) can be fired from the ground, or air-delivered. Ground-
based cluster munitions include mortar bombs, artillery projectiles and rockets, 
while air-delivered ordnance includes bombs, rockets and missiles. More detailed 
descriptions of cluster munitions are given in Chapter 2.
For the purposes of this document, a submunition is an individual item of explosive 
ordnance contained within the dispenser or ‘parent munition’. It is ejected, 
expelled, or dispersed at some point after the cluster munition is fired, launched, or 
dropped. Submunitions can also be deployed from dispensers fixed to an aircraft. 
Each submunition incorporates a high explosive charge, with many combining a 
fragmentation effect and a shaped charge; these are known as ‘dual-purpose’ 
submunitions. Fragmentation is intended to inflict injury on personnel and damage 
to material,2 while the shaped charge is designed to penetrate armour and other 
hard surfaces.
Definitions
The Cluster Munitions Ban process, also known as the Oslo Process, began in 
2007. It carefully described definitions of a cluster munition and an explosive 
submunition. These definitions (and others) are set out in Article 2 of the 2008 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), as follows:
‘Cluster munition’ means a conventional munition that is designed to disperse or 
release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 20 kilograms, and which 
includes those explosive submunitions. 
It does not mean the following:
(a) a munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, 
pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air  
defence role;
(b) a munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic 
effects;
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(c) a munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks 
posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics:
(i) each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
(ii) each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
(iii) each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage  
a single target object;
(iv) each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-
destruction mechanism; and
(v) each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-
deactivating feature.
‘Explosive submunition’ means a conventional munition that, in order to perform 
its task, is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is designed to function 
by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or after impact.
Military utility of cluster munitions
Use of cluster munitions stemmed from a military requirement to launch remote 
strikes at areas, where – due to their size or ill-defined individual targets – a large 
number of conventional ‘unitary’3 warheads would otherwise be needed. 
Area coverage of cluster weapons meant that accuracy of the delivery system was 
less critical, while – in the conflict zones where they were used – the potential for 
collateral damage was considered of little consequence. Delivery of large numbers 
of submunitions also off-set the problem of munitions that failed to function, once 
again with little thought as to the long-term implications.
Initially, the relatively small submunition warheads were only effective against ‘soft’ 
targets (such as people, light vehicles and stores), while ‘hard’ targets (including 
buildings, fortifications and armoured vehicles) would still require heavy unitary 
weapons such as bombs and artillery projectiles. This began to change and shaped 
charges were incorporated. These allow a small warhead to penetrate several 
centimetres of armour.
As the efficiency of warheads increased they could be made smaller, allowing 
more submunitions to be packed into the parent munition; the weapon could then 
cover an ever wider area. Once again, potential for collateral damage increased 
while the need for reliability became even less important.
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Multi-purpose warheads meant that different ‘target sets’ (such as infantry 
formations, vehicle convoys or storage areas) could be attacked using a single type 
of ammunition. This had the potential to substantially reduce the logistic burden 
– particularly for forces operating a long way from their base. This versatility also 
meant that an aircraft could be equipped to engage ‘opportunity targets’, which 
otherwise might be unsuited to its weapons load.
All of these factors combined to offer military forces greater efficiency and 
versatility at a reduced cost. It is therefore hardly surprising that, from initial use 
up until the end of the 20th century, the adoption of cluster munitions increased 
more or less continuously. 
The growing popularity of cluster munitions among the military was accompanied 
by a corresponding increase in design and production by developed countries. 
They further spread the weapons among favoured developing nations. By the time 
the CCM came into force, 344 countries had manufactured cluster munitions and 
around 405 countries or regions had been contaminated.
Why do cluster munitions cause ‘unacceptable harm’?
Clearly, all forms of explosive weaponry are capable of inflicting death, injury and 
damage. The group of nations which shaped the Oslo Process to ban cluster 
munitions adopted the phrase ‘unacceptable harm’ to describe their effects. Their 
meaning was that these munitions routinely inflicted suffering significantly over 
and above that expected from other types of ordnance.
Cluster munition characteristics mean that they pose a particular threat to the 
civilian population both during and after use, with victims often including a high 
proportion of children. Even the military have noted that CM endanger their own 
troops, which is one of the reasons for the incorporation of safeguards within 
newer designs. Further details are given in Chapter 2.
The main reasons why cluster munitions cause ‘unacceptable harm’ are as follows:
• their wide-area effect means an increased likelihood of civilian victims or 
collateral damage to civilian objects from the explosion of the submunitions 
dispersed by each CM during an attack. This problem is worsened by the 
typically high number of submunitions delivered in a single attack 
• the failure rate of many submunitions means that a single attack may leave 
hundreds – and in some cases thousands – of small unexploded, but lethal 
devices (sometimes called ‘blinds’ or ‘duds’)
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• compared with other types of ordnance, the high number of unexploded 
submunitions contaminating an area greatly increases the probability of an 
accidental encounter 
• unlike minefields, which are usually fenced and marked, there may be little 
or no indication that an area is contaminated with submunitions
• submunitions are small and light compared with many other types of 
ordnance. Their reduced impact energy therefore requires a sensitive fuzing 
system, which means that even minimal disturbance may be enough to 
cause them to explode. 
• unlike most types of ordnance, submunitions are often small and light 
enough to be picked up by children, who may not recognise them as 
dangerous munitions.
In addition to causing death and injury, the presence of unexploded submunitions 
endangers and discourages the return of the displaced, and impedes livelihood 
activities, such as agriculture or grazing.
1 Unexploded submunitions in Lebanon. There is often little or no warning to civilians  
that they are entering a contaminated area
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Permitted munitions
There are many types of parent munition which dispense payloads that are not 
considered to be particularly harmful and which, therefore, were not banned 
under the CCM. As the definition states, these include larger explosive munitions 
(over 20 kg) and non-explosive items such as flares, smoke and chaff. These are 
often dispensed by projectiles or bombs that are similar in design and appearance 
to banned cluster munitions, making correct identification critical to military 
authorities and clearance agencies.
Although landmines can be dispensed by parent munitions, they are excluded 
from the definition of a cluster munition. Anti-personnel mines are prohibited under 
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, while anti-vehicle mines are covered by 
Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.
The CCM does permit some explosive submunitions which meet the demanding, 
cumulative requirements set out in the definition. At present, very few types meet 
these criteria; examples are shown in Figures 4. 
2 This carrier projectile contains a payload 
of smoke-producing canisters, and is not 
classified as a cluster munition
3 This Russian ‘AGITAB’ is based on a 
cluster bomb, but contains a payload of 
paper leaflets
4 The BONUS and SMArt 155 submunitions are permitted under the terms of the CCM
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USE AND IMPACT OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS IN ARMED CONFLICT 
History of the use of cluster munition6 
First use – UK
The first significant use of cluster weapons was during the Second World War, 
when German planes dropped SD-2 ‘Butterfly Bombs’ on the British port of 
Grimsby. Although only 1,000 or so submunitions were dropped, there was 
chaos in the town for weeks and the subsequent clearance task took around 
10,000 man-hours. Almost as many people were killed after the raid as during it, 
as they attempted to collect or move unexploded submunitions.
Vietnam
The next major use of submunitions was during the Vietnam War, where both 
mines and impact-fuzed submunitions were dropped by the millions by the 
USA. It was also in Vietnam that the first dual-purpose submunitions (the MK118 
‘Rockeye’) were used. 
Lao PDR
The worst affected country is the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), 
where it is estimated that more than 260 million submunitions were dropped 
during the Indo-China War. The National UXO Programme assumes a 30 % failure 
rate for US submunitions (locally called ‘bombies’), resulting in an estimate of 
78 million unexploded submunitions.7 As in World War II, most of these ‘bombies’ 
were air-delivered in cluster munitions, had mechanical impact fuzes and used 
a fragmentation effect. Many of those used in Lao PDR were ‘spin-armed’ and 
contained an ‘all-ways acting’ fuze designed to operate at any impact angle. This 
type of fuze is particularly dangerous if it fails to function as intended. Some 
40 years after they were dropped in Lao PDR, these submunitions are still causing 
casualties on a regular basis.
Falkland Islands/Las Malvinas 
In 1982, the United Kingdom used BL755 cluster munitions during the Falklands 
conflict against Argentine positions. It is reported by Landmine Action that the 
only civilian casualties of the conflict were caused by these cluster munitions. 
First Gulf War
Extensive deployment of both air and ground-delivered cluster munitions 
occurred during the First Gulf War of 1991. Iraqi units were both devastated and 
demoralised by the continual submunition strikes that occurred throughout the 
‘air war’ phase of the campaign. The fact that the ground war lasted only four days 
and met little resistance was largely attributed to the effect of cluster munitions. 
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Since the Iraqi forces were mainly in open desert, there was little impact on 
civilians, although there were many post-conflict casualties among allied troops 
and explosive ordnance clearance workers.
The First Gulf War also highlighted the excessive failure rate of these munitions. 
More than 95,000 unexploded submunitions were recorded during the clearance 
of the US sector of Kuwait, which probably represented around one quarter of 
the unexploded ordnance throughout the whole country. Despite evidence of high 
failure rates and the risk of a significant post-conflict hazard, the same weapons 
types were used again in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and then in Iraq.
Chechnya
In the wars in Chechnya, cluster munitions were extensively deployed by Russian 
forces in populated areas, particularly in and around Grozny. In a cluster strike 
on Grozny market in 1999, witnessed by staff from an international demining 
organisation, 137 people were killed and many more injured. 
Eritrea-Ethiopia
The Eritrea-Ethiopia conflict of 1998–2000 saw the use of cluster munitions by both 
parties. In June 1998, Eritrean aircraft dropped cluster munitions in the Ethiopian 
town of Mekele, hitting a school. Fifty three civilians were killed and a further 
185 were injured in the attack. Ethiopian aircraft also dropped cluster munitions 
on civilians in Eritrea. On 9 May 2000, UK-manufactured BL755 cluster bombs 
were dropped on a camp for displaced people. In the period after the attack, 
420 unexploded submunitions were found and disposed of by an international 
demining organisation. 
Kosovo
In May and June 1999, allied forces dropped more than 240,000 submunitions 
(BLU-97, BL755, and MK118 Rockeye) on Kosovo, with tens of thousands more 
dropped on Serbia and Montenegro. The cluster munitions in Kosovo caused at 
least 75 deaths and injuries to civilians at the time of use and more than 150 post-
conflict casualties. The resultant contamination produced US$30 million worth of 
post-conflict clearance. According to one expert,8 in Kosovo alone, it is believed 
that the BLU-97 submunitions caused more fatalities than all of the landmines 
put together. He considers that this is largely due to the presence of an ‘all-ways 
acting’ secondary fuze; also the cause of so many casualties also in Lao PDR. 
Cluster munitions are still being cleared in Kosovo. 
Afghanistan
The USA reportedly dropped more than 248,000 submunitions over Afghanistan 
between October 2001 and March 2002, causing casualties at the time of use 
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and exacerbating an existing problem with cluster munitions following Soviet use 
in the 1990s.9 
Iraq
During major hostilities in Iraq in 2003, both air-delivered and artillery-delivered 
cluster munitions were used extensively. Although use of air-dropped cluster 
munitions in populated areas had decreased in comparison to past wars, the 
widespread use of ground-launched cluster munitions, including artillery 
projectiles and rockets, resulted in significant numbers of casualties. 
South Lebanon
During the 2006 conflict in southern Lebanon, Israel is believed to have deployed 
more than two million submunitions (the exact number has never been disclosed), 
using a combination of air, artillery, and rocket-delivered cluster munitions. These 
ranged from those containing Vietnam-era BLU-63 submunitions, (large numbers 
of which failed to explode) to M77 submunitions ejected from MLRS rockets, 
(many of which also failed to explode and subsequently caused civilian casualties). 
They also used artillery-delivered M85 submunitions fitted with self-destruct fuzes, 
intended to eliminate residual contamination, yet these also failed in significant 
numbers. Research undertaken by Landmine Action in September 2006 found that 
in 60% of cases, the centre of the strike was within 500 metres of the centre of a 
residential area. In 2008, the UN estimated that 48 square kilometres of southern 
Lebanon had been contaminated by hundreds of thousands of cluster munitions.1 
As of 12 December 2008, 153,755 unexploded submunitions had been destroyed 
by clearance operations. 
Recent use
Cluster munitions were used in 5 countries during 2015, according to the 
Cluster Munition Monitor 2015; Libya, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine and Yemen, all 
non-signatories of the CCM. In 2016 CM have been further used in Syria and 
Yemen.10 
Affected Countries
The Cluster Munition Coalition lists a total of 23 countries and 3 territories which 
are affected by cluster munition remnants. These are Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, Croatia, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Germany, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Montenegro, Mozambique, 
Serbia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Vietnam, Yemen, as well as 
Kosovo, Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara.
There may also be small amounts of contamination in another 15 countries.
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Impact of submunitions on civilians
The impact of submunitions during and after a cluster strike can be devastating to 
local communities. Difficulties in accurately targeting submunitions and their wide-
area effects mean that civilians may fall victim to the weapons during an attack 
despite stringent efforts to target only military objectives. Even a low failure rate 
can result in a large number of unexploded submunitions because of the often high 
quantities delivered. That impact is felt directly and indirectly. In some countries 
and regions, submunitions are a major cause of deaths and injuries to civilians. 
Indeed, in a global study in November 2006, Handicap International concluded 
that 98% of recorded cluster munition casualties were civilians.10 This does not 
mean, of course, that this is representative of all submunition casualties. The study 
confirmed a total of 13,306 victims killed and injured by cluster munitions. 11
At least as far as children are concerned, submunitions may be a greater threat 
than landmines. Submunitions are small, often visible on the ground, and attractive 
for children to pick up and play with. In 2001 in Kosovo, for example, the ICRC 
found that as compared to those killed or injured by anti-personnel mines, 
those killed or injured by submunitions were 4.9 times as likely to be under age 
14. Incidents involving submunitions were also much more likely than landmines 
to result in death or injury to several people.12 
Although the most severe impact of cluster munitions is human, there can also 
be significant socio-economic consequences: 
• residential areas can be densely contaminated with large numbers  
of unexploded submunitions
• unexploded submunitions can endanger returning populations and prevent 
people from returning home
• cluster munitions can hinder relief efforts and impede work to rehabilitate 
communities
• unexploded submunitions can affect areas that are already subject  
to the highest levels of poverty 
• cluster munitions can seriously affect livelihoods by blocking water 
supplies, disrupting work to restore power lines and preventing excavation 
of rubble and reconstruction efforts, and 
• unexploded cluster munitions can prevent or endanger the harvest  
of crops.13 
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In Lao PDR, which suffered one of the heaviest bombardments in history, including 
massive use of submunitions, a study in 2006 by the UNIDIR concluded that: 
‘Economics and the impact of cluster submunitions are fundamentally bound 
together. The fact that these devices are still in the ground hinders development by 
restricting land use and delaying or adding to the costs of infrastructure projects. 
And because people are poor, they have no choice but to use the land or to collect 
UXO for the scrap metal, which then creates the possibility of deeper poverty 
resulting from UXO accidents.’ 
Following the 34-day conflict in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, the south of the 
country remains littered with a huge number of unexploded submunitions. Since 
the end of the bombing through to 17 December 2008, 217 civilians were reported 
killed or injured by submunitions. In addition, thousands more are denied access 
to their land and the ability to return to normal life. 
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This chapter provides an overview of the types of cluster munitions in 
existence, as well as their characteristics and limitations. The enormous 
diversity of these weapons makes it difficult to categorise them simply. 
According to Human Rights Watch, 33 countries have produced at least 208 
different types of cluster munitions.1 This chapter gives a brief overview of the 
main types, along with their characteristics and effects.
MEANS OF DELIVERY 
There are four principal ways of delivering submunitions onto a target: 
• tube-launched (e.g. artillery shell, mortar, or naval gun)
• air-dropped container
• aircraft dispenser, and 
• rocket/missile. 
While the sizes, shapes and means of delivery vary, the basic characteristics of 
most cluster munitions are broadly similar. The warhead or bomb consists of a 
canister or casing, the majority of which is a cargo area filled with tightly packed 
submunitions. The warhead normally has a fuzing system linked to an ejection 
mechanism, both of which normally incorporate small explosive charges. Images 
showing cutaway views of typical cluster munitions are at Figures 5 and 6.
Once the projectile has been fired or 
the bomb dropped, the fuze initiates 
the ejection sequence, either after a 
set delay or at a given height. Activation 
of the fuze usually ignites one or more 
small propellant charges, which open 
the casing and eject the payload. The 
ejected submunitions, each of which 
has its own fuze, disperse further as 
they enter the airstream. 
5 A Cutaway of the Russian RBK-250-275 
cluster bomb
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Dispensers are different in that, unlike 
a bomb, the container is fixed to the 
aircraft. The unit is actuated by an 
electrical signal from the cockpit; this 
fires small propellant charges to eject 
the submunitions from the tubes or pods 
of the dispenser in a rapid sequence. 
The submunitions arm once they are a 
safe distance from the dispenser, then 
follow a ballistic trajectory to the ground. 
Some models are flight-stabilised by a 
drogue chute that opens after ejection, 
positioning the submunition correctly 
and altering its ballistic trajectory 
towards vertical.
Although most submunitions used 
to be air-dropped (e.g. in conflicts in 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, the former 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and 
Viet Nam), ground-based delivery by 
artillery or rocket systems has become 
increasingly prevalent, most notably in 
the First Gulf War, the conflict between 
the coalition led by the United States of 
America (USA) and Iraq in 2003 and the 
conflict in southern Lebanon in 2006. 
Rocket-launched 9N235 submunitions 
are known to have been used in Ukraine 
in 2015 and ZP-39s bomblets in Yemen in 2016.2 It is believed that most of the 
cluster munitions in stockpiles today are ground-based systems. 
ACCURACY
This section addresses both the capability of the parent munition to dispense 
submunitions over its target and the ability of individual submunitions to fall and 
detonate where intended.
6 A Cutaway of a typical cluster projectile
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In addition to leaving behind large areas contaminated with unexploded 
submunitions, a major humanitarian concern is the accuracy of targeting 
of submunitions during an attack. Most submunitions free-fall in a ballistic 
trajectory determined by a combination of factors, and can stray far from their 
intended target. Some modern anti-armour cluster munition systems now use 
independently targeted submunitions which identify, and fire at, an individual 
vehicle, although with limited ability to differentiate between military and civilian 
vehicles. Improvements are also being made to the accuracy of air-launched and 
missile- borne dispensers, which can incorporate wind correction and/or inertial/
GPS (Global Positioning System) guidance. However, such advanced systems are 
expensive and existing data on their performance in combat is very limited. 
Cluster munitions (other than those delivered by precision guided munitions), 
in common with every other form of remotely delivered ordnance, will have some 
degree of inaccuracy in their delivery. This arises from a combination of the error 
in alignment with the target, and the influences on the weapon between the time 
of discharge or release, and impact. The degree of inaccuracy from these factors 
is known as the Circular Error Probable (CEP) which is defined as the radius of a 
circle into which 50% of the weapons would be expected to fall.
To reduce the size of the CEP and Elliptical Error Probable (EEP), some 
manufacturers have developed Wind Corrected Munitions Dispensers (WCMD), 
7 Air-dropped cluster munition – dispersal of bomblets after opening
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e.g. BLU-103A/B WCMD with a CEP at only 26 metres. 50% (101 pc) or 202 
BLU-97 submunitions carried by BLU-103A/B should land in a circle with a 
diameter of 26m (or 85ft). It should be noted that WCMD-assisted CEP at 26 m 
is an unverified claim by the manufacturer, achieved in test environment in ideal 
terrain, altitude and weather conditions, and that indeed 50% of the submunitions 
are still expected to fall outside of the circle.
A further level of inaccuracy occurs as the submunitions disperse from the cluster 
munition. In most cases they are ejected explosively, with little or no control, and 
then follow a ballistic trajectory. As they fall to the ground, they are vulnerable to a 
variety of influences, including the wind and the detonation of other submunitions. 
The greater the height at the time of ejection from the parent munition, the larger 
the dispersion will be, and the more time there will be for submunitions to be 
further influenced by the wind.
In older systems, the inherent inaccuracy of the cluster munition, combined with 
the dispersion of the ejected submunitions, can lead to the strike missing the target 
area by a substantial margin. Even if the weapon is accurate, the coverage may 
extend well beyond the intended target and into civilian areas. 
STRIKE PATTERNS
The impact of a cluster strike leaves what is known as a ’footprint‘. In many cases, 
this strike area will be subjected to both the explosive effects of the submunitions, 
and to contamination by unexploded ordnance. The footprint from weapons 
following a ballistic trajectory is usually in an ellipse pattern, covering the entry 
(or beginning of the strike zone) and the ‘fade-out’ (the end of the strike zone). The 
(normally empty) casing of the parent munition may fall either within or outside 
this ellipse. 
Where the munition is falling almost vertically, as occurs when a bomb is dropped 
from a great height or is retarded by a parachute, the pattern may be more circular 
or donut-shaped. The empty casing of the parent munition will normally fall within 
this area. The ‘hole’ in the centre of the donut is the result of the submunitions 
being ejected in a radial pattern, with few, if any, following the path of the parent 
munition.
Cluster munitions are often used in multiple strikes, and while an individual 
footprint may be relatively clear, overlapping patterns can become very confusing. 
Cluster strikes can deliver thousands of individual explosive devices (a single 
salvo of 12 MLRS rockets can deliver 7,728 submunitions), leaving a large area of 
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contamination. In many cases, it is not possible to establish how many weapons 
have been used; this then makes it impossible to account for all submunitions 
when the area is subsequently cleared. 
SUBMUNITION TYPES AND CHARACTERISTICS 
Submunitions are intended for use against different targets and therefore their 
characteristics and effects also differ. Some are fragmentation devices intended 
to kill or injure personnel. Others are anti-armour, typically using a shaped charge, 
employing the Munroe effect designed to penetrate the armour of tanks and other 
protected vehicles. 
The Munroe effect is described as the following: a shaped charge incorporates a 
conical metal liner (often made from copper). On detonation, the liner is forced by 
the detonating wave from the explosive into a high velocity molten jet, which is 
projected forwards into the target. The high density and velocity of this jet give it 
the ability to penetrate armour and other hard surfaces to a far greater depth than 
the high explosive charge could otherwise achieve.
Increasingly, there has been a trend towards combining effects in order to make 
submunitions more versatile; this allows the same submunition to be employed 
against multiple target types. This move towards multi-purpose ammunition is 
partially responsible for the increased employment of cluster munitions in recent 
conflicts. ‘Dual-purpose improved conventional munitions’ (DPICM) combine anti-
armour and fragmentation effects, while ‘combined effects munitions’ (CEM), add 
an additional incendiary element.3
More modern ‘sensor fuzed’ cluster munitions detect their targets from a 
distance and therefore need a warhead that combines lethality with significant 
range. This ammunition tends to use a different type of charge called an 
‘explosively formed projectile (EFP)’. This type of charge uses the Misznay 
Schardin effect, which unlike the Munroe Effect, does not form a plasma jet. 
Instead, the concave disk is distorted by the heat and blast, and forms a slug. 
Kinetic energy drives the slug to the target and then penetrates it. The damage 
is caused by the blast overpressure, and the slug ricocheting and fragmenting 
around the inside of the target. The plate is often made from a heavy metal such 
as tantalum, which is shaped during detonation of the explosive into a high-
velocity projectile, capable of penetrating heavy armour over some distance. 
These have been further developed over the last few years to allow production 
of a hypersonic solid mass from these devices.
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There are currently very few types of sensor-fuzed submunitions, although they 
are reportedly being researched, produced, or acquired by at least 14 countries. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, these weapons are the only types of explosive 
submunition capable of complying with the legislation of the CCM.
EXAMPLES OF SUBMUNITIONS
Fin-stabilised fragmentation submunition 
The Russian AO-1SCh submunition, which weighs 1.2 kilograms and is 49 x 
156 mm (see Figure 8), is a fragmentation submunition with an anti-personnel/
anti-materiel effect.4 One hundred and fifty submunitions are dispersed from the 
cluster bomb (RBK 250-275) over an area of some 4,800 square metres. 
The submunition is basically a miniature 
bomb, containing a simple impact fuze 
and a 200 g high explosive charge 
encased in a thick steel body. The 
AO-1SCh submunition has been used 
in many regions, including Chad, the 
Russian Federation (in Chechnya), and 
Tajikistan.5 They are among the most 
common Russian submunitions and 
are found in stockpiles throughout the 
world.
Spin-armed submunition
The US BLU-61 is typical of a spin-armed submunition, having a spherical 
body, 99 mm in diameter, made from steel. The body is notched to enhance 
the fragmentation effect and encased in plastic, into which vanes are moulded. 
Once released from the cluster bomb, 
the vanes on the submunitions induce 
spin as they fall. Once the spin rate 
is sufficiently high, centrifugal force 
is used to arm the fuze, which then 
detonates the submunition as it strikes 
the ground.
8 The Russian AO-1SCh is a simple 
fragmentation submunition
9 The US BLU-61 is a typical example  
of a spin-armed submunition
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Spin-armed submunitions such as the BLU-61 generally use ‘all-ways acting’ 
fuzes (see Fuzing, below), which are fully encased within the submunition. These 
weapons were used extensively during the bombing campaign in Laos that began 
in the mid -1960s. Failure rates were high, with the number remaining unexploded 
estimated to be in the millions.6
Anti-armour and dual-purpose submunitions
The US Mk 118 ‘Rockeye’ (see Figure 
10) is an anti-armour submunition 
developed in 1968, during the Vietnam 
War. The parent munition is the 
Mk-7 ‘Tactical Munitions Dispenser’, 
containing 247 submunitions. The 
filled dispenser, known as a Cluster 
Bomb Unit (CBU), weighs around 230 
kilograms and is opened in the air after 
it has been released by explosively 
splitting the casing when the time-
delay fuze functions. 
Each dart-shaped submunition is 316 
millimetres long, weighs 600 grams, 
and incorporates a 183-gram shaped 
charge to penetrate armour. When 
ejected at an altitude of 150 metres, 
the submunitions cover an area of 
approximately 4,800 square metres. 
During detonation of the Mk 118, the 
casing of the shaped charge shatters to 
create fragmentation; many anti-armour 
submunitions incorporate notched steel 
casings to deliberately enhance this effect. Submunitions designed to produce 
both anti-armour and fragmentation effects are known as ‘dual-purpose’; an 
example is the Russian PTAB-2.5KO, shown in Figure 11.
Dual-purpose improved conventional munition 
Dual-purpose improved conventional munitions (DPICM) are compact 
submunitions capable of being dispensed in large numbers. Their small size and 
light weight make them ideal for use in longer range weapons where payload 
10 The US Mk 118 ‘Rockeye’ anti-armour 
submunition
11 The Russian PTAB-2.5KO is a dual-
purpose submunition, combining a 
HEAT shaped charge with a notched 
fragmentation casing
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space is limited, such as artillery 
projectiles and rockets. 
The US M77 (Figure 12) is a typical 
DPICM, dispensed by the MRLS rocket 
system. It is very similar to the M42 and 
M46 DPICM, which are widely used in 
artillery projectiles.
The submunition weighs only 213 g and 
has a tubular steel body just 38 mm in 
diameter. The open end of the body 
houses a copper shaped charge liner, while the other end is domed and fitted 
with a simple impact fuze. The fuze incorporates a small threaded striker attached 
to a loop of fabric ribbon; this is folded over the fuze, allowing submunitions to 
be stacked closely, nose to tail, within the dispenser. The striker retains a spring-
loaded slide fitted with a small stab-sensitive detonator. 
On impact, inertia carries the striker forward into the detonator, beneath which 
is a small booster pellet and the main charge. The body is shattered to create a 
fragmentation effect, while the shaped charge is fired downwards into the target. 
The M77 is capable of penetrating between 50 and 100 mm of armour, despite 
having an explosive charge of just 33 g. In some DPICM, ball-bearings surround 
the body to enhance the anti-personnel effect. 
Combined effects submunition 
A widely-used combined effects munition is the US CBU-87 cluster bomb. 
The BLU-97 submunitions it disperses (shown in Figure 14 BLU-97 with chute) 
12 The US M77 is a typical DPICM
14 The BLU-97 ‘combined effects’ 
submunition
13 The US CBU-89 cluster bomb contains 
202 BLU-97/B submunitions
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incorporate a shaped charge utilising 
the Munroe effect and are capable of 
penetrating more than 200 millimetres 
of armour. The body of each submu-
nition, made from internally notched 
steel, shatters into approximately 300 
fragments, each of which can penetrate 
6 mm of steel. These fragments can 
kill people, disable vehicles, and inflict 
damage on materiel to a range of 
20 metres or more. Also incorporated 
into the body of the submunition is a 
zirconium ring, which has an incendiary 
effect intended to ignite fuel and other combustible materials in the target area. 
A cutaway diagram of the BLU-97 is at Figure 15.
Sensor-fuzed cluster munition
The US BLU-108 Sensor-Fuzed Weapon (SFW) was developed to detect and 
engage individual armoured vehicles without creating a wide-area antipersonnel 
effect. Features include advanced active and passive sensors (infrared, millimetre 
wave radar) and the ability to loiter above a target area. The SFW cluster bomb 
carries ten submunitions, with each submunition incorporating four warheads. 
Each warhead is capable of engaging a separate vehicle within an area of 460 by 
150 metres. The SFW was first used in combat in Iraq in 2003, and has since been 
used in Yemen.7 Despite being equipped with a self-destruction device, numerous 
warheads remained unexploded.
Selectively Targeted Skeet
In response to this issue of unexploded warheads some militaries are trying to 
reduce this problem. One example of such efforts is the Selectively Targeted Skeet 
STS is a precision-guided munition8, four of which are inside a BLU-108A/B 
submunition. Several BLU-108A/B devices, in turn, are ejected from a bomb, 
missile, etc. The carrier itself is guided, such as the Joint Standoff Weapon9 
(JSOW). As the BLU-108 approaches the target area, it releases a parachute 
and fires a small rocket to spin the container. Four Skeets are released at right 
angles to one another. They deploy ‘Samara Wings’ which are weighted fabric 
blades tightly packed into the submunition as released. The STS is deployed 
spinning from its host carrier, causing both a stabilising spin and tilting the Skeet 
appropriately.
15 Cutaway diagram of the BLU-97
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In its descent, the Skeet uses pairs of infrared sensors to search for valid targets. 
If no valid target is found, the Skeet’s timed self-destruction function is set to 
activate and destroy it by detonation at an altitude posing minimal hazard to people 
on the ground. If a valid armoured target (e.g. a tank) is found, the Skeet orients 
itself to the top centre of the target. At the appropriate moment it detonates, firing 
a just-formed molten copper projectile of moving metal, travelling at hypersonic 
speed, which will penetrate the thinnest, top part of the tank armour by forward 
momentum and heat. Alternatively, if the Skeet senses a ‘soft’ target such as a 
truck, it will damage that unarmoured target with 16 fragments shot radially from 
its centre.
Fuzing 
The majority of submunitions use some form of stabilisation (normally fins, a 
streamer, or a drogue chute)10 to bring them into a nose-down attitude. In general, 
submunitions use spin and air resistance to actuate their arming mechanisms, 
preparing them to explode on impact. This initiation system is referred to as a fuze, 
which may or may not include a safety and arming unit. 
Most (but not all) fuzes incorporate safety features designed to prevent accidental 
initiation if the submunition is subjected to shock or impact prior to arming. These 
include the misalignment or disconnection of critical mechanical and explosive 
components, which are then brought together to form viable mechanisms 
and explosive trains when the cluster munition is at a safe distance from the 
deployment platform. 
Electrically-initiated fuzes often employ 
a piezo-electr ic element, which 
generates an electric charge when 
mechanically deformed. These fuzes 
normally incorporate both mechanical 
and electrical safeguards, such as the 
misalignment of the explosive train and 
a break in the circuit, both of which 
must be overcome by the movement of 
components during the arming process 
(Figure 16).
16 The British BL 755 is initiated by  
a nose-mounted piezo-electric element.  
The fuze incorporates both mechanical and 
electrical safety features
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Once armed, stabilised submunitions are normally designed to detonate on impact 
when they strike a hard surface nose-first (Figure 17). In these weapons, the 
fuzing mechanism is directional and will not be actuated if the bomblet impacts 
at the wrong angle. Some fuzes, however, are designed to function over a range 
of impact angles. Such fuzes are known as ‘all-ways acting’ fuzes and tend to be 
used on munitions that arm by spin as they rotate in the airstream. These fuzes 
are particularly significant because of the threat they pose if they fail to function. 
All-ways acting mechanisms typically incorporate a ball-bearing housed in a 
chamber with sloping sides. Sideways movement of the ball-bearing acts on the 
sloping surface and pushes a pin into a stab-sensitive composition. This means 
that they should function at any impact angle (Figure 18).
17 Components of the Russian AO-1SCh. The fuze has no safety or arming mechanism; 
sufficient impact simply crushes the nose of the fuze and drives the firing pin into the 
detonator
18 Diagram of an all-ways acting fuze
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The relatively high failure rate among submunition fuzes led to the addition 
of secondary fuzing systems in some later designs. Secondary fuzes serve as 
a back-up to initiate the submunition if the primary fuze fails for any reason, 
such as impact at the wrong angle. Some use all-ways acting mechanisms; 
however, if these are not actuated during impact, they can act like de facto 
anti-handling devices when the submunition is subjected to further sudden 
movement.
Unexploded US BLU-97 submunitions have gained a reputation for accidental 
initiation, caused by their all-ways acting fuzes. This secondary fuze often 
remains functional, despite failing during the initial impact.
Cluster munitions equipped with radar, infrared, laser, and/or radiometric sensor 
fuzing mechanisms are radically different from the mechanical and electrical 
designs of the Cold War era. After deployment by a ground-based or airborne 
system, the dispenser releases the submunitions. The submunition fuze is armed 
by the alignment of the firing train and connection of power to the electronic 
sensors, which then begin scanning for a target. Data from the sensors is fed 
to a processor, which then determines if, or when, an acceptable target has 
been identified. When the criteria are met, the Misznay Schardin effect charge 
is initiated, firing the heavy metal slug at the target. If, however, the confidence 
level of detection is not satisfactory, a self-destruct mechanism will be activated 
at a given height.11 Most sensor-fuzed submunitions incorporate power sources 
that discharge soon after deployment; this means that they are incapable of 
being initiated, should the self-destruct mechanism fail.
Self-destruct 
Awareness of the dangers posed (to both friendly forces and civilians) by 
unexploded submunitions led to the incorporation of self-destruct features 
in some designs.
Self-destructing submunitions are intended to automatically detonate after a 
set period of time if they do not detonate on impact. Mechanisms to ensure 
this automatic detonation are usually either electronic or pyrotechnic. In the 
latter, a burning fuse is ignited during the arming process; this is designed 
to initiate the detonator a few seconds after impact if the primary fuze fails 
to function.
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The only DPICM incorporating self-destruction to have seen significant operational 
use is the Israeli-designed M85 (see Figure 19). This was used by the UK during the 
2003 conflict in Iraq, and then on a larger scale by Israel during the 2006 Lebanese 
conflict. In southern Lebanon, the Israeli M85 was used alongside older DPICM. The 
self-destruct fuzes failed to achieve the 
reliability claimed by the manufacturers, 
although they did appear to have a 
significantly lower failure rate than the 
non-self-destructing types. This showed 
that, at least in this case, incorporation 
of a self-destruct device reduced 
the overall failure rate, but was not a 
solution to submunition contamination. 
It also illustrated substantial difference 
between the results obtained during 
testing, and the reality seen during 
operations.12 
There are also cluster munitions that ‘self-neutralise’ or ‘self-deactivate’. The Iraq 
conflict of 2003 saw the first major use of sensor-fuzed submunitions, designed 
to target and defeat armoured vehicles, which incorporate self-deactivation. An 
electronic fuze, which requires an electrical power supply, allows a sensor-fuzed 
munition to use a ‘reserve battery’, which is only activated when the munition is 
deployed. If it fails to explode on impact, the short life span of the battery means 
that the power source soon becomes unavailable to initiate the warhead, providing 
a reliable method of ‘self-deactivation’. This does not make the munition safe, 
but it does at least minimise the possibility of it functioning through accidental 
disturbance.13
Submunition failure rates 
One of the major humanitarian concerns regarding the use of cluster munitions 
is the numbers that fail to explode as intended.14 It is very difficult to determine 
the precise failure rate of submunitions, but there is considerable evidence that 
the predicted failure rate determined by a manufacturer is often much lower than 
the failure rate observed during operational use. The main reason for this is that 
testing rarely replicates real combat conditions. 
Submunitions may fail due to a number of factors, including: 
• design (failures in design or assembly)
• length and condition of storage (working parts deteriorated over time)
19 The Israeli M85 incorporates a self-
destruct mechanism, but this has proven  
far less reliable than claimed
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• preparation for use by combatants (such as failure to set fuzes correctly)
• drop height, angle, attitude, and velocity (too high, too low, too slow,  
too fast)
• vegetation (heavy, dense, or soft) 
• ground conditions at the impact area (e.g. soft, hilly, wet), and 
• interaction and damage (the effects of collisions, blast and fragmentation 
from other submunitions). 
In summary, there are many individual factors and combinations which may 
influence whether a submunition will explode as designed or not. In many designs, 
the primary fuze, secondary back-up, or self-destruct mechanism rely on the same 
action (such as the movement of a critical component) at the beginning of the 
arming sequence. This means that if this action fails, for any of the above reasons, 
both the primary and secondary fuze, or self-destruct, will fail too. 
When they fail to detonate, unexploded submunitions may be left in a highly 
dangerous state; partially or fully armed and often damaged. There are many 
instances of submunitions detonating at the slightest stimulus, while others 
endure being moved several times before exploding. These explosive weapons 
are extremely unpredictable. In essence, however, all submunitions are inherently 
dangerous once released from the delivery system and armed, and should be 
treated as such. 
The rigorous design and manufacture 
of newer electronically fuzed muni-
tions may make them less likely to 
malfunction than older mechanically 
fuzed types. This is primarily due to 
their lack of moving parts, the ability to 
test electronic circuits more thoroughly 
and the limitations of reserve batteries. 
In profit-driven ammunition testing, 
it is impossible to check every single 
mechanical fuze; hence limited sample 
lots are taken and tested. With electronic 
fuzes, all critical circuits can be tested 
quickly and easily.15
20 The electronic fuze of the Spanish  
SNA submunition. Circuits like this are 
less prone to malfunction than mechanical 
systems, and each one can be tested  
prior to production
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This chapter describes the negotiation and content of the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions and provides some updates on its implementation over the 
past five years. The convention, which prohibits all cluster munitions deemed 
to cause unacceptable harm to civilians, was adopted on 30 May 2008 in 
Dublin, Ireland, and was opened for signature on 3 – 4 December 2008 in 
Oslo, Norway. It entered into force on 1 August 2010 after the first 30 States 
submitted their instruments of ratification.1 
NEGOTIATION OF THE CONVENTION: THE OSLO PROCESS
The impetus for the negotiation of the Convention, as with the 1997 Anti- Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention, was concern over the impact of these weapons on civilians. 
One of the introductory paragraphs of the Convention refers to the determination 
of States Parties ‘to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused 
by cluster munitions at the time of their use, when they fail to function as intended 
or when they are abandoned.2
Norway launched the ‘Oslo Process’ after discussions within the auspices of 
the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) at the United Nations 
in Geneva failed to make progress on cluster munitions. Twenty-five States had 
called for the negotiation of a new international treaty on cluster munitions at 
the Third CCW Review Conference in November 2006. At the time, however, the 
development of such a treaty was opposed by a number of major military powers. 
The Oslo Process sought to negotiate and conclude a treaty outside the CCW.2
The process formally began in February 2007 at a meeting convened by the 
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Oslo. On 23 February, 46 States 
issued the Declaration of the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions (the ‘Oslo 
Declaration’), committing themselves to:
‘Conclude by 2008 a legally binding international instrument that will: (i) prohibit 
the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions that cause 
unacceptable harm to civilians, and (ii) establish a framework for cooperation and 
assistance that ensures adequate provision of care and rehabilitation to survivors 
and their communities, clearance of contaminated areas, risk education and 
destruction of stockpiles of prohibited cluster munitions.’
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The Oslo Process included a series of global conferences to discuss draft versions 
of the proposed Convention. These conferences took place in Lima (May 2007), 
Vienna (December 2007), and Wellington (February 2008) prior to the final 
diplomatic negotiations in Dublin in May 2008. The events were supported by 
a series of regional and thematic meetings in Phnom Penh, San Jose, Belgrade, 
Brussels and Livingstone, addressing particular aspects of the cluster munitions 
issue and providing input to the discussion on the global stage. 79 countries 
adopted the ‘Wellington Declaration’3 at the meeting in Wellington, New Zealand, 
which set out the principles to be included in the future convention, in particular:
• A prohibition on the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster 
munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and
• A framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate 
provision of care and rehabilitation to survivors and their communities, 
clearance of contaminated areas, risk education, and destruction of 
stockpiles.
The text was formally adopted on 30 May 2008 by the 107 negotiating states (see 
Annex 1). In accordance with its Article 15, the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
was opened for signature on 3 – 4 December 2008 in Oslo. As at 19 April 2016, 
119 States had joined the Convention; 100 as States Parties and 19 as Signatories.
DEFINITION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION
The Convention defines a cluster munition as meaning ‘a conventional munition 
that is designed to disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less 
than 20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions...’.4 The Convention 
also applies to submunitions contained within fixed-wing dispensers, which are 
termed ‘explosive bomblets’.5 This definition covers the vast majority of weapons 
with submunitions that have been produced, and all that had been used up to the 
adoption of the Convention.
The Convention excludes from the definition the following:
(a) A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, pyro-
technics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air defence role;
(b) A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic 
effects;
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(c) A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the risks 
posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following characteristics:
(i) Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
(ii) Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
(iii) Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage  
a single target object;
(iv) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic  
self-destruction mechanism;
(v) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic  
self-deactivating feature.6
The Convention neither prohibits nor restricts the use of these explosive weapons. 
Their use is permitted on the basis that they will not have indiscriminate area 
effects or pose a risk of failing to function and thus becoming unexploded 
ordnance. However, like all other explosive weapons, such munitions are regulated 
by the general rules of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities. They are also 
covered by Protocol V on explosive remnants of war.7 
The Convention also excludes air-launched and scatterable landmines from its 
prohibitions, which might otherwise fit the definition, as these are addressed in 
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention:
• All landmines
• A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke,  
pyro- technics, or chaff
• A munition designed exclusively for an air defence role, and
• A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or electronic effects
21 Signing conference in Oslo, 4 December 2008
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GENERAL PROHIBITIONS
Under Article 1, paragraph 1 of the convention, States Parties are obliged ‘never 
under any circumstances’ to:
(a) Use cluster munitions;
(b) Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to 
anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions;
(c) Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited  
to a State Party under this Convention.
The undertaking ‘never under any circumstances’ to use, develop, produce, 
stockpile, or transfer cluster munitions, or to assist, encourage or induce anyone 
to do so, means that the Convention applies in all situations and all circumstances, 
including peacetime and war or other armed conflict, and during internal 
disturbances or tensions. States Parties may not resort to cluster munitions 
in attack or self-defence, even if threatened with imminent military defeat. 
Furthermore, it is not possible to make any reservations to the provisions of the 
Convention. 8 States Parties may only take advantage of exceptions specifically 
provided for, such as the retention of a small number of cluster munitions for 
training and research into clearance techniques (see below section on exceptions 
to the prohibitions on stockpiling and transfer). 
Although the convention is addressed to States and not to non-State armed 
groups, the preamble notes that States Parties are resolved that such groups ‘shall 
not, under any circumstances, be permitted to engage in any activity prohibited 
to a State Party to the convention.’9 Although there has been relatively limited use 
by non-State armed groups of cluster munitions, as noted in Chapter 1, a leading 
member of such a group in Croatia ordered the use of the weapons against Zagreb 
in 1995, resulting in many civilian casualties. In addition, Human Rights Watch 
has alleged that Hezbollah used cluster munitions against Israel during the armed 
conflict in Lebanon in 2006.10 
In the five years since entry into force of the Convention, cluster munitions have 
been used in several countries including in Cambodia, Libya, Sudan, Syria, 
Ukraine and Yemen.11 During the First Review Conference on the Convention 
held in Dubrovnik, Croatia from 7 – 11 September 2015, the conference adopted 
with some reservations the 2015 Dubrovnik Political Declaration in which the 
States Parties recommitted to the full implementation of the Convention, to 
ensuring a world free of cluster munitions and condemned ‘any use by any actor’. 
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Consequently, in its capacity as the President of the Convention, in December 2015 
Croatia issued a statement in which it expressed its concerns at, and condemned 
the continued use of, the weapons in Syria.12 
Prohibition on use
The core of the convention is its prohibition on the use of cluster munitions, as 
defined in the Convention itself. Indeed, the Oslo Declaration referred to the 
‘grave consequences caused by the use of cluster munitions.’ Use covers the 
employment of cluster munitions in all situations, whether in armed conflict, 
internal disturbances, or peacetime (unless it falls within the permitted exceptions; 
see below sections on the prohibitions on stockpiling and transfer).
A provision entitled Relations with States not party to this Convention expressly 
allows States Parties to engage in military cooperation and operations with 
States that have not adhered to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and which 
might commit acts prohibited under the convention (see below section on 
interoperability).13 It is, however, also provided that in such a situation, no State 
Party may itself use cluster munitions, or ‘expressly request the use of cluster 
munitions in cases where the choice of munitions used is within its exclusive 
control.’14 Furthermore, States Parties are required to discourage the use of 
cluster munitions by States not party to the Convention and to notify them of 
their obligations under the Convention and promote the norms it establishes.15
Prohibition on stockpiling
Each State Party undertakes never to stockpile cluster munitions. States may, 
however, retain a limited number of cluster munitions and explosive submunitions 
for training in clearance and development of destruction techniques, as well as 
for the development of counter-measure techniques.16 
Prohibition on production and development
The convention’s prohibition on production of cluster munitions is immediate 
and absolute. There are no exceptions and in accordance with Article 1 of the 
convention each State Party is further obliged not to develop or acquire cluster 
munitions in the future. 
Prohibition on transfer
Each State Party undertakes never to transfer cluster munitions. This includes 
import, export, gift, and sale of the weapons. Article 2, paragraph 8 of the 
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convention defines transfer as involving, ‘in addition to the physical movement of 
cluster munitions into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and control 
over cluster munitions, but does not involve the transfer of territory containing 
cluster munition remnants.’ It explicitly excludes the transfer of territory on which 
abandoned or failed cluster munitions or unexploded submunitions are found.
An exception to the prohibition allows the transfer of cluster munitions to another 
State Party for the purpose of destruction, for training and for the development 
of counter-measure techniques.17 It is therefore not permissible to transfer 
cluster munitions to a State not party or to a non-state armed group under any 
circumstances.
Interoperability and assisting, encouraging or inducing  
a prohibited activity
The Convention on Cluster Munitions is the first international humanitarian or 
disarmament law treaty to specifically address problems of interoperability. 
Interoperability covers situations where military alliances of States are operating 
together and the legal obligations on these States differ (because, for instance, 
they are party to different international treaties, or have different understandings 
of the precise content of customary international law).
A State Party cannot assist anyone, irrespective of whether or not they are an 
individual, private company, State or non-State armed group or State not party, 
to use, develop, produce, stockpile or transfer cluster munitions. This provision 
must, though, be understood in conjunction with the provisions in Article 21 of 
the Convention, paragraph 3 of which states that:
‘Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and in accordance 
with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, may 
engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this 
Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.’
The States Parties in such an operation are required to discourage the use of 
cluster munitions by States not party to the Convention.
OBLIGATIONS TO DESTROY STOCKPILES OF CLUSTER 
MUNITIONS
Each State is further required – as soon as possible but not later than eight 
years after becoming party to the Convention – to destroy stockpiles of cluster 
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munitions that are under both its jurisdiction and its control. The term ‘jurisdiction’ 
typically covers the whole of the sovereign territory of a State Party (even where 
the stockpiles may belong to another State); the term ‘control’ may apply extra-
territorially, for instance if a State Party occupies territory belonging to another 
State and gains control of stockpiles of cluster munitions in the process. The 
formulation, which differs materially from that contained in the Anti-Personnel 
Mine Ban Convention, means that foreign stockpiles controlled by a State not 
party to the convention but located on the territory of a State Party may not fall 
within this requirement.
The destruction of cluster munitions is a complex engineering challenge, which 
often involves reverse-engineering and remote disassembly because of the 
initial design of the submunitions. It is therefore a relatively expensive process 
when compared against the destruction or demilitarisation of other conventional 
ammunition. States should therefore be encouraged to commence their 
destruction programmes at the earliest opportunity.
Each State Party undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply 
with applicable international standards for protecting public health and the 
environment.18 The European Union, for example, has directives governing the 
controlled management of hazardous waste.19 
The eight-year deadline for stockpile destruction can be extended for an additional 
four years and further extensions of four years may also be granted in exceptional 
circumstances.20 
Contrary to the general expectations in the early life of the Convention, most 
States Parties with obligations under this Article have succeeded in destroying the 
stocks well ahead of the stipulated deadline. Progress shown to date furthermore 
strengthens the outlook for all States parties to complete destruction well within 
the initial eight-year deadline provided for by the CCM. At the end of 2015, only 
11 out of 37 States Parties still had an obligation under this Article.
OBLIGATIONS TO CLEAR AND DESTROY CLUSTER MUNITION 
REMNANTS
Each State must also clear territory under its jurisdiction or control of cluster 
munition remnants within 10 years of becoming party to the convention.21 Cluster 
munition remnants are defined to include the following:
• Failed cluster munitions (where cluster munitions are dropped or fired but a 
dispenser fails to disperse the submunitions as intended)22
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• Abandoned cluster munitions (where unused cluster munitions have been 
left behind or dumped, and are no longer under the control of the party that 
left them behind or dumped them)23 
• Unexploded submunitions (where submunitions have landed, but have 
failed to explode as intended),24 and
• Unexploded bomblets (where explosive bomblets have been dropped from 
a fixed-wing dispenser but have failed to explode as intended).25
If, after becoming a State Party, cluster munitions are used in areas under its 
jurisdiction or control and become cluster munition remnants, the State Party is 
given up to ten years after the end of active hostilities to complete clearance and 
destruction operations.26 Where a State that later becomes party to the convention 
had previously used cluster munitions against another State Party, the State that 
used the cluster munitions is ‘strongly encouraged’ to provide assistance for the 
marking, clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants, including, 
where available, information on types and quantities of the cluster munitions used, 
precise locations of cluster munition strikes, and areas in which cluster munition 
remnants are known to be located.27 
In fulfilling its Article 4 clearance and destruction obligations, an affected State 
Party is obliged to do the following as soon as possible:
• Survey, assess and record the threat, making every effort to identify all 
contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control
• Assess and prioritise needs for marking, protection of civilians, clearance 
and destruction
• Take ‘all feasible steps’ to perimeter-mark, monitor and fence hazardous 
areas (see Chapter 6)
• Conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among civilians 
living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks and 
ways to minimise them (see also Chapter 6)
• Take steps to mobilise resources, and
• Develop a national plan, building, where appropriate, upon existing 
structures, experiences, and methodologies.28
In doing so, each State Party must take into account international standards, 
including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).29
Upon completion of its Article 4 clearance and destruction obligations, a State 
Party is required to make a declaration of compliance to the next Meeting of States 
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Parties.30 If, however, a State is unable to meet its 10-year deadline for clearance 
and destruction of cluster munitions remnants, it may request extensions from a 
Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for additional periods of up to 
five years at a time.31 
Since the adoption of the CCM in 2008, by the First Review Conference in 
September 2015, a total of 9 States Parties had completed cluster munition 
remnants clearance. The first deadlines will come up on 1 August 2020 
for 4 States Parties and they are expected to be in compliance by that time. At the 
time of this publication, 11 State Parties still have an obligation under this Article. 
Furthermore, 3 signatory states, 13 States not Party and 3 other areas or territories 
were believed or suspected to be contaminated by cluster munition remnants.
OBLIGATIONS TO ASSIST VICTIMS AND SURVIVORS
The Convention has the most far-reaching provisions on assistance for victims ever 
included in a disarmament or humanitarian law treaty.32 Each State Party that has 
cluster munition victims on its territory or under its control must provide for their 
medical care and physical rehabilitation, psychological support, and social and 
economic inclusion.33 In addition, the State must assess domestic needs in these 
areas and develop plans and mobilise resources to meet them.34 The definition 
of victims under the convention is extremely broad (see Box 1), covering not 
only those who are killed or injured by cluster munitions, but also families and 
communities that have suffered socio-economic and other consequences.
According to Article 2, paragraph 1:
‘Cluster munition victims’ means all persons who have been killed or suffered 
physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or 
substantial impairment of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of 
cluster munitions. They include those persons directly impacted by cluster 
munitions as well as their affected families and communities.
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE
Article 6 of the Convention contains detailed provisions related to international 
cooperation and assistance. This article outlines that each State Party, ‘in fulfilling 
its obligations under this Convention’, has certain rights, including ‘the right to 
BOX 1 THE DEFINITION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS VICTIMS  
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seek and receive assistance’35 and ‘the right to participate in the fullest possible 
exchange of equipment, material and scientific and technological information 
concerning the implementation of this Convention’.
Article 6 also indicates that each State Party has certain responsibilities – when 
‘in a position to do so’ – to provide assistance for victim assistance, risk reduction 
education, the clearance of cluster munitions remnants, and the destruction 
of stockpiled cluster munitions.36 In addition, each State Party accepts the 
responsibility not to ‘impose undue restrictions on the provision and receipt of 
clearance and other such equipment and related technological information for 
humanitarian purposes’.37 Assistance can be provided bilaterally, through regional 
organisations, or internationally, particularly through the UN. The UN, for example, 
already supports mine action programmes in more than 40 countries. Assistance 
can also be given through the ICRC, national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies 
and their International Federation, as well as NGOs.38 
ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE CONVENTION
The Convention on Cluster Munitions entered into force on 1 August 2010 after 
the 30 States ratified it. Since then the number of States that have joined the CCM 
stands at 119; 100 States Parties and 19 Signatories as at 19 April 2016. Each State 
Party is obliged to encourage States not party to adhere to the convention, ‘with 
the goal of attracting the adherence of all States’.39 
To further universalise the CCM and its implementation, on 20 October 
2015, during the 70th United Nations General Assembly, the President of the 
Convention, Croatia, submitted to the 1st Committee of the 70th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly the first ever resolution on the ‘Implementation 
of the Convention on Cluster Munitions’. The Resolution was co-sponsored 
by 29 States. When the Resolution was put to the General Assembly vote, 
the States voted; 139 in favour, 40 abstained and only 2 States voted against 
the resolution. 
During the First Review Conference, the Dubrovnik Action Plan (DAP) was adopted 
to cover the following five year period up the Second Review Conference in 2020. 
The DAP built on the earlier Vientiane Action Plan and is intended to move forward 
the desire expressed by States Parties to ensure the effective implementation 
of the provisions of the CCM from the First to the Second Review Conference 
of the Convention. The DAP includes specific operationalising actions, targets 
and completion time frames over this five-year period, with defined roles and 
responsibilities for States Parties.
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IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION
The implementation mechanisms of the Convention on Cluster Munitions are 
similar to those laid down under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. As 
noted by the ICRC, the adoption of domestic legislation and administrative 
regulations may be required.40 This obligation includes the need to impose penal 
sanctions to prevent and suppress violations by persons, or on territory, under 
the State’s jurisdiction or control.41 To this end, specific domestic legislation may 
have to be adopted and the regulations governing the armed forces amended.
In the interests of transparency, States are required to report annually to the 
UN Secretary-General on a range of matters, such as the types and numbers of 
cluster munitions destroyed, the extent and the location of areas contaminated 
by cluster munitions, the status of clearance programmes, the measures taken 
to provide risk education and warnings to civilians, the status of programmes for 
providing assistance to victims and the measures taken domestically to prevent 
and suppress violations of the convention.42 Reporting on these matters also 
provides an overview on the status of implementation.43 
Meetings of States Parties are held annually to review the effectiveness of the 
convention. 
In accordance with Article 12 paragraph 2(b), the First Review Conference of the 
Convention on Cluster Munitions decided to review the machinery, the objectives 
and the periodicity of Meetings of States Parties, the Meeting decided that the 
intersessional meetings would no longer be held while the meetings of State 
parties would continue to be at which ‘States Parties shall meet regularly and 
annually in order to consider, and, where necessary, take decision in respect of any 
matter with regard to the application or implementation of this Convention; where 
States Parties with obligations under the Convention report on their progress 
and challenges in their implementation of these;’ The Meeting further decided in 
favour of a change in the presidential period effectively placing it in advance of 
the Meetings of States Parties allowing for a more constructive lead time up to 
and inclusive of a meeting of States Parties under the chairmanship of the same 
President. A presidential period would thereby start at the end at the last day of a 
Meeting of States Parties and run through to the last day of the following Meeting 
of States Parties.
Beyond the meetings and in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 1, the 
States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other regarding the 
implementation of the provisions of the convention and to work together in a spirit 
of cooperation to facilitate compliance with their obligations. Should concerns 
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The Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) addresses 
post-conflict clearance of all explosive remnants of war (ERW), including 
abandoned cluster munitions and unexploded submunitions, through its 
Protocol V. The protocol also has limited provisions on preventive measures 
to minimise the amount of ordnance that becomes ERW. However, several 
discussions were held between 2009 and 2011, none of which yielded  
a possible protocol specifically addressing cluster munitions.
PROTOCOL V ON EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
In December 2001, the Second Review Conference of the 1980 CCW sought to 
address growing international concern about the threat to civilians from cluster 
munitions and other ERW. It agreed on a mandate for an open-ended Group of 
Governmental Experts to discuss ways to address the issue of ERW, including 
technical improvements and other measures for relevant types of munitions, 
including submunitions, which could reduce the risk of such munitions becoming 
ERW. The Group was also tasked with examining the adequacy of existing 
international humanitarian law in minimising post-conflict risks of ERW, both to 
civilians and to the military.1 
As a result, Protocol V on ERW was adopted in November 2003 after a year 
of formal negotiations and entered into force on 12 November 2006 following 
adherence to it by 20 States Parties to the CCW. As of 31 December 2015, a total 
of 87 States had consented to be bound by the Protocol.
In accordance with Article 10, paragraph 1 of the Protocol, 22 States Parties to 
the Protocol asked the UN Secretary-General in November 2006 to convene a 
first Conference of States Parties to the Protocol to discuss its operation. The First 
Protocol V Conference was held on 5 November 2007. It decided to establish a 
mechanism for cooperation and assistance, consisting of annual informal meetings 
of experts reporting to the Conferences of States Parties to the CCW.2 The GICHD 
has published a book on the implementation of the Protocol as a resource for 
States Parties and other interested actors.3
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CCW Protocol V on ERW addresses cluster munitions in three ways:
• during the design and manufacturing phase
• as abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) linked to an armed conflict, and
• as unexploded ordnance (UXO) linked to an armed conflict.
Minimising the occurrence of ERW
Under Article 9 of Protocol V, and ‘bearing in mind the different situations and 
capacities’, each State Party is ‘encouraged to take generic preventive measures 
aimed at minimising the occurrence of explosive remnants of war’, which include 
cluster munitions. The non-binding Technical Annex to the protocol suggests ways 
in which this can be achieved.
States producing or procuring explosive ordnance should seek the greatest 
reliability of munitions through certified quality control measures and inter- 
nationally recognised quality assurance standards. Periodically, a sample of 
stockpiled explosive ordnance should undergo live-fire testing to ensure that 
munitions function correctly. Testing under controlled or ideal conditions usually 
produces different results to combat. A State should examine ways of maximising 
the reliability of explosive ordnance that it intends to produce or procure.
Risk of explosions in stockpiles should be minimised by the use of appropriate 
ammunition management. In managing stockpiles, States should store unused 
cluster munitions in secure facilities or appropriate containers that protect the 
explosive ordnance and its components in a controlled atmosphere. States should 
apply appropriate explosive ordnance logging, tracking and testing procedures. 
This should include information on:
• the date of manufacture of each number, lot or batch of explosive ordnance
• the conditions it has been stored under, and
• the environmental factors to which it has been exposed.
Finally, the Annex notes that proper training of all personnel involved in the 
handling, transportation and use of explosive ordnance is an important factor 
in ensuring its reliable operation. States should therefore adopt and maintain 
suitable training programmes to ensure that personnel are properly trained for the 
munitions with which they work.
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Clearing ERW
Under Article 3 of Protocol V, States Parties, as well as parties to an armed conflict 
within the territory of a State Party, have obligations to address the threat posed 
by abandoned cluster munitions or unexploded submunitions on territory under 
their control after the cessation of active hostilities and ‘as soon as feasible‘. There 
are four obligations, to:
• survey and assess the threat posed by explosive remnants of war
• identify priorities for marking and clearance
• mark and clear, remove or destroy ERW, and
• take steps to mobilise the necessary resources.
Similarly, any State Party that has used cluster munitions on territory controlled 
by another State Party is required to provide, ‘where feasible’, technical, financial, 
material or human resources to facilitate the marking and clearance, removal or 
destruction of abandoned cluster munitions or unexploded submunitions. This 
assistance can be provided bilaterally or through a mutually agreed third party, 
such as the UN or other ‘relevant organisations‘.
According to Article 5, States Parties and parties to an armed conflict must take 
‘all feasible precautions‘ in territory under their control that is affected by ERW 
to protect civilians and civilian objects from the threat. These precautions may 
include warnings, risk education for the civilian population, marking, fencing and 
monitoring of territory affected by ERW, as set out in the Technical Annex.
Data recording requirements
Under Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Protocol, States Parties and parties to an armed 
conflict are required ‘to the maximum extent possible and as far as practicable 
record and retain information on the use of explosive ordnance or abandonment 
of explosive ordnance, to facilitate the rapid marking and clearance, removal or 
destruction of ERW, risk education and the provision of relevant information to the 
party in control of the territory and to civilian populations in that territory.‘
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The non-binding Technical Annex sets out in more detail some of the data that 
should be recorded in order to facilitate future clearance efforts. With respect to 
unexploded submunitions, a State should record the following:
• the location of areas targeted
• the approximate number of cluster munitions used in those areas
• the type and nature of cluster munitions used in areas, including technical 
information relevant to clearance, and
• the general location of known and probable unexploded submunitions.4 
Where a State has been obliged to abandon cluster munitions in the course of 
operations it should endeavour to leave the weapons safe and secure, and record 
information on their location, giving the approximate number and the types 
abandoned at each specific site.
NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN THE CCW ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS
In November 2006, at the Third Review Conference of the CCW, States Parties 
decided to convene in June 2007, ‘as a matter of urgency‘, an inter-sessional 
meeting of governmental experts to consider further the application and 
implementation of existing international humanitarian law to specific munitions 
that may cause explosive remnants of war, with a ‘particular focus on cluster 
munitions.‘
As a result of this meeting the governmental experts decided to recommend 
to the 2007 Meeting of States Parties to the CCW to determine how best to 
address the humanitarian impact of cluster munitions, ‘including the possibility of 
a new instrument.‘ The meeting of States Parties was held in Geneva in November 
2007. It decided to establish a Group of Governmental Experts that would meet 
to consider the issue further.
In 2008, the Group of Governmental Experts met five times (in January, April, 
July, September, and November) but did not achieve consensus on how to 
proceed. The 2008 Meeting of States Parties to the CCW decided that the Group 
of Governmental Experts would meet for up to two weeks in 2009, from 16 to 
20 February and then, if required, from 14 to 17 April. The Group, which was to be 
supported by military and technical experts, was expected to make every effort to 
conclude its negotiations as rapidly as possible and to report to the 2009 Meeting 
of States Parties to the CCW.5
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On 20 February 2009, just prior to the close of the meeting, the chair of the Group 
of Governmental Experts, Ambassador Gustavo Ainchil of Argentina, proposed a 
draft text on cluster munitions to the States Parties. At the April session, further 
progress was made towards a draft protocol, although it fell far short of the 
aspirations of States supporting the Convention on Cluster Munitions, with a 
prolonged transition period for the prohibition of any existing weapons. Certain 
major users of cluster munitions, such as Israel, the Russian Federation, and the 
USA, claimed that the current text represented a good basis for negotiation, and 
suggested that it would affect more than 85 per cent of existing global stockpiles 
of cluster munitions. At the opening of the April session, the Czech Republic, on 
behalf of the European Union, stated that:
‘As several High Contracting Parties are not yet in a position to join the CCM 
(Convention on Cluster Munitions), the EU is convinced that concluding in the 
framework of CCW a complementary agreement, compatible with the CCM, 
would significantly contribute to addressing the humanitarian impact of cluster 
munitions.‘6 
The Fourth Review Conference of the CCW was held from 14 to 25 November 
2011. At the end of the two-week conference, delegations from over 100 nations 
had failed to reach agreement on a controversial and weak proposal that would 
have legitimised the continued use of cluster munitions and undermined the 2008 
Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). States Parties also did not adopt a further 
mandate to continue to work on cluster munitions. Currently the matter is not 
among the subjects to be considered during the Fifth CCW Review Conference 
scheduled for December 2016. 
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This chapter provides an overview of techniques for the destruction of cluster 
munition stockpiles. 
The International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) state that, in the context 
of mine action, the term ‘stockpile’ refers to a large accumulated stock 
of explosive ordnance.1 Stockpile destruction is defined as ‘the physical 
destructive procedure towards a continual reduction of the national stockpile‘.2 
A State or other entity holding stocks of ammunition may wish to destroy 
explosive ordnance as:
• part of a disarmament process
•  to implement a legal obligation
•  upon expiry of shelf life
•  for reasons of safety.3 
As described in Chapter 3, the Convention on Cluster Munitions requires that 
each State destroy all stockpiles of cluster munitions under its jurisdiction 
within eight years of becoming a party to the convention. The eight-year 
deadline for stockpile destruction can be extended for an additional four 
years and further extensions of four years may also be granted in exceptional 
circumstances.4 Article 6, paragraph 5 of the Convention requires that each 
State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the destruction 
of stockpiled cluster munitions.
The Cluster Munitions Monitor estimates that prior to the start of the global 
effort to ban cluster munitions, 91 countries stockpiled millions of cluster 
munitions containing more than 1 billion submunitions. Since the 2010 entry 
into force of the CCM, States Parties have destroyed 532,938 cluster munitions 
and 85 million submunitions, while a dozen States Parties have completed 
their stockpile destruction. In their 2015 report, the Monitor reported that 
64 nations have cluster munition stockpiles, including 17 States Parties and 
signatories to the convention. Of these 17 nations, 15 are in the process of 
destroying their stockpiles.5
Stockpile destruction contributes to confidence-building between States, as 
well as preventing future proliferation of illegitimate weapons and ammunition.
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CHALLENGES OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION
Cluster munition warheads are generally more complex than those of other 
conventional weapons. In addition to the payload of explosive submunitions, 
they usually incorporate a number of components within the fuzing and dispersal 
systems. These may include igniters, explosive charges and other hazards, such 
as compressed gas and springs.
Each submunition is a self-contained weapon, with an integral fuzing system 
and warhead that are capable of functioning independently once separated from 
the parent munition. Removal must be achieved without initiating the arming 
mechanism, and the complete destruction of every submunition must be ensured, 
together with that of the parent cluster munition.
Most countries acquired their cluster munitions decades ago and many continue to 
have inadequate record of their stocks. CM found within any one country can come 
from a variety of sources; purchased from one of several states and manufacturers 
over previous years, or left behind when allies withdrew or conflicts ended. 
Often, there are no technical manuals to explain the unique ammunition system’s 
characteristics and in some cases no information on ammunition. With little subject 
literature available, it is difficult to understand the significant differences pertaining 
to technical specifications of the cluster munitions and their submunitions on the 
one hand, and CCM Article 2 definitions on the other. This may cause uncertainty 
about which stockpiled ammunition must be reported on.
22 Navigation page, Cluster Munitions ID Tool
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Problems with identifying ammunition, and then establishing whether they 
are permitted or banned under the CCM, led the GICHD to develop the Cluster 
Munition Identification Tool (CMID). This web-based database system is available 
free of charge and offers a simple and intuitive guide to the recognition of cluster 
munitions. Accessible at cmid.gichd.org, the CMID allows for easy identification 
of cluster munitions and, upon identification, of whether or not they fall within the 
categories banned under the CCM.
The situation is further complicated by the fact that many cluster munition stockpiles 
have not been properly maintained. Much of the ammunition manufactured in, or 
before, the 1980s is already well beyond its intended shelf life. Storage depots have 
often fallen into disrepair, subjecting the ammunition to extremes of temperature. 
Protective packaging may have deteriorated or been removed, allowing the ingress 
of water and mechanical damage. In some cases munitions have been stockpiled 
outside, exposed to everything from plant growth to bush fires.
Transporting cluster munitions to disposal sites is also problematic. A variety 
of safety concerns must be addressed, particularly if the ammunition has to be 
moved through populated areas. For large quantities, this will involve a substantial 
logistic effort and therefore considerable expense. Permissions, legal issues and 
other administration necessary for international shipment may make transportation 
over land all but impossible. This is why the earlier that the ammunition is 
destroyed, the cheaper and safer it is.
23 These cluster bombs in Mozambique have been stored outside for many years, 
deteriorating as a result of exposure to high temperatures and rain 
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TECHNIQUES FOR STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION
Destruction of cluster munition stockpiles can be achieved through a variety 
of techniques. Physical destruction techniques available range from relatively 
simple ‘open detonation’, through manual disassembly of the munitions to highly 
sophisticated industrial processes. Opting for any particular technique will be 
based on factors such as:
• ammunition type
• safety
• cost
• available resources
• environmental considerations. 
As the IMAS note, destruction of munitions is a potentially hazardous task. 
Dangers are minimised if risk assessments are carried out and correct procedures 
are followed. If they are not, the possibility of a serious accident becomes 
very high.6
Open detonation
Open detonation techniques are probably among the cheapest means to destroy 
stockpiles of cluster munitions. Specialist demolition skills are required to ensure 
complete destruction and it is not always easy to find a suitable demolition area. 
This technique is not suitable for large-scale destruction of CM stocks, and might 
raise environmental concerns (see below – Environmental considerations). 
Unless very large quantities of high explosives are used, the detonation may 
not ensure destruction of all submunitions within a cluster munition. There is a 
considerable risk that live submunitions may be thrown out from the demolition; 
these can travel a considerable distance and become armed or unstable. This 
would produce a more dangerous situation, requiring additional EOD work, and 
putting more people at risk. After every demolition, the area must be carefully 
investigated to ensure that no live submunitions have been thrown out.
Closed detonation
A ‘closed’ detonation technique has been used in Norway, where munitions 
are destroyed in deep mine shafts. This method has successfully contained 
all known undesirable environmental effects, the depth and ground structure 
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ensuring that no contamination can enter the atmosphere or the water table. 
However, the process is slow and expensive compared to open detonation, with 
few such facilities available elsewhere in the world.
Closed incineration
Closed incineration usually involves feeding ammunition into a large armoured 
oven, which results in the explosive components burning away to leave inert 
metallic scrap. This technique is suitable for mass destruction of a wide variety of 
ammunition, although submunitions would have to be removed from their parent 
cluster munitions. In many cases, the submunition would then require further 
preparation, such as the removal of the fuze and shaped charge cone. For cluster 
munitions, therefore, closed incineration is often combined with disassembly (see 
below – Industrial Demilitarisation and Manual Disassembly) as part of a disposal 
process, rather than in isolation.
Closed incineration requires more technology and infrastructure than detonation, 
which is expensive. Some mobile plants are available but the installation is 
generally fixed, so that the cluster munitions must be transported to the facility. 
Incineration must comply with national environmental laws; those governing 
emissions are particularly relevant, since burning of explosive produces high 
concentrations of nitrogen oxide. 
Industrial demilitarisation
A number of countries operate sophisticated disassembly plants in which the 
majority of tasks are fully automated and undertaken by robotic machinery. This 
creates a highly efficient system in which few people are involved and safety 
levels are high. Such plants can operate 24 hours a day as long as the input 
and output streams can be managed. This stage of the demilitarisation cycle is 
environmentally friendly and the technology is readily available. 
The requirement for high capital investment is a disadvantage. Industrial 
demilitarisation involves purpose-built machines, which require testing and 
calibration. They must be housed in specially constructed facilities, with staff 
trained for their use and maintenance. A machine can only process one type of 
ammunition, which means that this process is only viable for large quantities of a 
particular type of ammunition (typically in the tens of thousands). The plants are 
fixed installations, so cluster munitions must be transported to the site. Industrial 
processing plants often only accept ammunition in good condition, which rules 
out many of the stockpiles present in developing countries.
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Manual disassembly
Manual disassembly involves people physically dismantling cluster munitions 
using simple hand tools or engineering jigs. This technique has the advantage of 
requiring limited capital investment and can be implemented virtually anywhere, 
eliminating international transportation problems. This option is ideal for relatively 
small stockpiles (up to low thousands), mixed types and munitions in poor 
condition. The majority of the manual labour is carried out by local staff using, 
wherever possible locally sourced tools. This benefits local economies and builds 
capacity that can be applied to disposal of other ammunition types.
Manual disassembly is normally a cost-effective disposal option, with the added 
potential of recycling materials and re-using components. Examples include 
the Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) SHADOW programme 7 and the Explosive 
Harvesting Project of the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation.8 In response to 
the increasing number of explosions at ammunition storage sites, the SHADOW 
programme emphasises national capacity building for stockpile management and 
destruction through low-tech and cost-effective techniques. 
The inherent hazards of disassembly are managed through the implementation of 
strict and thorough quality management procedures, but the dangers can never 
be eliminated. This is a labour-intensive process which results in relatively slow 
production rates; it is rarely a problem for the countries involved, but the process 
would not be suitable for very large stockpiles.
Dur ing convent ional  exp los ive 
harvesting, the munition is opened 
using remotely operated saws. The 
explosive is then melted out and 
re-cast into new charges. Golden West 
provides these recycled explosive 
charges to demining organisations, 
which use them for the demolition 
of landmines. For cluster munitions, 
shaped charges can be removed and 
re-used for more specialist demolition 
work.
24 Macedonian operators disassemble a 
Russian BKF cluster munition 
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A SHADOW programme enabled 
Moldova to become the first country 
to destroy its own stockpile of cluster 
munitions in July 2010.9 Similar pro -
grammes, run by NPA with technical 
oversight from Fenix Insight Ltd, have 
been implemented in Macedonia, 
Croatia, Serbia, Mozambique and Peru.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
There are no international standards specifically for the destruction of cluster 
munitions beyond what is set out in the CCM, Article 3. Thus, each State Party to 
the CCM undertakes to ensure that destruction methods comply with applicable 
international standards for protecting public health and the environment.10 Where 
the destruction requires cluster munitions to be transported or stored outside the 
area of jurisdiction, then relevant national laws and international regulations for 
transporting of dangerous goods apply.
United Nations International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG Edition 2, 
Feb 2015) Chapter 10.10 provides detailed information on demilitarisation and 
destruction of conventional ammunition. The guidance is voluntary for states 
to take advantage of as stand-alone instruction for stockpile management, 
or as a toolset to support national standards, including its provisions for e.g. 
transport of ammunition (Ch. 08.10), ammunition processing (Ch. 07.10) and 
operational (temporary) storing of ammunition (Ch. 06.10). IATG’s comprehensive 
technical guidance expands from demilitarisation and destruction techniques to 
related, pivotal aspects of stockpile reduction including e.g. pollution controls, 
environmental norms, disposal options, explosive limits, quality management, 
planning processes, and more. The CCM is mentioned on Page 3 of the 
IATG  10.10.11
Standard NATO agreements (called STANAGs) lay down general standards for 
management of conventional ammunition, while an OSCE Handbook of Best 
Practices on Conventional Ammunition (2008) provides general guidance on 
the destruction of conventional ammunition. In addition to these international 
25 A projectile is cut open to gain access  
to the explosive
Chapter 5 | 71
standards and guidance platforms, there are regional and national laws and 
regulations influencing the options for destruction of cluster munitions.
Environmental considerations
Concerns have been expressed regarding environmental consequences of 
destroying cluster munitions by open detonation methods, both by States holding 
stockpiles and also potential donors, which may fall foul of national or international 
environmental legislation and guidelines.12 In Europe, some countries have banned 
open detonation of munitions unless there is no alternative, which in turn can 
only be justified on the grounds of safety. With further reasons, such bans have 
encouraged the development of purpose-built demilitarisation facilities. 
Studies have shown that, under the right conditions, the environmental impact 
of small demolitions is negligible; indeed, this often appears to be the best option 
where the alternative would be a long journey or the construction of a special 
processing facility. However, there are many complex factors to consider and the 
argument surrounding the environmental effect of open detonation is still ongoing.
There are international standards for determining and measuring air pollution from 
industrial processes. These standards apply to any pollution control systems used 
during industrial demilitarisation but do not provide guidance on what overall 
emission limits should be.
Setting emission controls and limits remains the responsibility of the national 
authority and is stipulated by agreed domestic, regional and international 
thresholds for toxins, heavy metals and CO2. To fight global warming and reduce 
industrial pollution worldwide, the Paris Climate Agreement was signed by 
175 countries on 22 April 2016 at UN Plaza in New York City. It is the first legally 
binding, universal agreement adopted by 195 countries in December 2015.
Until the Paris Climate Agreement enters into force in 2020, the only applicable 
regional legislation that covers emissions into the atmosphere from the incineration 
of hazardous waste is the Directive 2000/76/EC of the European Parliament and 
the European Union Council on the Incineration of Waste, 4 December 2000 
(Emissions to Air). This provides a comprehensive standard and is in use by all 
European Union countries and those countries with associate status. It does not 
prohibit open detonation.13 
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This chapter considers the survey of cluster munition strikes. It covers recent 
key developments in the field of survey that have improved measurement of 
contamination and efficiency of subsequent clearance. 
NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE SURVEY
Effective survey is essential for the efficient clearance of cluster munition 
contamination. In the past, clearance has sometimes been conducted where 
there is little or insufficient evidence of cluster munitions.
In some countries clearance teams found one submunition for every few thousand 
square metres searched. Sometimes land without any cluster munitions or 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) was cleared. The need to improve operational 
efficiency was clear.
Added impetus was provided by the development of land release principles 
starting in 2007 and by the practical need to define areas of contamination in 
compliance with the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). 
A core principle of finding credible evidence emerged as a prerequisite for 
clearance. An innovative study and review was conducted by the INGO Norwegian 
People’s Aid (NPA) in 2010. The study examined how land release principles could 
be applied to enable compliance with the CCM. The process enabled mapping 
of cluster munition remnants within defined Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHAs) 
through a rapid process of Technical Survey (TS). CHA perimeters were established 
based on evidence.
Although the concept had potential, the challenge was to apply it practically. 
The Lao PDR was selected as an operational environment to prove the theory. 
A TS technique known as Cluster Munition Remnants Survey (CMRS) was 
developed. This would become more widely known as Evidence-Based Survey 
(EBS). Although CMRS was developed for the South East Asia contamination 
environment the principles behind it can potentially be applied elsewhere and to 
more recent conflicts. 
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Lao PDR context 
Cluster munition (CM) contamination in South East Asia, from the conflicts 
of the 1960s and 1970s, is extensive. Bombing resulted in multiple strikes on 
overlapping targets over a number of years. With so much contamination, 
clearance organisations initially only cleared land that was prioritised for use, 
rather than full cluster munition strike ‘foot prints‘. In the early years of clearance 
this land use request approach was deemed reasonable but as time went on it 
became progressively inefficient. The term ‘request-based clearance‘ became 
accepted and misidentification of extremely large areas as contaminated led to 
a slower overall removal of explosive hazards from the ground. Technical survey 
would, in some instances, simply involve marking out turning points around areas 
designated for clearance. This was to re-assure the land owner or local community 
regardless of whether any evidence was present. 
Cluster munition contamination in the Lao PDR is relatively uniform. According to 
the United States Theatre History of Operations Reports (THOR) bombing data, 
81.45% of all cluster munitions dropped on Laos were spin-stabilised, such as 
the CBU-24 (containing 665 BLU-26 bomblets or submunitions).1 Such cluster 
munitions tended to form predictable oval patterns or footprints on the ground 
which could be potentially identified from a start point of one submunition located 
in its original strike position. 
Development of Evidence-Based Survey (EBS)
The solution to the issue of insufficient or inaccurate survey, alongside sometime 
inefficient clearance, was to develop a process that concentrated on the gathering 
of credible evidence. This involved a desktop analysis of historical bombing, 
survey and clearance data and fresh Non-Technical Survey (NTS) to assess 
information from local people in the first instance. This was followed by a more 
credible technical survey to ultimately ascertain if there was direct evidence of 
contamination. Preparation for survey included comprehensive analysis of previous 
data, accident reports, spot tasks, clearance reports and use of databases such 
as THOR. 
NTS was conducted within village boundaries as the unit of inquiry. The survey 
teams had where possible the necessary gender and ethnic balance with language 
skills to best gather evidence from local populations. Evidence points of cluster 
munitions were represented on a village map and became start points for technical 
survey. Local communities were given a full explanation of the entire survey and 
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clearance process at this point to ensure their involvement in the prioritisation and 
clearance of their own land. Good quality NTS was essential. However the key 
development was the new technical survey procedure, CMRS, developed by NPA. 
The CMRS process starts with the results of NTS, namely the recorded evidence 
points for both cluster munition remnants and other UXO in the area. All cluster 
munition evidence points identified in a given area (e.g. typically within the 
boundary of a village) became starting points for investigation by CMRS teams. 
Actual submunitions or other UXO found during NTS were immediately dealt with 
by Roving Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) teams. If a submunition was found 
in one location, teams would investigate the surrounding area to see if this was a 
single moved item or part of a wider strike footprint. Teams essentially followed 
the evidence until the full extent of a strike was known. It could be said that the 
aim of CMRS teams in the field is to find and report cluster munition Confirmed 
Hazardous Area (CHAs). Once the survey was complete, a CHA polygon was 
drawn around the area where contamination was confirmed and reported to the 
national authority. 
The key objective of CMRS is to find evidence of a cluster strike. This could be a 
submunition or fragmentation from a submunition. It involves rapidly surveying 
50 m x 50 m (2500 m²) boxed areas around the initial evidence start point. CMRS 
determines which boxes contain evidence of contamination. Five, and later four, 
searchers were assigned to each box. When searchers found a submunition or 
strong evidence such as a fuze, survey in that boxed area was terminated and 
the box was recorded as colour code red. Given the nature of cluster strikes in 
the Lao PDR, typically searchers would identify a red box within 5-10 minutes of 
commencing a search.
If searchers found fragments of cluster munitions (e.g. a fragmentation ball bearing 
from a BLU-26), the box was recorded in yellow. If no evidence was found within 
the box during the allotted time (typically around 30 minutes or when the section 
commander believed more than 50% of the box was covered; whichever was 
longer), the box was recorded as green. Inaccessible boxes were recorded in grey, 
and boxes that contained other UXO were recorded in blue. Boxes that contained 
both UXO and CM were also coloured red. 
The dimensions of the box could, if necessary, be marked out on the ground using 
a simple 25 m rope system fanning to four points of the compass from the centroid 
(centre point) of the box. A CMRS team of two sections would survey around 
10 – 14 boxes (25,000-35,000 m²) per day although this figure was dependent on 
ground conditions and terrain. Some strikes were far from the nearest road access 
and could require significant time to reach within a given working day.
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Detector sensitivity is dependent on soil conditions in a given area. NPA searchers 
used UXO detectors such as the Vallon VMXC1-3. Other organisations used 
Minelab F3 (red endcap) and the Ebinger PIDD for the same role. The searchers 
moved through each box in a controlled manner under the direction of the section 
commander. Tests showed five searchers could cover at least 59.8% of the 
box in 23.5 minutes in open land and 53.8% in heavily forested close terrain 
in 30 minutes.2 
By mid-2012, the CMRS method was fully operational. It would become known 
at a national level as Evidence-Based Survey (EBS). By 2014 a number of other 
operators, including HALO Trust and UXO Lao, were also conducting a form of 
CMRS. Partnerships developed in which where NPA would conduct technical 
survey producing Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHAs) whilst MAG or UXO Lao 
would conduct the subsequent clearance. 
Approaches varied between operators. NPA was keen to survey as much of 
the contamination as possible in order to create a national baseline. HALO took 
advantage of operating on a smaller scale by conducting all stages of the land 
release process within a village unit sequentially. This maximised interaction with 
local communities and increased chances of finding as much contamination as 
possible, not just through EBS but also during ongoing clearance. There were 
reasonable arguments for both approaches.
Information Management (IM) Aspects of CMRS
Evidence-Based Survey required the capture and reporting of huge quantities 
of data, arguably more than previous technical survey within mine action. 
Proficient IM was essential for the success of this new process.3
The initial stage involved creating a grid system covering a digital map of the 
country in 1 km x 1 km sized grid boxes. This was exactly overlaid on top 
of the UTM grid system and was normally made using the Fishnet tool in ARCGIS, 
although Google Earth was also a viable alternative. 
The 1 km grid squares were identified by a unique Military Grid Reference System 
(MGRS) number, e.g. 48Q_AA_12_34. The fishnet tool was also used to create 
400 x 50 m x 50 m boxes within each 1 km² box. A shapefile of a centroid for each 
50 m x 50 m box was created using Xtools. 
The UTM grid references of these centroids are the start points for TS of each box, 
which has a unique identifier. The centroids were easily sent to field teams by use 
78 | Chapter 6
of DNR Garmin. Conversion to GPX files was required for use in GPS, and to KML 
files for representation in Google Earth. Where they were available, good quality 
geometrically corrected ortho-maps were used instead. Imagery from Unmanned 
Ariel Vehicles (UAVs) is likely to be increasingly used in the future.
At the end of each work day teams reported search results within the labelled 
boxes. Some organisations had report forms loaded onto tablets; others 
reported results for each box searched that day by phone. As time passed more 
organisations invested in the training and equipment required for digital reporting. 
The benefits of quicker access to data, alongside the reduced possibility of 
transcribing errors, were quickly evident.
Use of IM tools was a fundamental component of successful TS of cluster 
munitions. Advances made could not have happened without integrating proficient 
IM into operations. Development of Evidence-Based Survey by NPA stands as a 
notable example of benefits that can be realised when IM and Operations work 
closely together. While much of the IM design behind operational procedures 
could seem complex for lay people, the procedures they supported were at all 
times practicable. Use of Infopath forms and SharePoint reduced input errors and 
allowed real time access to data reported from the field anywhere in the world. 
Similar means of reporting across mine action have since become increasingly 
common.
Significance of Evidence-Based Survey
Development of EBS was essentially the first real application of technical survey 
for cluster strikes. Previously the possible extent of strike footprints might remain 
unknown until the end of the clearance phase. Now, to a significant degree, such 
a picture comes a phase earlier; at the end of technical survey. 
Clearance for cluster munitions is typically manual, and costly. Scarce clearance 
assets should be assigned to land confirmed as contaminated. While the clearance 
process remains part of a continuous investigation of evidence, clearance itself can 
now be more effectively planned and targeted with the implementation of EBS. 
Kontayoun village case study
The following case study of a site near Kontayoun village, Thateng District, Sekong, 
Lao PDR shows the EBS process from start to finish. 
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NTS by NPA identified cluster munition evidence points in an area of jungle, mixed 
with some cultivated fields. The site was required to develop a coffee plantation 
in accordance with the regional economic development plan.
NPA conducted CMRS which resulted in a CHA of 159,891 m² being drawn. NPA 
found 91 items during CMRS alone (3 x 60 mm mortar, 1 x 40 mm grenade, 
3 x BLU-3b, and 84 x BLU-26).
26 Plan view of task site near Kontayoun village. Terrain was a mix of cultivated fields  
and jungle
27 Plan view of CRMS results. Items found in red boxes are shown by the small white labels
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Subsequent clearance identified at least five clear strikes in areas of jungle 
or bands of jungle adjoining the cultivated land. There were another two or 
three probable strike footprints on the eastern side of the CHA. Cultivation 
had probably altered the footprint patterns since the conflict over forty years 
earlier. 
BLU-3bs, which can be found in patterns that are potentially more difficult to 
detect by TS, were also present in small numbers at this site. Clearance enlarged 
the polygon by 62.3% to 259,533 m². A further 775 items were found (760 x 
BLU-26, 8 x BLU-3b, 2 x M67 hand grenades, and 5 x 40 mm rifle grenades). 
The total number of submunitions for the final clearance polygon (including CMRS 
items found) was 844 x BLU-26 and 11 x BLU-3bs. 
In a basic measure of efficiency, while discounting non-cluster munition ERW, NPA 
found one cluster munition for every 303 m² cleared. This compared favorably with 
cluster munition clearance across the world at the time. 
This case study also illustrates the subsequent discussion of how EBS should 
develop. Of the 259,533 m² ultimately cleared, many of the submunitions were 
found in a much smaller area. For example the two distinct footprints in the south 
west of the CHA had a combined surface area of 15,649 m². 
28 Plan view of Clearance results
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During CMRS and clearance, 312 cluster munitions were found in these two 
distinct footprints, i.e. one item for every 50.16 m² ultimately cleared. These results 
supported a case for drawing CHAs relatively tightly. 
Green boxes would not be included in CHAs unless absolutely necessary (normally 
if surrounded by red or yellow boxes). Indeed, at the time, some operators would 
not include yellow boxes within a CHA unless there was a compelling reason. 
Subsequent clearance would always be conducted a standard 50 m from the last 
cluster munition found in any case, so tight drawing of CHAs would be unlikely 
to risk strikes being missed. 
29 Plan view of two strike footprints on the south western side of the CHA
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Indeed, given that tight CHA drawing led to an even better focus of resources on 
areas of real contamination, ultimate clearance of explosive hazards speeded up 
and the overall risk was arguably reduced. In 2011, when NPA started large scale 
CMRS in Laos, the average CHA size was 64,383 m². By mid-2015 that size had 
been reduced to 35,562 m². 
Subsequently it was argued by some that CHA should not be drawn so tightly. 
A view emerged that CHAs produced by EBS should reflect the likely amount of 
clearance required and if drawn tightly would potentially underestimate the figure. 
A decision was taken by a number of operators in Laos in 2015 to include a fade 
out of 50 m at the survey stage. This enlarged CHA sizes but possibly gave a 
clearer indication of the amount of clearance that would be ultimately required in 
an area. By the end of 2015 NPA’s average CHA size was 57,988 m² which reflected 
this new approach. CHAs in countries such as Cambodia and Vietnam have 
traditionally been larger from the start of EBS, reflecting different interpretations and 
applications of EBS, according to circumstances in each country. Changes in Laos 
standardised, in some respects, an approach to CHA drawing in South East Asia.
It should be noted that, regardless of the average size, some CHAs can be 
remarkably large. EBS has shown that areas that saw concentrated bombing 
over a prolonged period, which are typically logistics hubs or key road junctions 
or river crossings, can create CHAs of km². 
30 Tightly drawn CHA around a BLU-3b CHA.  
Note the yellow boxes are not always included within the CHA
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The image below shows a 4,185,769 m² CHA found by NPA near the village of 
Phouhom, in Attapeu Province, Lao PDR between May and December 2015. 
From the EBS alone 881 explosive devices were found within this CHA, 875 of 
which were submunitions. More will no doubt be found when the site is eventually 
cleared.
All reasonable effort and liability
The technical survey techniques developed in South East Asia are not infallible. 
Items can be missed, just as items have unfortunately been missed during 
clearance. The prime consideration is the finite resources available to remove 
cluster munitions. With so many submunitions to be removed, the key question 
is how best to apply these resources. 
Before EBS was developed, the extent of contamination in a number of countries 
was not accurately known and resources were not always effectively targeted. On 
balance, it is perhaps better to target resources more effectively while accepting 
a small risk that technical survey procedures might miss items or might only 
be targeted in areas with a sufficient evidence threshold. In many ways EBS 
will only ever be as good as the Desktop Analysis and NTS that precedes it. 
It is important these stages are conducted by well trained and managed teams. 
31 Example of a large CHA found near Phouhom, Attapeu Province, Lao PDR in 2015
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This minimises the possibility of missing evidence. Quality Management of all 
stages of the Land Release process should be rigorous, and not limited to technical 
survey and clearance. 
It should be noted that a number of checks are integral to EBS. Evidence so far 
suggests that the average size of the most common cluster munitions footprint in 
South East Asia, the CBU-24, is approximately 11,000 m². In an average footprint, 
the survey team would have to miss items in over four boxes to fail to find a strike. 
This would be an unlikely scenario. Most footprints overlap so in reality teams 
would need to miss evidence in more than four boxes. In any case survey teams 
typically report finding contamination within five or ten minutes of searching. 
Some have come to accept that good quality EBS can constitute ‘all reasonable 
effort‘.4
Debates continue over the extent of survey required. Some operators advocate 
more extensive survey to provide greater reassurance. Others contend that there 
is an option of NTS or EBS teams returning if new evidence of strike footprints is 
found after technical survey or clearance. The debate over what constitutes all 
reasonable effort at each stage of the land release process in a given country is 
likely to continue. 
Quality Management (QM) of Evidence-Based Survey must of course remain 
strong and accident rates in surveyed and cleared areas should be closely 
monitored. However, there are currently no indications that EBS will lead to 
an increase in risk from explosive hazards to local populations. Arguably it will 
reduce risk considerably, due to faster removal of more explosive hazards. Not 
all explosive hazards will be removed, and inevitably some will remain as residual 
contamination. Every country that has experienced significant conflict has been 
confronted with a degree of residual contamination. Many have shown that it is 
possible to successfully manage the risk that residual contamination poses. In the 
short term, the priority will remain the timely survey and clearance of as many 
items as possible. EBS is a significant part of this process. 
Future Developments
Techniques pioneered in the Lao PDR, and replicated in Vietnam and Cambodia, 
are, in some ways, specific to those operating environments. The fundamentals of 
the process can, however, serve as a framework for the conduct of future surveys 
of cluster strikes in other countries. The key principle of combining practical IM 
with practical procedures in the field remains. 
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The challenge will be adapting these methods to operating environments where 
the hazard from cluster munitions and the respective national safety rules (as 
detailed in National Mine Action Standards) are different from one country to 
another.
In some countries with similar contamination, such as Lebanon, it is not permitted 
to enter a cluster munition strike footprint. However, in South East Asia it is 
permitted. In Lao PDR, operators typically have four searchers and possibly a 
section commander within a 50 m x 50 m box. In other countries this would break 
safety distance rules. In Lao PDR personal protective equipment (PPE) is not worn 
by all operators; in other countries it is mandatory. 
Perceptions of risk and reasonable effort differ from country to country. EBS might 
not be applicable to certain types of cluster munition contamination. For example, 
even in Lao PDR some argue it is not best suited to identifying strikes from larger 
submunitions, such as BLU-45s and BLU-49s. Others see the technique as more 
effective against spin-stabilised cluster munitions rather than cluster munitions 
dispensed directly from an aircraft, such as the CBU-14 and CBU-25.
Challenges involved in adapting EBS to other countries are clear but are not 
insurmountable. Fewer searchers with full, appropriate PPE can be used in a box 
and, if necessary, single searchers can search many boxes concurrently when 
section commanders and team leaders are adequately trained to coordinate this. 
Even if teams search a series of boxes more slowly than in SE Asia, due to different 
safety procedures, the process will still offer an improvement in TS and is likely to 
speed up land release as a whole. There is potential for dogs to be used for EBS. 
NPA Cambodia and HALO Trust in the Lao PDR have had notable success with 
multi-skilled teams which can undertake NTS, TS (CMRS), Battle Area Clearance 
(BAC) and basic Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD). It is possible this concept 
could be replicated elsewhere. 
Inevitably different operators, and even programmes within the same organisation, 
will adapt EBS in accordance to their own circumstances. This is a strength of EBS 
because such diversity allows further constant improvement through varied trial 
and error on the ground. EBS will necessarily evolve as a method. The challenge 
will be maintaining quality, sufficient standardisation and relevance to varied 
operating environments concurrently.
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CONCLUSION
The development of EBS in Lao PDR was very significant. It played an essential 
role in making clearance more efficient and in enabling long term planning and 
prioritisation. The NPA approach was soon accepted and adopted by the clearance 
operators, firstly in Lao PDR and then in Vietnam and Cambodia. 
The challenge is now to adapt key elements of the process (notably the system 
of grid boxes and the IM that supports this) to other contaminated countries. 
CMRS was particularly effective when surveying spin-stabilised cluster munition 
strikes such as those from CBU-24s. It has a probable application for other types 
of cluster strike as well, and it is hoped it can be successfully adapted and applied 
in the future. 
ENDNOTES
1 http://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/19.2/r-d/evans.shtml
2 NPA Laos Field Tests, April 2014. GPS tracking shows that all five searchers covered 1245m  
in open ground. The degree of coverage depended on the width of arc that an average 
searcher would achieve with a Valon VMX C3. If 1.2m is taken as a minimum 1492 m2  
were covered. Many searchers covered 2m+ arc with their detectors so 1492 is likely to be  
an underestimation of the ground covered.
3 ‘Surrounding the entire land release process should be an effective information management 
system that ensures that data is collected accurately and consistently, is reported in 
compliance with formats and schedules, is entered into databases correctly, and is analysed 
to provide reliable support to decision makers, quality monitors and other interested parties.‘ 
IMAS 07.11 First Edition (Amendment 2, March 2013). Land Release. Introduction p.1
4 IMAS 07.11 First Edition (Amendment 2, March 2013).
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This chapter considers the safe clearance and disposal of cluster munitions 
in accordance with the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS),1 taking 
into account the lessons learned in recent conflicts in which cluster munitions 
were used.2 The clearance and disposal of certain cluster munitions is required 
by both the Convention on Cluster Munitions (see Chapter 3) and Protocol V 
to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (see Chapter 4). 
Mine action organisations generally refer to clearance of explosive ordnance other 
than landmines i.e. explosive remnants of war (ERW) as battle area clearance 
(BAC), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), weapon and ammunition destruction 
(WAD), or conventional munition disposal (CMD).3
This chapter concentrates on BAC where submunitions are the main hazard rather 
than other ERW, although it is recognised that other munitions are likely to be 
found during the clearance process.
Aims of post-conflict submunition clearance include:
• prevention of further casualties
• restoration of land, buildings and infrastructure to productive use
• opening of routes to permit freedom of movement, and
• creation of confidence within the local population.
The clearance of cluster munitions is a challenging and potentially dangerous 
explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) task. It is, however, fundamental to post-
conflict remediation. In many cases, displaced people are unable or reluctant to 
return to their homes, their land or their workplaces. Unlike minefields, which are 
normally clearly delineated in open ground, cluster munition strikes may extend 
across rural and built-up areas, with little or no obvious sign of their presence. 
The sensitivity of many fuzing systems means that disposal in situ is the only safe 
option. However, in the absence of specialist EOD resources, untrained people – 
sometimes children – have attempted to clear areas by collecting submunitions for 
destruction elsewhere, often with devastating consequences. It is therefore vital 
that clearance tasks are prioritised, planned and executed by well-trained teams 
as a matter of urgency.
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CLEARANCE METHODOLOGY 
Generally speaking, clearance methodology is a function of ongoing risk 
assessments made at both national planning and tasking level and on the ground 
by field operators. IMAS defines BAC as ‘the systematic and controlled clearance of 
hazardous areas where the hazards are known not to include mines‘, and clearance 
as ‘tasks or actions to ensure the removal and/or the destruction of all mine and 
ERW hazards from a specified area to a specified depth‘ (IMAS 04.10 – 2005) 
A submunition clearance task will normally be either a visual search of the surface 
of the suspected area, or a visual search and an instrument-assisted search below 
the surface to a specified depth. 
The choice of method may be influenced by the following factors: 
• casualty rate
• conflict history: access to official records of the number and type of cluster 
munition strikes
• contamination profile: submunition type(s) and other ERW
• clearance history: access and quality of records and reports of past activities
• intended land use: urban, rural (grazing) or rural (agricultural)
• type of terrain: e.g. access to the area, vegetation density, road proximity
• impact of CM on the communities within the SHA and in the surrounding 
area
• weather at the time of the cluster strike and planned clearance activity
• season; e.g. the extent of vegetation, crop cycles, ground condition,  
access, rain 
• available resources
Visual/surface search 
This method has been used on several occasions after conflict as a quick and 
effective means to reduce the immediate hazard in an area. In many emergency 
response scenarios this methodology is employed in order to maximise the 
impact of scarce EOD resources, although its effectiveness is hazard and terrain-
dependent. For example, it may be particularly appropriate in urban areas or on 
rocky hard ground where unexploded submunitions are lying on or above the 
surface. Visual search will normally include the search of ground and vegetation 
or structures above it, since submunitions frequently end up in trees, fencing 
and buildings. 
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Visual/surface search is often conducted during the emergency phase of a post-
conflict clearance operation. The advantages are that it can be implemented 
quickly, with limited resources, and can rapidly lower the casualty rate. If all cluster 
munition remnants were indeed visible on, and above the surface in a given area, 
then after their disposal the area is no longer contaminated. This enables local 
populations to resume activities there.
The disadvantages of the visual search method lie in occasional misperceptions 
among local communities and authorities that at the end of the search, the area 
would have been cleared to a specified depth, as this is not the case. In addition, 
if a conducted visual search results in no evidence of CM in a given area, the 
tasking authority may delete the area from the clearance plan, or lower its priority. 
Sometimes the information is just not good enough and areas that were deemed 
safe were in fact contaminated under the surface. 
In recent operations, many surface search tasks have left hazardous areas – in some 
cases for many years – with inadequate or ambiguous official records and no local 
markings. Where rapid surface search is conducted, it is therefore crucial that: 
• the extent and limitations of the search are recorded
• the local population are aware of residual hazards, and
• follow-on (sub-surface) operations are planned as soon as possible. 
In all instances where visual searches have been conducted, it is essential that 
accurate recording and reporting of the task is conducted for follow-up tasking if 
32 Small submunitions, such as DPICM, often end up on the surface and can be 
located visually 
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necessary. Each item found should be properly recorded using maps and a GPS 
in order to be able to establish the footprint of the strike, and to account for all 
submunitions.
Instrument/sub-surface clearance 
Sub-surface clearance is slower than a visual surface search, but provides a more 
comprehensive solution. The decision whether or not to conduct sub-surface 
clearance is dependent on an objective assessment of the likelihood of unexploded 
submunitions below the surface. If, for example, part of the footprint is on a tarmac 
road, the road itself will not normally require more than a visual inspection. If, on 
the other hand, the ground is soft (such as a ploughed field), then sub-surface 
clearance will almost certainly be needed. Whichever decision is taken, it must 
be documented and the reasons recorded.
When a decision to conduct sub-
surface clearance is taken, it may still 
be appropriate to carry out a surface 
search beforehand; not only does this 
reduce the immediate threat to the 
local population, but it also enables 
clearance personnel to traverse the 
area in greater safety.
The extent and the depth of clearance 
should be dec ided by nat ional 
authorities. A typical example would 
be to search a distance of 50 metres 
past the last submunition found (to 
cover ‘fade-out‘)4 and to a depth of 
20 centimetres (e.g. for Dual Purpose 
Improved Conventional Munitions 
– DPICM). For larger submunitions, 
clearance depths may be set, at 50 cm, 
a metre or more. The search parameters 
may change as a result of new evidence (e.g. submunitions located beneath the 
search depth) or changing factors, such as new land use requirements. In any 
case, the decision-making process should be fully documented.
Instrument search may also be used to augment above-ground visual and surface 
clearance where, for example, submunitions are believed to be hidden in thick 
vegetation or suspended in trees.
33 A sub-surface instrument search  
being conducted in Kosovo 
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RENDER SAFE PROCEDURES 
Render Safe Procedures (RSP) are technical instructions for the destruction or 
neutralisation of unexploded munitions. They are usually detailed in technical 
manuals or Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs) intended for use by trained 
EOD operators using specialised equipment. 
The four most common disposal methods are: 
• destruction by detonation, normally carried out in situ
• destruction using ‘deflagration‘ technique 
• techniques to separate the fuze mechanism from the main charge
• manual neutralisation of the fuze. 
These are discussed briefly in turn. It should be stressed, however, that any RSP 
should only be carried out by appropriately qualified EOD technicians who are 
familiar with all aspects of the submunition and fuze mechanism design.
Detonation
Destruction by detonation in situ is usually the most appropriate RSP for 
unexploded submunitions. This involves placing a high explosive charge beside 
the submunition and detonating it, which also detonates the submunition. Of 
course, where clearance activities have to be conducted in or around populated 
areas, this may not be a popular decision among locals. 
Where destruction by detonation in situ is conducted, sandbags (or some other 
protective structure capable of containing the fragmentation) should be placed 
around the device before demolition. In Lebanon, some clearance operators 
used rubber tyres or a water-based ‘prill‘ sandbag system to mitigate damage. 
Multiple submunitions are often detonated simultaneously using electric cable or 
detonating cord to link charges.
A major consideration during the disposal of some submunitions is the danger 
from the formation of a shaped charge jet. These jets have the potential to travel 
more than 1,800 metres, so it is important to place explosive charges in a way 
that prevents their formation. An alternative is to place a robust barrier in front of 
the submunition to ‘catch‘ or attenuate the jet.5
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Deflagration 
Deflagration is the rapid burning of the explosive content without detonation; this 
method is also normally conducted in situ. A small purpose-built shaped charge 
(often referred to as a point focal) may be fired at the submunition to induce 
deflagration of the main filling. Alternatively, for example, pyrotechnic torches may 
be used to induce deflagration of the explosive within a submunition.
This method is generally safer than demolition as the charge can be mounted a 
distance from the target (at least 80 mm), but it requires more training, tends to 
be more expensive, and takes longer to set up. 
Successful deflagration is less destructive than detonation, but the disadvantage 
is that it may leave live fragments of explosive and hazardous components, such 
as detonators, in the area.
With all deflagration techniques there is always a risk of the submunition 
detonating, therefore the same precautions and danger areas have to be put in 
place as for when using normal detonation procedures. 
Separation techniques 
Separation techniques, such as the use of small linear cutting charges, water-
jet disruptors, or explosively fired projectiles, are designed to detach the fuze 
mechanism from the main charge of the submunition. Once separated, the fuze 
well cavity of the munition should be inspected to ensure that no hazardous 
components of the fuze remain. If the fuze well cavity is clear of hazardous 
components then the munition can be moved and disposed of in a suitable 
location. It may even be possible to move the fuze, provided that all component 
parts can be positively identified and the EOD technician is certain that the 
initiation mechanism has been totally disrupted.
Manual neutralisation 
Manual neutralisation is rarely advisable, since the condition and sensitivity of 
unexploded submunitions is usually unknown. Under some circumstances, this 
option might be considered by EOD personnel for simple mechanical submunitions 
(such as the Russian AO-1SCh) in good condition. It should not be conducted for 
any submunition with electric or piezo-electrical fuze components. In general, 
manual neutralisation should only be considered where a grave and immediate 
threat to human life exists. 
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OPERATIONAL PLANNING 
Criteria used in determining operational priorities
The purpose of priority-setting in any field is to ensure we are doing the ‘right 
job‘ with a view to maximising the ratio of benefits to costs.6 When determining 
clearance priorities for cluster munitions and other ERW, the following factors 
should be considered and, therefore, reflected in the criteria used for setting 
priorities:
• technical data: the nature and extent of the contamination; access to sites; 
weather conditions; ground cover; etc. These factors determine whether  
a suspected hazard needs to be cleared at all and, if it does, the skills, assets, 
funds and time required.
• risk to life and limb for:
 } civilians, particularly when they are displaced and upon their return,  
as they will not know the nature and location of the hazards 
 } humanitarian and development aid workers
 } security forces, including international peacekeepers, who are trying  
to restore security in conflict-affected zones
• potential value of contaminated or inaccessible land and other assets, 
including:
 } denial of properties – farmland, water points, forests, and other assets 
needed for livelihoods, as well as roads and paths that provide access  
to markets, health clinics, schools, etc.
 } constraints on reconstruction and development – even when people  
can ‘work around‘ contamination and get on with their lives, submunition 
contamination may constrain infrastructure reconstruction and new 
investments, both public and private, that are needed to lift conflict-
affected communities and entire regions out of poverty
• likelihood that the cleared or unblocked land/assets will be used 
productively – land disputes; the absence of complementary inputs 
(e.g. seeds for planting); or the absence of funds for reconstruction and 
development projects will constrain the productive use of areas cleared 
or made accessible, which would alter the benefit to cost ratio and the 
priority of the task
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• international legal obligations and norms – States Parties to the Convention 
on Cluster Munitions or Protocol V of the CCW have accepted legal 
obligations and are bound to respect them. Value must also be placed 
on meeting some or all of these obligations in non-party States when  
(i) the government seeks to be in compliance with international norms that 
stigmatise the use of cluster munitions or (ii) the country receives financial 
or technical assistance from countries that are States Parties to the  
relevant conventions.
A key issue is what relative weights to attach to the various criteria. Possible 
operational tasks must be assessed against all criteria. During the Socio-economic 
Survey and Priority-setting workshop held in Vientiane, March 2009, the GICHD 
described the following way of using criteria to set priorities: 
Total Benefits = Value of Risk Education + Economic growth + Poverty reduction 
+ Value of Treaty Compliance.7 
In addition, any priority-setting system for dealing with significant contamination 
must feature both top-down and bottom-up elements. For example, allocating 
resources from the national level among provincial districts is a top-down decision. 
However, most impacts of explosives contamination are highly localised and so 
information about preferences from affected communities is needed to ensure 
the correct task priorities are identified for the assets available in the province or 
district.8 
Priority-setting and operational planning
A number of special challenges can complicate priority-setting for cluster munition 
clearance, such as:
• multiple decision-makers: officials from the local government, UN agencies, 
and donor countries, plus operations managers, may all have different 
views on the relevant weights to assign to the priority-setting criteria 
• poor data quality: particularly in the emergency response phase, when poor 
task selection could lead to unnecessary casualties and wasted resources
• rapidly evolving context: due to, for example, changes in national politics 
and in the security situation; this may mean that clearance priorities need to 
change
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There is no priority-setting blueprint that can be applied in all countries. Even within 
a country, the system for setting clearance priorities may have to be modified 
as contamination data improves, displaced people return to their communities, 
more clearance assets arrive, organisations enter or leave the programme, and 
government capacities grow. Given these factors, it is often useful to think in terms 
of stages in a country’s transition from conflict to development, and how clearance 
priorities might evolve through those stages.9
Stage in 
conflict  
& political 
transition
Stage of 
Response
Typical issues for planning  
& priorities
Continued 
conflict/peace 
negotiations
Pre-response 
planning
Obtaining data on military strikes; 
preparation of contingency plans; 
liaison with national authorities and 
early response agencies
Immediate 
post-conflict
Emergency Survey & clearance of routes 
for refugee/IDP return and for 
aid delivery; expanding survey 
effort; establishing coordination 
& reporting mechanisms
Restoration 
of internal 
security
Emergency/
integrated 
peacekeeping
As above, plus meeting mobility 
requirements for security forces; 
exit planning and establishing 
national capacities
Priority 
reconstruction
Post-emergency Support for reconstruction  
of infrastructure and developing 
capacities to address residual 
hazards
Development Transition Support for development 
investments;10 transition and exit
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Given this transition, saving lives and limbs is typically given great weight in the 
early stages of a programme. Economic value of contaminated or blocked land 
becomes an increasingly important criterion as people return to re-establish 
their livelihoods and as the pace of reconstruction increases (a process that can 
continue for over a decade following significant conflicts) and new investments for 
development are started. Where international peacekeeping forces are present, 
priority is normally given to their needs for mobility to fulfil their mandate.
Once security is restored and high impact areas have been cleared the situation is 
less urgent but often more complicated. A response capacity is normally required 
to deal with residual threats to life and limb, but technical consideration will 
dominate priority-setting for clearance of low threat hazards to meet international 
obligations.
Special issues when dealing with extensive contamination
When contamination is too extensive to be resolved with a short to medium-
term clearance programme, support for the development of national capacities 
for planning and management (as well as operations personnel and assets) is 
essential; long-term problems require sustainable solutions. Capacity development 
to nationalise the planning and management of a programme is itself a medium-
term task; typically three to five years, even when national authorities have shown 
commitment and assigned capable individuals to manage their programme. 
Therefore, an exit plan must be formulated and agreed well in advance to guide 
transition planning, along with the country’s capacity development effort.11
Transition, capacity development and exit always entail difficult trade-offs. It is 
more efficient to use experienced organisations – often internationally managed 
– to address contamination, but then the necessary local capacities may never 
develop. A reasonable balance must be struck.
In addition, national responsibility requires that the clearance programme is aligned 
with national systems. Relevant factors include: 
• how responsibilities are split between national and sub-national 
governments
• how the budgeting and development planning systems work
• the mechanisms used for inter-departmental coordination
• how to obtain ‘bottom-up‘ information from the impacted communities.
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Simply handing over a clearance programme designed and managed by 
international experts to their national counterparts is not a responsible exit 
strategy, and is unlikely to provide a sustainable solution.
In Afghanistan, clearance of cluster munitions, mines and other ERW 
has been for the last three years solely managed by the government’s 
Directorate for Mine Action Coordination (DMAC), with no foreign experts 
or administrators in the organisation. United Nations Mine Action Centre for 
Afghanistan (UNMACA), a project of UNMAS, has assisted in planning and 
implementing this transition since 2007 with a gradual transfer of functions 
and responsibilities from foreigners to experienced Afghan nationals. At one 
point in 2005 UNMACA had 55 international staff in Afghanistan, while it 
now operates with only 3 internationals. The UNMACA’s role has gradually 
evolved from the authority to an advisor. The current core activities revolve 
in managing the distribution of Voluntary Trust Fund (VTF) to national mine 
action operators, and provision of strategic advisory to Afghanistan’s National 
Disaster Management Authority, the parent organisation of DMAC. 
Whereas at 10 years the transition period was long, so too is the complexity 
of the ERW clearance in Afghanistan. It is the biggest mine action program 
in the world and arguably the most dangerous operating environment for 
both the national and international clearance operators. The challenge of 
managing the work of 10’000 people in clearing the most diverse and extensive 
contamination of ERW from the current and past conflicts; and doing this in 
the midst of a war in a vast, mountainous country with little road infrastructure, 
cannot be overstated. The DMAC is highly competent to succeed in this 
endeavour yet their work in making the country safe is all but over.
RECORDING AND REPORTING
It is essential to record and report the conduct of clearance, along with an 
auditable record of the risk assessments made. It is also important to ensure 
that reporting demonstrates how the clearance of cluster munition remnants 
contributes to humanitarian and development objectives and outcomes. Reporting 
only on outputs, such as the number of square metres cleared and the number of 
items destroyed, is not sufficient. There is a need to demonstrate how clearance 
is improving lives and livelihoods of people living in contaminated communities.
BOX 2 AFGHANISTAN: A SUCCESSFUL EXAMPLE OF TRANSITION 
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All suspected submunition strike areas should be recorded with a view to 
identifying the extent and centre point of the footprint. This would generally be 
the basis of the strike zone grid reference. This information should be recorded by 
the central data collection facility (generally the information management section 
in the national mine action authority or mine action centre). 
Cluster munition strikes are generally recorded as a suspected hazardous area 
(SHA) and confirmed hazardous area (CHA). In the initial response, several cluster 
munition strikes, overlapping or close together, may be recorded as a single SHA, 
Individual strike footprints wherein evidence of CM contamination has been 
identified are recorded as CHA. This may distort the perception of contamination 
on the ground. In many cases, the extent of the footprint gradually emerges as 
clearance proceeds, so haphazard disposal of individual submunitions over the 
same area may also confuse the issue. The same problem can occur where surface 
clearance has been conducted but has not been properly recorded and reported.
When many individual strikes have been reported it may be found, during 
the implementation of the task, that several SHA/CHA have been covered in 
the clearance of a certain area. Careful review and management of planning, 
databases, mapping and operational staff will ensure that accurate data is 
collected. In the process, relevant SHA/CHA and their parts are removed from 
the map and that the true picture of contamination is reflected. 
Once the area has been visually searched above ground and sub-surface cleared 
to a specified depth, a completion report should be issued. Completion reports 
should form the basis for further planning, analysis and tasking. If only a visual 
search was conducted with no evidence to warrant sub-surface clearance, then 
a low risk (or similar depending on the NMAS) report should be issued. 
Low risk and completion reports for cluster munition clearance activity should 
include the following types of information: 
• type of clearance
• depth of clearance
• findings
• equipment used
• all clearance activity
• the location and type of individual submunitions (supporting the general 
picture of the strike footprint)
• marking
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• fencing
• digital mapping (or accurate, scaled sketch)
• comments from community liaison efforts, including on usable land, 
community needs before and after clearance, and their assessed awareness 
of the problem at hand 
•  follow-up activities planned, if only visual search was carried out. 
IMAS AND CCM
The International Mine Action Standards have a significant role in the safe 
clearance and disposal of cluster munitions and their remnants.
The CCM specifically refers to the IMAS in two places: in Section 3 of article 4 
on clearance and destruction of cluster munitions remnants and Section 2 of 
article 3 on storage and stockpile destruction. The IMAS series were reviewed and 
amended in 2009/10 to ensure compliance with the CCM. To ensure that cluster 
munitions issues were addressed, minor amendments were made to all IMAS and 
specifically in the clearance and stockpile destruction chapters.
The Land Release IMAS address issues relating to survey and clearance of mines 
and ERW, including unexploded submunitions. General guidance on Battle Area 
Clearance (BAC) is provided in IMAS 09.11.
There is also a Technical Note 09.30-06/2008 on clearance of cluster munitions, 
addressing the subject in more detail based on experience in Lebanon. The 
Technical Note concentrates on BAC where submunition contaminated areas 
are the main hazard rather than other ERW, although it is recognised that there 
may be some other devices found in the process. It discusses operational 
planning, clearance methodology, and recording and reporting of information. 
The document highlights the importance of community liaison throughout 
design, implementation and recording of CM clearance tasks, as well as methods 
of neutralisation or destruction, which may be selected during the disposal of 
unexploded submunitions.
For more details please refer to the Technical Note 09.30-06/2018 available at 
http://www.mineactionstandards.org/standards/technical-notes-for-mine-action-
tnma/
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ENDNOTES
1 A new IMAS on BAC was issued in 2007: IMAS 09.11: Battle Area Clearance.
2 See, for instance, the Technical Note on Mine Action based on experiences clearing cluster 
munitions in Lebanon. Clearance of Cluster Munitions based on experience in Lebanon, TNMA 
09.30/06, 1 January 2008, available at: www.mineactionstandards.org/tnma/TN_09.30.06-
2008_clearance_of_cluster_munitions_based_on_experience_in_Lebanon_(version_1.0).pdf.
3 One view is that BAC focuses on locating the explosive hazard, which then leads to an EOD 
task. EOD is defined under the IMAS as ‘the detection, identification, evaluation, render safe, 
recovery and disposal of EO. EOD may be undertaken: 
a) as a routine part of mine clearance operations, upon discovery of ERW; 
b) to dispose of ERW discovered outside hazardous areas, (this may be a single item 
of ERW, or a larger number inside a specific area); or 
c) to dispose of EO which has become hazardous by deterioration, damage or attempted 
destruction.‘  
IMAS 04.10: Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations, Second Edition, 
1 January 2003, 3.90.
4 In Lebanon, for example, applicable standards require 50 metres clearance past the last 
submunition found.
5 Email from Adrian Wilkinson, 12 April 2009.
6 For more information, see: Ted Paterson, ‘Priority-setting fundamentals. Ensuring Mine Action 
Promotes Development: Priority-setting and Pre/Post-clearance assessment workshop, 
Vientiane, Lao PDR, 11-13 March 2009‘, GICHD. 
7 For more information, see: Ted Paterson, ‘Priority-setting fundamentals. Ensuring Mine Action 
Promotes Development: Priority-setting and Pre/Post-clearance assessment workshop, 
Vientiane, Lao PDR, 11-13 March 2009‘, GICHD.
8 Preferences are ‘wish list‘ while priorities are the tasks to which resources are actually 
allocated. We have a problem if priorities do not reflect local preferences.
9 For a more thorough discussion see Chapter 3 in GICHD. Guide to Socio-Economic 
Approaches to Mine Action Planning, 2004. http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/publications/
Guide_Socio_Economic_Approaches.pdf
10 Many more organisations, both public and private, are involved in development than in 
the reconstruction phase, which often is ‘centrally planned‘. This places greater burdens 
on the clearance programme. For more information, see GICHD. Linking Mine Action and 
Development – Guidelines for Policy and Programme Development: National Mine Action 
Centres, 2008. http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/ma_development/Guidelines/Guidelines-
LMAD-NationalMAC-24Nov2008.pdf
11 For more information, see ‘A Guide on Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National 
Ownership‘, GICHD in collaboration with UNMAT, 2013: http://www.gichd.org/mine-action-
resources/publications/detail/publication/a-guide-on-transitioning-mine-action-programmes-
to-national-ownership/#.Vx8Sy1V96Uk 
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RISK REDUCTION EDUCATION
C
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This chapter examines how to reduce risk to civilians through Risk Reduction 
and Risk Education. Together they are referred to as Risk Reduction Education 
(RRE) and cover public education campaigns, community mine action liaison, 
and fencing and marking activities.
DEFINITION OF RRE
‘Risk Education ensures that communities are aware of the risks from mines, 
unexploded ordnance and/or abandoned munitions and are encouraged to behave 
in ways that reduce the risk to people, property and the environment. Objectives 
are to reduce the risk to a level where people can live safely and to recreate an 
environment where economic and social development can occur free from the 
constraints imposed by contamination‘.1 
Cluster munitions, especially unexploded sub-munitions, can represent a 
significant threat to civilians, particularly to children. Children are at great risk 
from Explosive Remnants of War (ERW), including sub-munitions.2 A key principle 
to Risk Education (RE) is the individual’s right to receive accurate and timely 
information about landmine risk and other explosives in the environment. 
Risk Reduction Education ‘is a process of information transfer involving a dialogue 
with the community on not only the landmine/ERW threat, but also wider 
developmental concerns, and seeking possible solutions discussions and focus 
on practical, detailed and precise alternatives as a way of promoting a reduction 
in risk-taking behaviour‘.3 
There are ‘five pillars‘ or disciplines of mine action which give context to RRE 
within the sector; RRE plays a role in each of them. It is the particular collaboration 
between RE and clearance that creates Risk Reduction Education, or the ‘limiting 
(of) risk of physical injury from mines and unexploded ordnance that already 
contaminates the land‘.4 
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INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY AND FRAMEWORKS
United Nations strategy
The Strategy of the United Nations on Mine Action (2013-2018) has a first strategic 
objective of:
Risks to individuals and the socio-economic impacts of mines and ERW, including 
cluster munitions, are reduced.5
UN specific activities for Objective 1 include, among others:
• Facilitate and provide prioritised marking, fencing, technical and 
non-technical survey, and clearance
• Support and provide mine-ERW risk education.6 
Legal framework 
Little reference to Risk Education is included in the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions, although each affected State Party is required ‘as soon as possible‘ 
to ‘conduct Risk Reduction Education to ensure awareness among civilians living 
in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of the risks posed by such 
remnants‘.7 In doing so, the State Party is obliged to ‘take into account international 
standards, including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS)‘.8 
In contrast, CCW Protocol V refers to the provision of both ‘warnings‘ and ‘Risk 
Education‘.9 Warnings are primarily intended to raise urgent awareness about the 
threat from unexploded sub-munitions (or other explosive ordnance), whereas 
RE is seen as a longer-term process designed to instil safer behaviour in target 
populations. Warnings will often be conducted while armed conflict is ongoing 
(immediately following an attack, for instance). When conflict is over (or security 
allows), more in-depth and sustained communication activities, especially through 
dialogue with affected communities, will characterise RE. 
The non-legally binding Technical Annex to CCW Protocol V outlines a number of 
‘best practice elements‘ of warnings and RE.
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RISK EDUCATION
National and international standards 
According to Protocol V’s Technical Annex, ‘All programmes of warnings and 
risk education should, where possible, take into account prevailing national and 
international standards, including the International Mine Action Standards‘.10
Standards for Mine Risk Education (MRE) have been approved as IMAS. In total, 
seven standards deal with MRE, namely: 
• 07.11 | Guide for the management of MRE
• 07.31 | Accreditation of MRE organisations and operations
• 07.41 | Monitoring of MRE programmes and projects
• 08.50 | Data collection and needs assessment for MRE
• 12.10 | Planning for MRE programmes and projects
• 12.20 | Implementation of MRE programmes and projects
• 14.20 | Evaluation of MRE programmes and projects
Standard 07.11 should be read before reading the others.11 
According to IMAS, MRE has three components: public information dissemination, 
education and training, and community liaison. They are complementary and 
mutually reinforcing. RRE principles are exactly the same where CM are the 
main threat: the primary emphasis in safety messages warns against touching or 
disturbing unexploded sub-munitions in any way. 
CM users should fund warnings and RE
‘Parties to a conflict should, if possible, provide additional resources for warnings 
and risk education. Such items might include: provision of logistical support, 
production of risk education materials, financial support and general cartographic 
information’.12
It is implicit that where government is not best placed to deliver warnings or RE 
directly, it can support others in doing so. An international organisation can be 
supported to conduct RRE warnings by facilitating access to public information 
sources free of unnecessarily complicated administrative procedures and, 
if possible, at no cost. 
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PLANNING AND COORDINATION
All forms of RRE require coordination, resource mobilisation, local capacity 
development and institutional support, information management, training of 
personnel, and quality management.13 RRE is conducted by cooperation under a 
national mine action authority or other coordination body.
In a non-emergency setting, an implementing agency will conduct a needs 
assessment to analyse information needs, educational capacities, communication 
access, risk behaviours, etc.
Variables exist for geographical location and contamination, gender, age, socio-
economic occupation, literacy levels, etc. The information gathered will be used to 
identify target groups most at risk, messages most required, appropriate materials 
and dissemination methods.
Information can be gathered through desk research and community-based 
participatory approaches, including mapping. Mine risk management by mapping 
is the use of simple portable technology for map overlays to visually determine 
contamination, land use, population, clearance, and safe land and risk behaviours. 
Maps can be used for planning purposes and to stimulate discussion of priorities 
and needs by both the community and NMAA, and later incorporation into a GIS 
system for effective sharing within mine action authorities.14
Adequate needs assessment and evidence-based research before creating RRE 
activities makes for managed, effective, measurable and time-bound projects. 
Needs analysis should incorporate a gender perspective, due to ‘different uses 
and knowledge of the land, different priorities for clearance due to different 
needs, identifying impact of weapons on a community… In mine action, gender 
mainstreaming involves considering the separate needs and realities of males and 
females in all activities aimed at identifying the impact and mitigating the threats 
of landmines and UXO, whether it is through mine clearance, risk education, 
advocacy or victim assistance‘.15 ‘One straightforward and effective solution is to 
have gender balanced teams, enabling the organisations to liaise with and collect 
information from all ages and genders’.16 
RRE is an IMAS requirement where contamination is present. RRE campaigns 
should, therefore, stop when the risk is no longer present. 
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EMERGENCY RE WARNINGS
Public information dissemination 
Public information dissemination refers primarily to activities which seek to reduce 
risk of injury from mines and ERW by raising awareness among individuals and 
communities, establishing modified safer behaviour in newly dangerous situations. 
It is primarily one-way communication, often through mass media, providing 
relevant information and advice in a cost-effective and timely manner. In an 
emergency post-conflict situation or unplanned population movement, public 
information dissemination is often the most practical means of communicating 
safety information. It is aimed generally rather than at specific target groups and 
is limited to the duration of immediate danger. It is possible to measure impact in 
a limited way through whether the material and messages are recalled at a later 
period. The medium chosen would depend on its popularity and literacy levels, 
accessibility of transport and communications channels and perceived neutrality. 
Time is of the essence. ‘Warnings should be given, as soon as possible, depending 
on the context and the information available. A Risk Education programme should 
replace a warnings programme as soon as possible. Warnings and Risk Education 
always should be provided to the affected communities at the earliest possible 
time‘.17 
LONG TERM RRE
Education and training 
Education and training is a two-way process, involving imparting and acquiring 
knowledge, attitude and practice through teaching and learning. RRE is aimed 
at creating new norms of acceptable long-term safety behaviour and building 
peer and social support. It is different to ‘warnings‘, in the range of messages 
delivered, room given for dialogue and interaction, and specific targeting of social 
and geographical populations at risk. Information, Education and Communication 
(IEC) materials, specifically designed for target groups, are wider in range and for 
visual and tactile use. An organisation delivering education and training should 
conduct a deep needs analysis to ensure impact and monitoring mechanisms.
‘Parties to a conflict should employ third parties such as international organisations 
and non-governmental organisations when they do not have the resources and 
skills to deliver efficient risk education. The best-placed entity to deliver warnings 
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis‘.18 
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Delivery of RRE by military structures should be avoided, except where they 
are regarded as informative and trusted sources by specific target groups and 
use appropriate methods and materials. Military, civil defence and humanitarian 
organisations may all be able to contribute to saving lives and limbs under 
coordinating efforts of mine action coordination centres.
Capacity-building
Education and training may be delivered by an NGO or mine action organisation 
directly, or indirectly, through capacity-building by other institutions. These 
institutions can be a formal education structure, health service structures, 
community-based organisations and local hierarchies, religious leaders, and 
other mediums depending on country and culture. Indirect delivery reaches wider 
audiences and creates a dialogue through known and trusted media. It therefore 
has potential for greater impact on behavioural change.
As a long-term RRE approach a government may choose to incorporate RRE 
into educational curricula at either provincial or national level. This is a chosen 
response, even in countries where school attendance is low, as both a way of 
reaching a percentage of children and as a starting point for out-of-school children. 
To be effective, a school-based RRE approach requires proper planning, technical 
input and support, training and monitoring. Often a high degree of support is 
required from collaborating stakeholders for this to be effective. It is costly to 
develop and a long-term commitment. As for all RRE channels, it needs to be 
timed to stop when ERW no longer form a threat.
It can be difficult to implement RRE where there is no approved national 
curriculum, space within the curriculum to absorb a non-academic subject, or 
teacher training, quality or retention is weak. 
A government should also support a school-based programme together with 
relevant RRE channels for adults and out-of-school children, or nomadic and 
non-settled communities. Education and training activities may be conducted as 
parent-to-children and children-to-parent education in the home, child-to-child 
education, peer-to-peer education in work and recreational environments, RE 
training for humanitarian aid workers and inclusion of RE safety messages in 
regular occupational health and safety practices. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY
A thorough needs analysis at the planning stage will define appropriate educational 
and publicity materials for specified target groups. These should have been field 
tested and adapted accordingly before distribution and use. The needs analysis 
should also have created understanding of appropriate delivery methods or media. 
For example, short plays and skits may be appropriate for a nomadic and illiterate 
target group; radio may reach a good number of the adult male population, etc. 
The IMAS MRE guides are relevant reference points. 
Finding creative, authoritative communication channels is critical where 
access is difficult for religious, cultural and geographical reasons. The Mine 
Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA) have trained midwives to 
deliver RE to women, religious imams to deliver RE to their mosque attendees, 
and community-based police officers to deliver RE to other police officers, 
communities and children, helping to reinforce their protective role as community 
police.19
Organisations delivering RRE should plan a needs assessment beyond the 
emergency warnings phase. This will highlight methods suitable for the target 
group. The target group will not remain stable but will change throughout the 
post-conflict development and environment. Therefore, materials, methodology 
and messages have to respond to changing needs of geographical, age, gender 
and socio-economic groups.
TRANSIENT AND SETTLED POPULATIONS
Warnings and risk reduction education should be provided to both those living 
in or near affected areas and those who transit such areas,20 particularly where 
accidents have occurred, where there are high levels of engagement with 
contaminated land, or where RRE has not been delivered previously. It could be 
aimed at those returning to contaminated areas in the future, or living in areas with 
a high likelihood of becoming contaminated.
Return of refugees and/or internally displaced persons could be planned or 
spontaneous. Population movements are one of the main triggers of increased 
incidents involving explosive ordnance. This requires essential coordination 
for information dissemination and protection en route and during periods 
of resettlement with relevant UN agencies, government departments and 
implementing partners. 
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For those living and working in an area affected by ERW, there is often an 
economic reason to investigate contaminated areas. For example, some may 
collect scrap metal from ERW as a vital addition to income. Exposure to risk can 
be deliberate and voluntary. Change from risk avoidance to risk reduction has 
greater impact on reducing intentional risk.
RRE AND MARKING
While clearance of cluster munition remnants is ongoing, or where it is not 
immediately feasible, other measures can reduce civilian risk. These include 
marking of CM-affected areas and provision of warnings and other RE to at-risk 
groups. This is required by international law, in particular the CCM and CCW 
Protocol V (see Chapters 3 and 4). This section reviews good practice in support 
of applicable international legal obligations. 
Community mine action liaison assists in these activities through community 
involvement in decision-making, support and protection of marking precautions 
and exchange of information. RRE can keep communities regularly informed of 
reduction, clearance, cancellation and confirmation of contaminated areas.
Marking of contaminated areas 
Marking of contaminated areas is key. Additional methods including reducing 
risk of death or injury to civilians and freeing up space for continuation of socio-
economic activities, creating corridors for people to freely access markets and 
resources and to travel with security are important. Marking is a temporary 
measure before clearance. As noted in the IMAS,21 mine and other explosive 
ordnance hazards are marked to provide a clear and unambiguous warning of 
danger to local populations.
The IMAS provide detailed guidance on appropriate marking of contaminated 
areas. Based on legal obligations and the IMAS, as well as research by the 
GICHD,22 this section suggests a ten-step approach to maximising the contribution 
of medium to long-term marking to casualty reduction. 
Step 1 Make marking part of an overall strategy. 
Step 2 Concentrate on marking areas where population movement  
 is expected or settled. 
Step 3 Combine marking with risk education. 
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Step 4 Involve local communities in marking efforts, if appropriate  
 and feasible and backed by technical support and clearance. 
Step 5 Make sure markings can be seen. 
Step 6 Use durable markings of minimal value. 
Step 7 Record the location of markings. 
Step 8 Maintain the markings. 
Step 9 Monitor the status of the markings and any casualties. 
Step 10 Remove the markings when they are no longer needed. 
Marking saves lives. It creates identified safe areas and corridors to allow 
continuation of socio-economic activity. Mine action activities of mapping, 
marking, community liaison and RRE all play a vital role. All the above steps will 
require some community liaison to ensure cooperation and timely information 
dissemination on markings and signs.
Legal framework 
The CCM requires that States Parties take ‘all feasible steps‘ to ensure that, as soon 
as possible, areas affected by cluster munition remnants are marked and fenced 
to ensure effective exclusion of civilians. According to Article 4, paragraph 2, each 
State Party is required, as soon as possible, to ‘take all feasible steps to ensure 
that all cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control are 
perimeter-marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to ensure 
the effective exclusion of civilians‘.
Erecting a fence is generally applicable as a security measure to ammunition 
storage areas with stockpiled cluster munitions. However, fencing off a series 
of cluster strike footprints, where these are detectable in the first place, and 
then usually involve unexploded submunitions in relatively small numbers in 
sizable areas both urban and rural, is not simple. Fencing is not easily done and 
is not always an effective way of addressing the problem. It can be impractical 
to erect kilometres of costly metal barrier around contaminated areas. To do it 
right, any security fence infrastructure needs other amenities with it including 
surveillance, signage and markings, maintenance and physical guarding. The 
cost of actually clearing the contaminated area can be lower than putting a fence 
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around it. However, where this can be done, it inevitably improves the safety of 
the communities at risk. 
Article 5, Protocol V of the CCW approaches the marking and fencing in a more 
subtle manner, urging parties to an armed conflict to take ‘all feasible precautions‘ 
in territory under their control that is affected by ERW to protect civilians and 
civilian objects from the threat. These precautions ‘may include‘ marking, fencing, 
and monitoring of territory affected by explosive remnants of war, as set out in 
the Technical Annex. 
The Annex in CCW Protocol V, regarding warnings, risk education, marking, 
fencing and monitoring, states:
(h) When possible, at any time during the course of a conflict and thereafter, 
where explosive remnants of war exist the parties to a conflict should,  
at the earliest possible time and to the maximum extent possible, ensure 
that areas containing explosive remnants of war are marked, fenced and 
monitored so as to ensure the effective exclusion of civilians, in accordance 
with the following provisions.
(i) Warning signs based on methods of marking recognised by the affected 
community should be utilised in the marking of suspected hazardous areas. 
Signs and other hazardous area boundary markers should as far as possible 
be visible, legible, durable and resistant to environmental effects and 
should clearly identify which side of the marked boundary is considered  
to be within the explosive remnants of war affected area and which side  
is considered to be safe. 
(j) An appropriate structure should be put in place with responsibility for 
the monitoring and maintenance of permanent and temporary marking 
systems, integrated with national and local risk education programmes. 
The signs should also clearly identify which side of the marked boundary is 
considered to be hazardous and which side is considered to be safe. 
An appropriate structure should be put in place to monitor and maintain permanent 
and temporary marking systems, which should be ‘integrated‘ with national and 
local risk education programmes. 
IMAS 08.40: Marking mine and UXO hazards, Second Edition provides further 
guidance on marking of known contaminated areas.
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COMMUNITY MINE ACTION LIAISON
Community Mine Action Liaison refers to the systems and processes used to 
exchange information between national authorities, UN agencies, mine action 
organisations and communities on the presence of mines and ERW, and of their 
potential risk and localised prioritisation. It informs communities when a clearance 
activity is planned to take place, the nature and duration of the task, and the exact 
locations of areas that have been marked or cleared. In addition, community liaison 
can support relief and development interventions that reduce risk to affected 
communities. 
Risk Reduction Education minimises civilian casualties before and during clearance 
operations by conveying factual information. Community liaison should ensure 
that communities understand and are part of decision-making over resources and 
collaborate on enforcing community safety. RRE helps communities to continue 
to thrive within their socio-economic activities as much as possible given the 
contamination context, not just to survive. Community liaison allows implementing 
agencies to work with development actors to provide high-risk groups with safer, 
alternative livelihoods that can also help significantly reduce risk by addressing 
underlying motivations of high-risk behaviour.
Community liaison researches socio-economic and cultural norms and feeds into 
all five pillars of mine action. Community Mine Action Liaison can coordinate with 
the wider humanitarian sector to ensure that communities living in and around 
contaminated areas are assisted. Liaison within mine action can create safe routes 
for access to valuable local resources – e.g. cleared paths and signed areas to let 
children return to school, to ensure people can access market and forest, water 
sources etc. until total clearance can be achieved.
IMPACT MEASUREMENT
Initial detailed research and needs analysis should provide relevant indicators 
for RRE. There are a range of methods to measure impact of risk reduction, 
warnings RE, and long-term RE, to assess effectiveness of materials, messages 
and methodology, as well as impact on behaviour.
Knowledge Attitude and Practice (KAP) surveys have frequently been used to 
evaluate RE and show comparative progress over years. Behavioural change 
measurement methodologies can be borrowed from the health sector. 
Measurement indices of knowledge should not be dismissed; it is the starting 
point to behavioural change.
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Qualitative and quantitative data can be gathered to demonstrate community 
engagement in supporting marking and fencing and therefore the success of 
community liaison activities in enabling this.
There are well acknowledged challenges in measuring impact of behavioural 
change and the low level of RRE impact on particular social groups. In particular, 
changing behaviour of young men and teenage boys is known to be difficult.22 
The prefrontal cortex that is involved in high level cognitive function is not fully 
developed until 25; it is the reason for risk-taking behaviour in several areas of life. 
‘This age group (15-25) dies of accidents of almost every sort … at high rates.23 
A public health campaign aimed at this specific target group needs to be realistic 
and creatively aimed at mitigating risk. ‘Brain research has shown that the 
adolescent brain undergoes really quite profound development, and this has 
implications for education, for rehabilitation, and intervention‘.24
OTHER PILLARS
RRE can contribute to achieving the overall aims of mine ERW, small arms and 
light weapons and cluster munition clearance through the other pillars.
Stockpile destruction
RRE around stockpiles in residential areas is critical, including recognition of 
fencing and warning signs. Survey of caches and stockpiles can benefit from a 
community liaison perspective to record local community knowledge of, proximity 
to and interaction with the risk.
Survivor assistance
RRE has long placed an interactive role in survivor assistance, through collecting 
data, reporting and referral mechanisms, employment of survivors or case 
studies or survivors in RRE campaigns and materials. Support, collaboration and 
coordination with survivor assistance projects have been valuable. 
Advocacy
RRE has contributed to advocacy campaigns through data collection, research, 
case studies, evaluations, examples of effective campaigns, by giving a voice to 
affected populations. There have been creative efforts in low-key advocacy too, 
with children engaged in child-to-child RE projects making links with children in 
non-affected countries, building relationships and understanding.25
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CONCLUSION
RRE is a valuable opportunity to swiftly and cost-effectively change and save lives, 
whilst being participative and collaborative to achieve consensus and support 
for humanitarian clearance efforts. RRE components – from public warning and 
education campaigns and community support to fencing and marking activities 
– are an essential part of achieving cleared and safe environments.
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ASSISTING THE VICTIMS
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Assisting the victims of a particular weapon system, or victim assistance (VA), 
is a relatively new concept, first seen in a multilateral disarmament treaty in 
the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC).1 Following its entry 
into force, the concept evolved greatly. With VA obligations having appeared 
more recently in Protocol V to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons (CCW) and in the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM), there is 
now a uniform approach to what VA means.
The international community understands in very broad terms who or what 
a victim might be and that VA involves a wide range of activities. While mine 
clearance and VA are both aspects of mine action, there are differences in 
what is involved in achieving both. Unlike humanitarian demining, which 
emerged in the mid-1990s as a new discipline, complete with its own 
standards and other professional trappings, VA is part of broader long-
established domains, such as development, disability and human rights. This 
has important implications for VA responsibilities.
WHO IS A VICTIM?
The CCM defines victims as ‘all persons who have been killed or suffered physical 
or psychological injury, economic loss, social marginalisation or substantial 
impairment of the realisation of their rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. 
They include those persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their 
affected families and communities.’2 
Data collection of CM victims has primarily recorded only those people killed and 
injured and little is known about the actual number of families and communities 
affected by CM. ‘The Monitor has documented a total of 19,868 cluster munition 
casualties in 33 countries and three other areas from the mid-1960s through the 
end of 2014. This includes casualties recorded as directly resulting from the use of 
CM, as well as from CM remnants. However, a summary total of more than 55,000 
casualties globally, calculated from various country estimates, provides a better 
indicator of the number of CM casualties. Although casualties continue to be 
under-reported, recent improvements in data collection highlight the widespread 
failure to record CM casualties in past conflicts, particularly casualties that 
occurred during airstrikes and shelling in Southeast Asia and the Middle East.’3 
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States and other areas with cluster munition casualties  
(as of August 2015)4 
State Parties Non-signatories and other areas
Afghanistan Cambodia
Albania Eritrea
Bosnia and Herzegovina Ethiopia
Chad Georgia 
Croatia Israel
Guinea-Bissau Kuwait
Iraq Libya
Lao PDR Russia
Lebanon Serbia
Montenegro South Sudan
Mozambique Sudan
Sierra Leone Syria
Signatories Tajikistan
Angola Ukraine
Colombia Vietnam
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Yemen
Somalia Kosovo
Uganda Nagorno-Karabakh
Western Sahara
Note: other areas are indicated in italics.
122 | Chapter 9
‘In 2010-2014, CM casualties were reported in 14 countries and three other areas: 
Afghanistan, Cambodia, DRC, Croatia, Iraq, Lao PDR, Lebanon, Libya, Serbia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Vietnam, as well as Kosovo, Nagorno-
Karabakh, and Western Sahara. The majority of reported CM casualties (64%) 
have occurred in States Parties to the convention, particularly Afghanistan (775), 
Iraq (3,035), Lao PDR (7,628), and Lebanon.
A continuing pattern of harm to civilians, particularly children and young adults, 
is still apparent. Children under 18 years of age accounted for half of all CM 
casualties in 2010–2014 in countries where casualties from sub-munitions were 
disaggregated and details known. In this same period, civilians were the majority 
(92%) of all CM casualties where the status was recorded. Humanitarian clearance 
personnel accounted for 2%, and security forces; military and other security 
personnel as well as non-state armed group (NSAG) actors; accounted for 5%.’5 
’In their 2008 Plan of Action on Victim Assistance, the High Contracting Parties 
to Protocol V to the CCW have accepted that ‘explosive remnants of war may 
not only affect the persons directly impacted by them, but also their families and 
communities.’6 
This broad definition of victim has drawn attention to the full range of victims. 
Nevertheless, most attention has focused on providing assistance to those 
individuals directly impacted by ERW. They have specific needs for emergency 
and on-going medical care, rehabilitation, psychological support, work and 
employment, inclusive sports, leisure and cultural activities, inclusive education 
and a legal and policy framework to guarantee their rights to participate in the 
civil, political, economic, social and cultural spheres of their societies on a basis 
equal with others. Although little is known about the actual number of families and 
communities affected by CM, the limited information available indicates that their 
needs are likely to be extensive. Most victims are already part of the most poor; a 
CM accident may push them further into poverty through medical expenses and 
loss of income.
The ultimate goal of participation on a basis equal with others suggests that the 
more empowering term 'survivor' should normally be used in relation to those 
individual women, girls, boys and men who have been injured, survived and left 
living with an impairment as a result of contact with CM. However, the term 
'victim' continues to be used, in part to avoid ambiguity for legal obligations, given 
that the term appears in legal texts. The international community has also created 
a definition that goes beyond the individual directly affected.
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VICTIM ASSISTANCE (VA) IN CM CONTEXT
State Parties to the CCM recognise that victims are entitled to receive age 
and gender-sensitive assistance in the fields of medical care, rehabilitation, 
psychological support and social and economic inclusion. Necessary data 
should be collected to plan and report on VA, and national laws and policies 
developed, enforced and implemented to meet the obligations under the CCM. 
The States Parties are expected to actively involve victims and their representative 
organisations in all work of the Convention, and not discriminate against or among 
CM victims, or between CM victims and those who have suffered injuries from 
other causes.
Medical care
An incident involving a CM can cause a range of injuries including loss of limbs, 
abdominal, chest and spinal injuries, visual and hearing impairment, scars, and 
psychological trauma. Direct victims often acquire a lifelong impairment.
Emergency and continuing medical care includes first aid, emergency evacuation 
and medical care including surgery, blood transfusions, pain management 
and other health services. Provision of appropriate emergency and continuing 
34 Rehabilitation centre (Afghanistan)
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medical care, or the lack of it, has a profound impact on immediate and long-term 
recovery and is one of the main factors affecting mortality rates. In reality many 
affected countries lack trained staff, medicines, blood supplies, equipment and 
infrastructure to adequately respond to traumatic injuries. 
Another factor impacting fatality rates is the sex of the casualty: the female fatality 
rate is 43%; for men it is 29%.7 Setting up a low-tech pre-hospital emergency 
system in areas with high casualty rates, including training local villagers in basic 
first aid, can significantly increase survival chances. Research in Northern Iraq by 
the Tromsø Mine Victim Resource Centre has shown that mortality of victims of 
mines and war injuries (n = 919) decreased from 28.7% to 9.4% (p = 0.001), as did 
the time from injury to first medical help, from 2.4 hours to 0.6 hours (p = 0.002) 
when such an emergency system was developed.8
Rehabilitation
Survivors may also need rehabilitation including provision of services for 
physiotherapy and supply, maintenance and training in the use of assistive 
devices such as prostheses, orthoses, walking aids and wheelchairs. Physical 
rehabilitation focuses on helping a person regain or improve the capacities of 
her or his body, with mobility and independence in daily activities as the primary 
goal. Use of mobility devices improves education and work opportunities, and 
contributes to improving health, social participation and overall quality of life. 
In many low-income countries, however, only 5-15% of those people needing 
assistive devices actually have access to them.9
Rehabilitation services should apply a multidisciplinary team approach including 
a medical doctor, a physiotherapist, a prosthetic/orthotic professional, an 
occupational therapist, a social worker and other relevant specialists. The team 
should include male and female professionals, as in many countries it is not 
appropriate for women and girls to be attended by men and vice versa.
Psychological and psychosocial support
Psychological and social impacts are significant. Survivors can face social 
exclusion or are abandoned after the accident because of prevailing community 
beliefs (e.g. that the person brings bad luck). Many persons with disabilities are 
excluded from relationships and family life as a result of negative attitudes. These 
negative consequences affect survivors in different ways. Both boys and girls may 
drop out of school as a result of an accident and may find it difficult to get married 
later in life. Women with disabilities have a lower marriage rate than men with 
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disabilities. Barriers to returning to work lead to unemployment. Adults who are 
no longer able to generate an income for their families often experience frustration 
and depression.
‘Activities that empower survivors and promote social inclusion are integral to 
enhancing psychological well-being’10 Appropriate psychological and psychosocial 
support can make a significant difference to survivors, and the families of those 
killed or injured.
This type of support is part of mental health services and comprises psychological, 
psychosocial and peer-to-peer support. Providing it may be necessary in the 
immediate aftermath of the accident and at different times throughout their 
lifetime. The goal is to prevent and respond to psychological distress in populations 
experiencing disabling injuries and the threat of traumas from accidents involving 
CM, as well as preventing and responding to mental disorders, such as post-
traumatic stress. Mental health services contribute to ensuring that people can 
find balance and harmony in the environment in which they live.11
Unfortunately in low-income countries, only 1.54% of the health budget is 
allocated to such services.12 In their absence survivors all over the world have 
developed peer-to-peer support networks, where a survivor supports another. 
These networks should not be seen as a substitute for professional psychological 
support, but they have proved to be a vital alternative, particularly in rural remote 
areas.
Social inclusion
‘Psychological well-being and social inclusion are closely inter-linked. 
Psychological well-being can lead to full and effective social inclusion while 
inclusion contributes to psychological well-being. Furthermore, to enjoy full and 
effective inclusion survivors must be empowered to change their situation and 
access their rights.’13
Many CM survivors are excluded from family, school, community and work life. To 
reverse this, social inclusion services support someone to gain direction in life and 
to realise goals, find a place within the family, and participate in community life. 
These include personalised social support dealing with relationships and family life, 
and participation in cultural sports and leisure activities. Improving participation 
is a vehicle for personal expression, well-being and health, contributing to 
challenging negative community attitudes and raising awareness of rights and 
capacities of survivors and other persons with disabilities.
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The goal of social inclusion activities is to increase a person’s self-reliance by 
gaining insights about him/herself and learning to mobilise his/her own resources, 
both internal and external (e.g. family, neighbours, community). It values each 
person and promotes human development principles, where persons take an 
active role in planning their life. Social inclusion improves the quality of CM 
survivor’s life, generating a sense of human dignity, belonging and self-worth.14 
Inclusive education
Considering that half of all casualties are children, ensuring access to education is 
crucial to ensure all people are able to learn what they need and want throughout 
their lives. Components of education are early childhood care, primary, secondary 
and higher education, non-formal education and lifelong learning. Inclusive 
education is a process to increase participation, effectively responding to the 
individual needs of all learners, including girls, boys and persons in situations 
of vulnerability (such as child survivors and other children with disabilities). 
Inclusive education is a right in and of itself, and a way to facilitate the realisation 
of other rights (such as access to health, employment and political participation). 
Education contributes to the well-being of persons, their families and that of their 
communities. Gender affects access to education. In poor households, or in those 
facing a trauma, girls are often first to stop going to school.15
Economic inclusion
Economic inclusion is essential in promoting self-sufficiency, independence, 
enhanced self-esteem and a sense of dignity. This is a particular challenge in 
countries affected by CM where there is a general lack of opportunity for economic 
participation. For many CM survivors and families of those killed or injured, the 
main priority is finding opportunities to be productive community members. 
It is important to improve the economic status of survivors, their families and 
affected communities, guaranteeing all persons have income to ensure an 
adequate standard of living through employment and social protection. Economic 
inclusion benefits a single person as well as the collective development of her 
family and community by increasing income and improving social participation 
and psychological well-being. Activities in this domain include vocational training, 
access to micro-credit, income generation opportunities through self and waged 
employment, and the economic development of the community infrastructure.
Laws and policies
VA obligations require that a legal and policy framework is provided that 
guarantees the rights of victims with a view to ensuring opportunities in society 
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on a basis equal with others. In relation to survivors, the 2008 Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) provides significant guidance. As noted 
by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navanethem Pillay, ‘When 
survivors of mines and other explosive devices acquire a disability they fall under 
the scope of the CRPD.’16 
Policies, strategies and action plans on disability and inclusion should contain 
reference to survivors, take their reality into consideration and include an adequate 
response to their needs. Indirect victims tend to belong to the larger group of the 
poor and vulnerable; as such, efforts to address their situation should also respond 
to the day-to-day reality faced by family members of people injured and killed, and 
those living in communities affected by CM.
Identification and referral
Identification and referral are important if victims are to access available services. 
Victims tend to live in rural and remote areas, far from capitals where most services 
are provided. Many barriers exist including time and cost to reach services, 
absence of childcare and accommodation, lack of information or physical access, 
or discriminatory attitudes. Identifying victims where they live and supporting 
them to access services is often a vital step in ensuring increased participation 
and improved quality of life.
Understanding the challenges faced
Another important element of VA is data collection to understand the extent 
of the challenge; gathering, analysing and sharing of information in a given 
domain. Its goal is to understand, to report on and disseminate information on 
the number, sex, age, situation, needs and capacities of victims. In doing so, it 
enables Ministries and other stakeholders to formulate, implement, monitor and 
evaluate policies, plans and programmes to respond to the rights and needs of 
victims. Without relevant and precise data, it is impossible to propose effective 
policy options, to measure progress, to mobilise resources, and more generally, 
to plan and implement VA effectively and strategically.17
To achieve the objective of understanding the challenge, different methodologies 
are used for acquiring and analysing accurate data. These are:
• Casualty data collection for planning of risk education, prioritisation of 
clearance operations and land release. The Information Management 
System for Mine Action (IMSMA) provides a suitable platform for this  
and is being used in many states.18 
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• Needs assessments and mapping of services in a given area to plan and 
prioritise programmes. Data is collected on the target population's needs, 
demands, capacities, resources and the environment: service providers, 
social and cultural norms and infrastructure that can act as either facilitators 
or barriers to victims' quality of life.19
• Diagnosis for personalised support compiling information on the most 
vulnerable of victims, and persons with disabilities, with the aim of 
improving their quality of life. It includes the needs and priorities of the 
person and feedback from their family and professionals such as health and 
social workers; it also identifies barriers and facilitators in her environment.20
Accurate sex and age-disaggregated data on CM and other casualties is essential, 
as well as data on the broader prevalence of disability and on injuries. Only with 
good data the limited resources can be targeted effectively and appropriate 
policies, plans and programmes formulated and implemented.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY 21
Gender, age and diversity dimensions of VA vary according to the local context; 
how CM accidents affect various groups of people and how they should be taken 
into account. Parties to the APMBC, Protocol V to the CCW and the CCM agree on 
the importance of providing age and gender-sensitive assistance. States Parties to 
the APMBC have also identified the need to include a diversity perspective in all VA 
efforts to address the circumstances and experience of all persons living in situations 
of vulnerability in affected communities, including internally displaced persons, the 
elderly, people living in extreme poverty and other marginalised groups.
Principles that guide implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) include respect for difference and acceptance 
of persons with disabilities as part of human diversity; equality of opportunity; 
and equality between men and women. Although women and girls are a minority 
among ERW survivors, they can face greater obstacles than boys and men in 
accessing services to promote their physical, psychological and economic well-
being. For cultural reasons, girls and women may not be able to access medical or 
rehabilitation services if only male practitioners are available, or they may not be 
able to travel to available services without a male escort. Childcare responsibilities 
may limit time for women to receive rehabilitation and psychological support. 
Women may face additional burdens if the main family breadwinner is killed or 
injured. In many cultures, women have limited opportunities to access economic 
empowerment initiatives to support their families. Women and girls with disability 
can also face greater discrimination within their communities.
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NON-DISCRIMINATION
It is widely understood that the call to assist victims should not lead to exclusion 
of any person injured or impaired in another manner. The human rights principle of 
non-discrimination is prominent in the CCM text, with reference in the preamble:
‘Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, 
inter alia, requires that States Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure 
and promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms 
of all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of 
disability.’22
According to Reiterer, this principle was one discussed most intensively during 
the Oslo process leading to the Convention on CM.23 
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‘In drafting the overall victim assistance provision it was of utmost importance 
that the language ensured the best possible assistance to cluster munition victims 
without this being at the expense of victims of, say, landmines or other explosive 
remnants of war. In other words, the new provision was to be crafted in a way that 
would not allow it to be construed as creating a new category of victims enjoying 
‘preferential’ treatment at the expense of others.’
Reflecting this concern, Article 5(2) (e) of the CCM stipulates that each State Party 
shall:
‘Not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims, or between cluster 
munition victims and those who have suffered injuries or disabilities from other 
causes;’
According to Reiterer ‘…this again seemed a rather wide clause, which could 
potentially have been interpreted as an excuse for inactivity following the 
maxim that as long as everyone is treated in the same insufficient manner, no 
discrimination occurs.’ To avoid this, article 5(2) (e) continues by stating:
‘Differences in treatment should be based only on medical, rehabilitative, 
psychological or socio-economic needs’ thereby specifying that differences in 
treatment should only be related to needs.
This implies that physical rehabilitation programmes, for example, should not 
discriminate on the basis of what caused the need for services but rather should 
be established in a sustainable manner to meet the needs of survivors and all 
others who may require services provided.
All actors should take great care to avoid developing responses to the victims 
of CM and other ERW that run parallel to, or are in isolation from broader 
efforts to meet the needs and guarantee the rights of those who have been 
injured and/or who live with disabilities and who are indirectly victimised as 
a result of being a family member of a person injured or killed, or living in an 
affected community.
Assistance to survivors and indirect victims should be viewed as a part of 
an overall public services system within which efforts to fulfil the promise to 
survivors should be undertaken. Similarly, donor countries should consider their 
VA obligations in light of their humanitarian mine action efforts, and also more 
broadly in the context of international cooperation and assistance in the context 
of development, human rights and humanitarian initiatives.
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VA IN BROADER CONTEXTS
While VA is referred to as an integral component of mine action, there are 
important contextual differences between humanitarian demining and activities 
related to assisting victims of CM, mines and other ERW.
Humanitarian demining has developed as a new and specialised discipline. 
A responsive programme to clear mines or CM remnants and to promote 
behavioural change through risk education is ultimately intended to finish, 
and some already have. In contrast, problems faced by survivors are similar 
to the challenges of those who have suffered injuries and who are living with 
impairments. The problems faced by family members of people injured and killed 
are similar to others who are extremely poor. Many of the challenges they face 
will remain significant for their entire lives. 
Survivors are individuals who are part of larger communities of persons with 
disabilities and of individuals requiring a broad range of services. Their needs do 
not require development of new disciplines as the various VA elements are already 
encompassed in existing sectors.24 The existing healthcare and social service 
systems, rehabilitation programmes, vocational training, employment and social 
protection initiatives, and legislative and policy frameworks should be adequate 
to meet the needs of all citizens; including victims of CM.
The CCM preamble states that the CRPD is the overarching framework through 
which to implement VA. The Parties to the APMBC, the CCM and Protocol V to 
the CCW have all noted the role of the CRPD in fulfilling each treaty’s promise 
to survivors. 22 of the 50 CRPD articles are particularly relevant to assisting 
survivors.25 Handicap International published a paper that lays out the various 
elements at play when considering VA in light of the CRPD and disability-inclusive 
development.26
While the CRPD is indeed the guiding framework for survivors with disabilities, 
it should be noted that the VA provisions extend beyond survivors to affected 
families and communities. While the CCM, APMBC and Protocol V of the 
Convention on Conventional Weapons of War contain provisions towards victims, 
there is not one other treaty or framework that applies to all.
The disarmament community has long understood that integrating VA into 
development, human rights and humanitarian frameworks is essential if victims 
are to participate at all levels of society, providing the most sustainable avenue to 
support survivors as well as indirect victims.
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As agreed by the APMBC States Parties and included in the Maputo Action Plan:
‘Engagement in other domains is also necessary in view of the States Parties’ 
understanding that victim assistance should be integrated into broader national 
policies, plans and legal frameworks related to the rights of persons with disabilities, 
health, education, employment, development and poverty reduction.’ 27
It is also important that assistance to victims is integrated into broader programmes 
for conflict victims. The CCM provides more guidance on integration. Article 5(2) 
(f) on VA states that:
‘Each State Party shall develop a national plan and budget, including timeframes 
to carry out these activities, with a view to incorporating them within the existing 
national disability, development and human rights frameworks and mechanisms, 
while respecting the specific role and contribution of relevant actors.’ 28
The Dubrovnik Action Plan 29 includes a reference to:
‘Ensure that existing national policies, plans and legal frameworks related to people 
with similar needs, such as disability and poverty reduction frameworks, address 
the needs and human rights of cluster munition victims, or adapt such plans 
accordingly.
Monitor and evaluate the implementation of victim assistance as integrated into 
national laws, policies, and plans, related to people with similar needs, or as a part 
of a national action plan….’
A long-term solution to addressing victims' needs can only be ensured if it is 
embedded in broader development, human rights and humanitarian frameworks. 
Encouragingly, recent treaty documents underline the importance of making 
integration operational. 
INTEGRATED APPROACH TO VA
Dedicated VA efforts have ensured access and provided services to survivors and 
other persons with disabilities 30 alike. Little to no evidence exists, however on 
whether and how victims are being reached through relevant efforts undertaken in 
the context of development, human rights and humanitarian efforts in CM affected 
countries. While efforts supported with earmarked VA funding have been shown 
to reach survivors and also integrate other people with disabilities amongst those 
it reaches, evidence of the contrary is lacking.
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Initiatives31 are underway to provide guidance that should lead to a more holistic 
understanding of how VA obligations can become operational. This is referred to 
as an integrated approach to VA, which is two-fold. Firstly it implies that specific 
VA efforts benefit survivors, indirect victims, and people impaired through other 
causes. Secondly, that assistance provided through development, human rights 
and humanitarian initiatives also include survivors and indirect victims amongst 
the beneficiaries.
This dual approach should be implemented until mainstream efforts can 
demonstrate that they are inclusive of survivors and indirect victims. Funds 
earmarked for VA assistance should continue until mainstream initiatives can 
clearly demonstrate inclusion of CM victims.
Specific VA efforts as a catalyst to advance inclusion of persons 
with disabilities
Non-discrimination is a cornerstone of VA. Any specific effort should increase 
participation of survivors and indirect victims and other persons with disabilities 
as well. Specific efforts include VA earmarked funding provided by donor states, 
as well as any specific VA mechanism put in place, or instrument developed, by 
affected states.
Today, donor states understand that initiatives supported with VA earmarked 
funds will be used to develop services that are accessed by survivors and other 
persons with disabilities facing similar challenges. Evidence to ensure this is not 
always available.
In some affected states, VA supported initiatives have indeed been proved to 
improve access to services and spur on a disability dynamic where disability was 
not yet a priority, such as in Tajikistan,32 for example. Here, ‘the Victim Assistance 
Program of the Tajikistan National Mine Action Centre became a Disability Support 
Unit, recognising a broadening of its mandate and reinforcing the understanding 
that victim assistance is inclusive of other persons with disabilities.’
While most affected states now coordinate specific efforts related to their VA 
obligations in tandem advancing inclusion of persons with disabilities, there are 
still some states that treat VA, for survivors, as separate from efforts to advance 
the inclusion of persons with disabilities. This is not sustainable in the long-term 
and a missed opportunity at the national level; building bridges between specific 
efforts on VA and those to ensure the rights of persons with disabilities can only 
advance a society’s evolution towards being more disability-inclusive.
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Broader efforts reach victims amongst overall beneficiaries
As noted previously; ‘victims’ are a diverse group. For survivors with impairments, 
the integrated approach requires that disability-specific and disability-inclusive 
efforts are designed, implemented and evaluated with their specific situation 
in mind. As such, special attention should be given to the place of VA in broader 
approaches to disability and disability rights. Steps taken to ensure that all women, 
girls, boys and men with disabilities may participate in the civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural spheres of their societies on a basis equal with others are, 
in fact, steps taken to ensure that the promise made to mine and other ERW 
survivors in various conventional weapons treaties is met. The CRPD provides 
guidance. Efforts should be made to integrate a response to survivors into broader 
efforts to implement this landmark human rights convention.
Given the recent adoption of disability-inclusive Sustainable Development Goals,33 
all development efforts in CM-affected countries should now consider how to 
ensure that CM victims are beneficiaries. Similarly, actions undertaken in line with 
the World Health Organization (WHO) Plan of Action on Disability,34 endorsed by 
all States through the World Health Assembly, are another opportunity to realise 
VA obligations to survivors.
In terms of family members of people injured and killed, as well as people living 
in affected communities, an integrated approach would take their challenges 
and capacities into consideration when planning, implementing and measuring 
impact. These initiatives should all be disability-inclusive and as such benefitting 
people with and without disabilities in a similar manner.
It appears that this concept is still not fully understood similarly by all actors and 
concrete results have yet to be demonstrated. The challenge is turning it from 
concept into practice.
Implications of the integrated approach are different for states in a position to 
provide international cooperation and assistance (donor states, UN agencies and 
other actors supporting development initiatives in affected countries) and for 
affected states.
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INTEGRATED APPROACH TO VA UNDER THE APMBC AND CCM IN THE 
CONTEXT OF DEVELOPMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN 
INITIATIVES
DONOR STATES, UN AGENCIES AND OTHER DEVELOPMENT ACTORS
Specific VA efforts Broader development, human rights 
and humanitarian efforts in affected 
states
VA earmarked funds – as part of 
humanitarian action on CM, mines 
and other ERW support efforts 
that lead to services accessible 
to survivors, other persons with 
disabilities and indirect victims and 
spur a disability dynamic at the 
national level
Realising VA obligations through 
efforts that are not labelled as ‘VA’ 
i.e. not funded with VA funds, in 
the realm of human rights and 
development
AFFECTED STATES
Specific VA efforts Broader efforts
A national action plan or strategy on 
VA is designed and implemented in a 
manner that benefits survivors, other 
persons with disabilities and indirect 
victims
National injury surveillance 
mechanisms, if and when they exist, 
should incorporate data collection 
on individuals directly impacted by 
mines and other ERW.
Strategies of health, disability, 
education, labour, transportation, 
and social welfare ministries include 
initiatives that are relevant to reality 
faced by direct and indirect victims
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The integrated approach to VA in the context of development, human rights 
and humanitarian initiatives has already capitalised on one opportunity, namely 
VA-supported efforts acting as a catalyst for strengthening disability inclusion 
more generally. Other as yet unexplored opportunities include fulfilment of 
VA obligations through their integration into plans to achieve the Sustainable 
Development Goals and to realise the WHO Plan of Action on Disability.
RESPONSIBILITIES FOR VA
Well-being and the guarantee of a state population's rights are within the domestic 
jurisdiction of each state. Meeting needs and guaranteeing the rights of mine and 
other ERW victims is the responsibility of each state for individuals in areas under 
its jurisdiction and control. This is a particularly profound responsibility for the 
approximately 35 states, which have indicated, or are presumed to be responsible 
for, significant numbers of victims.
Most of these states are also in the process of clearing mines, CM remnants 
and other ERW, destroying stocks and delivering mine risk education. Lead 
responsibility for VA should not normally rest with those leading these activities, 
namely national mine action centres and authorities. 
For VA, responsibility should be held by state entities that have existed for 
decades, such as ministries of social affairs, labour or health. Recognising where 
lead responsibility should lie, and reinforcing relevant state institutions to exercise 
responsibility, is the logical approach to ensure that victims are treated in the long 
term in an efficient, sustainable and non-discriminatory manner.
The 2003 United Nations’ policy on the scope of action of mine action centres and 
authorities in VA highlights that ‘mine action centres are not designed to take the 
lead role in victim assistance, nor do they have the mandate, expertise or required 
resources,’ but suggests that they can contribute in a number of ways:
1. Raise awareness within government of the important promise States 
have made to mine and other ERW victims by ensuring that different 
ministries understand their responsibility for VA including the need to 
identify victims, ensure access to services through mapping of services 
in an accessible format for those with different impairments, referral, 
personalised social support, and provision of services, particularly in rural 
and remote areas.
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2. Push for ratification of the CRPD and call for its implementation, 
including contributing to reporting, updating existing legislation and 
supporting action in line with the WHO Plan of Action on Disability. Make 
casualty data available to those responsible for monitoring and reporting  
on compliance with the CRPD, including civil society organisations.35 
3. Raise awareness of the steps needed to realise the Sustainable 
Development Goals and support related efforts, while ensuring that these 
respond to the reality faced by survivors, family members of people injured 
and killed and people living in communities affected by mines and other 
ERW.
4. Call on governments to develop a national action plan on disability 
inclusive of survivors’ needs and contribute to its development. In the 
absence of political will to develop such a plan, call for and support the 
development of a national action plan on VA grounded in the principle of 
non-discrimination. Contribute to related monitoring and evaluation efforts.
5. Participate in inter-ministerial and multi-stakeholder coordination on 
disability, ensure survivors’ rights are recognised; guarantee and support 
participation in related meetings.
6. Collect sex and age-disaggregated data on mine casualties and feed this 
into broader national injury surveillance and disability information systems.
7. Contribute to reporting on VA under CCM article 7.
8. Mobilise resources and technical expertise for VA by facilitating 
international interest in assisting victims in a manner that calls for advances 
that benefit the broader community of those who have been injured and/or 
are living with impairments.
9. Ensure victims and other people with disabilities are aware of their 
rights as per the APMBC, CCM and the CRPD.
10. Promote collaboration in civil society between organisations of persons 
with disabilities and those representing victims.
While ultimate responsibility for VA rests with individual states, many institutions 
have limited capacity and national ownership requires strengthening. In such 
instances, international organisations and international and national NGOs are vital 
in delivering services and enhancing national capacity. In addition, many states 
with responsibility to meet the needs, and guarantee the rights, of significant 
numbers of victims, lack financial means to do so.
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The APMBC, the CCM and Protocol V to the CCW each call upon its parties to 
provide technical, material and financial support for VA. In addition, the CRPD 
states that ‘States Parties recognise the importance of international cooperation 
and its promotion, in support of national efforts for the realisation of the purpose 
and objectives of the present Convention.’36 
Since the entry into force of the CCM, tens of millions of dollars in VA contributions 
have been generated. Undoubtedly, however, the biggest support has come 
through development assistance contributions for health care, which are not 
explicitly labelled as VA. In recent years, annual development assistance flows 
to affected countries for basic health care and infrastructure, personnel, medical 
education and training and medical services have been over ten times greater 
than funding specifically for VA. Evidence to show that efforts supported by these 
funds are reaching victims is not available yet and data collection to demonstrate 
who is benefitting is needed.
Responsibilities of a ministry of social affairs or health, a national ERW clearance 
programme, a non-governmental organisation and an international donor are 
different. However, all actors share the responsibility of ensuring effective 
participation and inclusion of survivors, other persons with disabilities and indirect 
victims.
Survivors and other persons with disabilities have a unique perspective on their 
own situation and needs. They can, and should be, constructive partners in all 
VA and broader disability efforts. The principle of participation and inclusion is 
well understood in the context of the APMBC, the CCM and Protocol V to the 
CCW, with parties to each heeding the message of ‘nothing about us without 
us.’ As such, participation of CM survivors is essential in all aspects of planning, 
coordination, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of activities that affect 
their lives.
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Information Management aims to enable actors at all levels of cluster munition 
clearance to use good quality and timely information to maximum benefit in 
evidence-based decision-making. This chapter provides an overview of the 
information cycle. This starts with the need to clearly identify what information 
is required to support clearance of cluster munition remnants, especially 
unexploded submunitions, before moving on to data collection, storage, 
analysis and reporting
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT CYCLE
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Identifying information requirements
The first step in the information management cycle is to define clearly what 
information is needed by whom and in support of what decision processes. 
This step should be taken in consultation between information management 
staff and all information stakeholders (for example, operations and programme 
management staff). IM capacity assessments carried out by the GICHD in a 
number of mine action programmes clearly show that those programmes with 
the most successful IM units are those in which programme and operations 
management personnel were actively involved in defining information 
requirements and information management processes.
The non-binding technical annex of the Convention on Conventional Weapons 
Protocol V sets out some of the data that should be recorded in order to facilitate 
future clearance efforts. With respect to unexploded submunitions, a State should 
record the following:
• location of areas targeted;
• approximate number of cluster munitions used in those areas;
• type and nature of cluster munitions used in areas, including technical 
information relevant to clearance; and
• general location of known and probable unexploded submunitions.
Data collection
After a clear definition of information needs has been obtained, these can be 
broken down into the data elements that will constitute the database. These must 
be collected in the field through the use of structured and standardised forms.
There is no internationally agreed format for recording this data. It should be both 
clear and accurate with – if possible – GPS coordinates of point targets. While 
submunitions may not have landed at these coordinates, this will be a useful 
starting point for a survey of contaminated areas. Similarly, where a State has 
recorded information related to its use of cluster munitions, it should be stored in 
a manner which permits retrieval and subsequent release.
Tools for data collection range from simple paper-based forms to digital data 
collection devices of varying complexity. While paper-based tools are simple to 
deploy, require little training and are less prone to technical failure, they are open 
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to data entry (human) errors. They also require more time to process and enter 
into the database post-survey. Mobile data collection tools on the other hand can 
incorporate data quality checks and can transfer data to a database much faster. 
However, they present more technical vulnerabilities in remote field environments. 
The choice of technique will require a trade-off between these considerations.
Data validation and storage
Robust data quality management is vital to successful information management. 
Poor data quality leads to unreliable information products and erodes stakeholder 
confidence in the IM process. This in turn undermines their willingness to invest 
further effort, leading to a vicious cycle of degrading information quality. Data QM 
should be incorporated at every stage of the cycle. For example, one key aspect of 
quality is ‘fitness-for-purpose‘. Fitness for purpose of data is addressed in the initial 
stage of identifying data requirements. Similarly, data accuracy and timeliness are 
addressed through efficient and robust data collection processes. 
However, the ‘last line of defence‘ for data quality is the validation process 
before committing data to the database. This validation process can incorporate 
organisational processes (data is validated by competent staff as it travels from 
the field, through regional offices, to headquarters for example) and technical 
processes (data entry business rules as well as data coherence queries play a large 
role in ensuring the data entered into the database is free of errors). The data entry 
phase therefore provides a valuable opportunity to check the accuracy of the data 
provided. There may be mistakes in recording or duplication of suspected hazard 
areas as a result of one or more surveys conducted. For example, where a survey 
of several impacted communities has identified multiple strike zones close to one 
another, it is worth trying to verify whether it is not actually one single strike zone 
that is affecting the different community members. This can help save time and 
resources.
After these validation steps are carried out, the data should be committed to a 
secure database, hosted in a safe location and regularly backed-up. This database 
should contain all of the data relevant to cluster munitions collected at all levels for 
the entire area being serviced. Establishing and regular updating and dissemination 
of this single master data-set greatly improves the chances that all those engaged 
in addressing the cluster munition threat will be working from a common picture 
of both the hazard and the progress being made to address it.
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Data analysis
Data analysis is the process of generating new, actionable information from raw 
data. This analysis may be qualitative, quantitative or a combination of both. It 
aims to provide answers to a set of operational and/or strategic questions, such 
as ‘where are the hazards?‘; ‘how close are the hazards from populated areas?‘; 
‘How old is the contamination?‘1 
A number of analytical tools exist to support this process. Geographic Information 
Systems (GIS) should be considered a primary tool for this work, given the 
inherently geographic nature of cluster munition clearance (it consists of first 
locating the hazard, assessing its impact through proximity to populations then 
taking terrain, vegetation and climate into account when planning operations). In 
addition, a number of intuitive analysis and reporting tools are now available that 
can be configured to address specific operational and strategic questions.
Reporting and dissemination
The goal of Information Management is to provide useful and usable information 
to those who need it. The effort of collecting, validating, storing and analysing data 
can only be justified if the final information products are made available for use in 
decision-making. The release or exchange of data on the use of cluster munitions 
has been a contentious issue in several armed conflicts over the past decade, 
but is now required by international treaty. The Convention on Cluster Munitions 
requires all States Parties to report annually on the following:
• the technical characteristics of each type of cluster munition produced by 
each State prior to becoming party to the Convention, with ‘such categories 
of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of cluster 
munitions‘;
• the information should include, at a minimum, the dimensions, fusing, 
explosive content, metallic content, colour photographs and other 
information that may facilitate the clearance of cluster munition remnants.2 
The Convention also has an innovative provision that applies in cases in which 
cluster munitions have been used or abandoned by one State prior to becoming 
party to the Convention and which have become cluster munition remnants in 
areas under the jurisdiction or control of another State Party.
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In such cases, the ‘user‘ State is ‘strongly encouraged‘ to provide assistance to 
the affected State Party, including, ‘where available‘, information on:
• types and quantities of the cluster munitions used
• precise locations of cluster munition strikes, and
• areas in which cluster munition remnants are known to be located.3 
CCW Protocol V sets out a qualified obligation to share relevant data, subject to 
a caveat relating to the legitimate security interests of the user.4 According to the 
protocol, relevant information should be released to the party (or parties) in control 
of the affected territory and others engaged in clearance of the affected areas or 
in the provision of risk education. If the State that has used cluster munitions does 
not wish to provide the relevant data directly to the party in control of the affected 
areas, it can make use of mechanisms established internationally or locally for the 
release of information, such as through the UN Mine Action Service, and other 
expert agencies.
According to the Technical Annex to CCW Protocol V the information should be 
released ‘as soon as possible, taking into account such matters as any ongoing 
military and humanitarian operations in the affected areas, the availability and 
reliability of information and relevant security issues.‘5 
It is also important to gather and use data on cluster munition remnants to 
demonstrate how the contamination impedes post-conflict humanitarian and 
development efforts. This data should therefore be systematically shared with 
relief, reconstruction, and development actors.
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR MINE ACTION 
(IMSMA)
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) has supported 
the development and deployment of the Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA) from its first version in 1998/99 until now. The system is currently 
installed in about 40 mine action programmes around the world.6
Based on requirements submitted by users in the field, the system has been 
continuously revised and upgraded since its initial release in the summer 
of 1999 and has become the de facto standard in mine action information 
management.
Chapter 10 | 149
The latest version of IMSMA combines a full-featured Geographic Information 
System (GIS) with a powerful relational database which acts as a national data 
repository. Distribution of the system is managed by the GICHD. It is provided 
free of charge to affected countries and to the governments of countries actively 
involved in peacekeeping and mine action support operations.
Practically, IMSMA can be used to:
• plan, manage, report and map cluster munition survey and 
clearance activities;
• plan, manage, report and map risk education activities;
• record, report on, and map information on the assistance needs  
of submunition victims; and
• record, report on, and map relevant socio-economic information. 
The GICHD has adapted its IMSMA strategy and initiated a new development 
cycle. This has been undertaken with new trends and technologies in mind, and 
following an analysis of the evolution of IMSMA and the strengths and weaknesses 
of its various versions from 1999 to today. The GICHD aims to address evolving and 
emerging needs, especially regarding technological development, user experience 
and interoperability with third-party applications. Moreover, the GICHD will seek 
to make more use of off-the-shelf tools that can be configured to mine action 
requirements without as much need for costly programming and customisation. 
This will reduce the need for specific technical system support and free up both 
GICHD and field IM resources for providing user-driven information products such 
as maps, reports and statistics.
In many programmes the core function of IMSMA is the provision of a national storage 
and data validation platform, while other functions such as data collection and data 
analysis can be performed by specialised third-party applications. The Information 
Management System for Mine Action should therefore no longer be understood as 
a singular tool, but as a system; a set of interrelated tools and processes that operate 
together to provide the sector with sound information management. 
The approach adopted by the new IMSMA strategy is that each step in the process 
can be carried out by a variety of standard or customised tools as long as these 
tools are interoperable, i.e. that they can communicate data between one another 
in a standardised and reliable manner. To accomplish this, the GICHD will develop 
and maintain a robust mine action data exchange language (maXML) and API. 
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Respectively these allow standardised exchange of data and of functionality 
between different tools in the system. 
In this way the GICHD seeks to foster and encourage an ‘ecosystem‘ of user-
driven, interoperable, modular tools that can quickly leverage rapid advances in 
technology and more effectively put IM into the hands of strategic and operational 
stakeholders.
ENDNOTES
1 It is also important to identify and record the level of tolerable risk in the event of major 
contamination as this will help to guide clearance plans. What is deemed tolerable should  
be led by the affected communities themselves.
2 Article 7, paragraph 1(c), Convention on Cluster Munitions.
3 Article 4, paragraph 4, Convention on Cluster Munitions.
4 See Article 4, CCW Protocol V.
5 Technical Annex, Article 1, CCW Protocol V.
6 See www.gichd.org/operational-assistance-research/information-management/imsma/
overview/.
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Programmes to reduce the impact of cluster munitions should mainstream 
gender and diversity into planning, implementation, budget, monitoring and 
evaluation to ensure that operations are inclusive, efficient, and effective and 
benefit all affected groups.
GENDER AND DIVERSITY TERMINOLOGY
Diversity refers to differences in values, attitudes, cultural perspective, beliefs, 
ethnic background, sexual orientation, ability or disability, skills, knowledge, age 
and life experiences. These differences must be recognised, understood and 
valued if an organisation is to ensure that all groups of people are able to benefit 
equally from mine action and that it does not add to discrimination experienced 
by already marginalised groups. 
Gender is defined as ‘culturally and socially constructed differences between 
males and females that determine their roles and responsibilities in society and 
vary from place to place and time to time‘.1 The concept was introduced in the 
1950s to distinguish between biological sex and the social construct of attributes 
and opportunities associated with being male or female.2 
IMAS 04.10 contains key terminology related to gender:
• Gender Equality – the equal rights, responsibilities and opportunities  
of men and women and implies that the interests, priorities and needs  
of both are taken into consideration equally.
• Gender Mainstreaming – the process of assessing the different 
implications for women, men, girl and boys of any planned action,  
including legislation, policies or programmes, in all areas and at all levels.  
It is a strategy for making the concerns and experiences of both women 
and men an integral dimension of the design, implementation, monitoring 
and evaluation of policies and programmes in all political, economic  
and societal spheres so that women and men benefit equally and inequality 
is not perpetuated
• Gender-Sensitive – takes into consideration the different impact landmines 
have on men, women, boys and girls. The ultimate aim of gender-sensitive 
mine action is to conduct mine action in such a way that respects and  
is based on gender equality
Chapter 11 | 153
WHY GENDER AND DIVERSITY IN ACTIONS ON ERW?
The work in removing, and reducing the impact of cluster munitions does not 
happen in a vacuum. It takes place in a context where there are differences and 
inequalities between women, girls, boys and men in responsibilities assigned, 
activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-
making opportunities. Consequently, programmes to reduce the impact of cluster 
munitions do not necessarily benefit individuals from different backgrounds 
equally and should make sure that they neither sustain nor exacerbate existing 
inequalities between different affected groups and individuals. 
Gender, age and other aspects, such as class, job, language, race, ethnicity, 
political affiliation, religion, education, sexual orientation, literacy, physical abilities, 
and residency status/migration history influence exposure to cluster munitions and 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) and the risk of becoming a victim, the ability to 
access medical and psychological services, long term reintegration, risk education 
and awareness (RE), and the likelihood of getting employed in mine action. 
Due to gender and diversity-specific roles and responsibilities, women, girls, boys 
and men from diverse groups are affected differently by cluster munitions and 
ERW and therefore need to be assisted in different ways. For example, gender-
distinct mobility patterns often mean that different age and sex groups hold 
different information on contamination and might have different priorities for 
survey and clearance.
Inclusion of all stakeholders in consultations and surveys leads to more complete 
information on the nature and extent of the problem and a more accurate 
understanding of all the different priorities and needs in the affected communities. 
This contributes to enhanced security and sustainable and inclusive development 
for affected women, girls, boys and men.
In other areas of mine action, such as victim assistance and RE, services need 
to be tailored to reach specific target groups. For example, men might be 
harder to reach by RE teams during daytime; or they might be reluctant to seek 
psychological help after being maimed by a cluster munition/ERW because of 
prevailing cultural beliefs about masculinity. Women in some contexts might not 
be able to go to public meetings or to speak to male surveyors. Children might 
need more interactive and dynamic forms of RE; or if they lost a limb in a cluster 
munition/ERW accident, they will need to change their prosthesis more often 
than adults.
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MAINSTREAMING GENDER AND DIVERSITY IN PROGRAMMES 
TO REDUCE CM IMPACT 
It is essential to carry out a gender analysis to identify and develop an 
understanding of differences between women, girls, boys and men in terms of: 
risky behaviour; who is affected and how; access to resources, opportunities, 
decision-making, services; specific needs/priorities; obstacles for participation; 
the impact of mine action activities; and potential effects on gender equality.
Gender and diversity are cross-cutting issues and must be mainstreamed at all 
levels of a programme.
Planning:
• Mainstream gender and diversity in the national mine action strategy, 
national mine action standards (NMAS), work-plans and relevant Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOPs).
• Collect, analyse and use quantitative and qualitative information 
disaggregated by sex, age and other relevant diversity dimensions to inform 
the design of mine action programmes.
Priority setting: 
• Consult actively with both female and male representatives from all affected 
groups 
• Develop gender-sensitive indicators as part of a weighting system to reflect 
the priorities of females and males from different backgrounds
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Non-technical survey:
• Mixed teams to collect information from women, girls, boys and men  
(IMAS 08.21)
• Adapt the methodology and team composition accordingly in areas where 
direct contact with women and girls or marginalised groups is not possible
Technical Survey and Clearance:
• Offer equal access to employment opportunities to qualified men and women
• Offer appropriate facilities for male and female staff
• Have a code of conduct in place and clear mechanisms to deal  
with breaches of the code
Handover procedures:
• Make sure that male and female beneficiaries from diverse groups  
are accurately informed about the land that is safe to use
Pre and post-clearance impact assessment:
• Ensure that affected females and males are consulted and verify if  
they benefit equally
Community Liaison and Risk Education: 
• Use mixed teams
• Design and deliver sessions in an age, gender and diversity-sensitive way
Victim Assistance: 
• Train and hire male and female professionals from different backgrounds  
to provide services
• Make sure that there are no barriers for any group/individual to access  
the services
• Offer assistance to direct and indirect victims
Information Management:
• Make sure that forms are designed to collect data disaggregated by sex, 
age and other relevant diversity dimensions
• Develop gender and diversity-sensitive indicators to monitor and evaluate 
outputs and outcomes
Quality Management:
• Mainstream gender and relevant diversity dimensions in the relevant 
NMAS, SOPs, quality assurance forms and accreditation processes
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There are many examples of the benefits of mainstreaming gender and diversity in 
programmes that are designed to reduce the impact of mines, cluster munitions 
and other ERW. In Jordan, there is a clear example of how well gathering 
information from women, girls, boys and men works in producing a more detailed 
picture of local information and of the benefits of having mixed survey teams. 
The National Committee for Demining and Rehabilitation (NCDR) and NPA 
undertook a Landmine Retrofit Survey with a clear gender perspective. Information 
was gathered from women and men in the communities by survey teams which 
also consisted of women and men surveyors. Convenient times and locations 
for the meetings were chosen to make sure all segments of society could 
participate. By discussing how minefields threaten lives and block development 
and how the clearance would improve life for women, men, girls and boys, 
people submitted information on where landmine accidents had taken place. 
The technical assessment results showed that males and females identified 
different areas as contaminated by landmines, as women and men have access to 
different information depending on mobility patterns, daily tasks and knowledge. 
One of the main conclusions drawn from the experience was that clearance 
recommendations have to take into account the needs of both women and men, 
and that female participation is not only relevant for gender balance, but also for 
obtaining relevant data.3
Effective risk education involves communication among different individuals and 
different groups or audiences, therefore methods, tools and materials need to be 
adapted to different target groups.
For example, women in some communities do not feel at ease either to appear 
in public alongside the male members of their community, or to receive mine 
education sessions from male counterparts. In such cases, it is opportune to have 
the female facilitators, as they are able to conduct, in a culturally sensitive manner, 
separate sessions for women and girls only. 
The involvement of women has moreover led to changes in these women’s lives, 
including increased confidence in expressing themselves.
In further examples of adaptations for different audiences sessions for children 
need to be short, dynamic, fun and interactive; materials need to be available in 
local languages and contain images that are self-explanatory for people with low 
or no literacy; and risk education targeting men needs to happen at times and in 
places where they are accessible.
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NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK AND KEY REFERENCES
A number of guidelines, UN documents and resolutions, reports and action plans 
stress the importance of including gender perspectives and considerations in mine 
action programmes. The following table provides references to these. 
References to gender and mine action
Convention on 
the Elimination 
of all forms of 
Discrimination 
Against Women 
(1979)
States commit themselves to undertake a series  
of measures to end discrimination against women  
in all forms, including:
• to incorporate the principle of equality of men and 
women in their legal system, abolish all discriminatory 
laws and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting 
discrimination against women
• to establish tribunals and other public institutions  
to ensure the effective protection of women against 
discrimination
• to ensure elimination of all acts of discrimination against 
women by persons, organisations or enterprises 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/
CEDAW.aspx
Beijing platform 
(1995)
‘Women living in poverty, particularly rural women, also 
suffer because of the use of arms that are particularly 
injurious or have indiscriminate effects…’
Actions to be taken by governments include recognising 
that women and children are particularly affected by the 
indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land-mines
United Nations 
Security 
Council 
Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1325 
on Women, 
Peace and 
Security (2000)
Emphasises ‘[…] the need for all parties to ensure that 
mine clearance and mine awareness programmes take 
into account the special needs of women and girls’. 
UNSCR 1325 represents a legal reference to stakeholders’ 
obligations to ensure that mine action addresses the 
special needs of women and girls 
http://www.un.org/events/res_1325e.pdf
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United Nations’ 
Millennium 
Development 
Goal 3: Promote 
gender equality 
and empower 
women
Mine action organisations are obliged to ensure gender 
equality and to actively empower women in their activities 
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/MDG%20
Report%202010%20En%20r15%20-low%20res%20
20100615%20-.pdf#page=22
Convention 
on Cluster 
Munitions 
(2008)
Makes reference to gender on a number of occasions, in 
particular in relation to the importance of ensuring VA is 
age and gender-sensitive  
http://www.clusterconvention.org/
UN Gender 
Guidelines 
(2010)
http://www.gmap.ch/fileadmin/UN_gender_guidelines/
UN_Gender_Guidelines_for_Mine_Action.pdf
Gender and 
Landmines: 
from Concept 
to Practice 
(2008)
This report by the Gender and Mine Action Programme 
(GMAP) studies the significance of gender in the impact 
and the effectiveness of mine action. It aims at giving the 
reader an overview, together with concrete examples from 
5 different countries (Colombia, Lebanon, Mozambique, 
Sri Lanka, Sudan), on how gender can be mainstreamed in 
mine action 
http://www.gmap.ch/fileadmin/Gender_and_Landmines_
from_Concept_to_Practice/SCBL_-_Gender___
Landmines_2008_rev_Sep09.pdf
Strategy of the 
United Nations 
on Mine Action 
(2013-2018)
Promotes gender mainstreaming and contains specific 
indicators on gender, for instance on the provision of 
age and gender victim assistance services and on the 
collection of sex and age-disaggregated data
http://www.gmap.ch/fileadmin/National_and_
Donor_Mine_Action_Strategies/UN_mine_action_
strategy_2013-2018.pdf
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Gender and 
Mine Action 
Programme 
(GMAP)
GMAP runs an international programme whose general 
objective is to raise awareness of the importance of 
taking into considerations different needs, priorities, 
capabilities and knowledge of women, girls, boys and 
men affected by landmines, cluster munitions, and ERWs. 
The programme encourages and supports the mine action 
sector to mainstream gender in policies, programming 
and operations, complementing similar efforts by the 
UN and other actors. It is the main source of information 
on all aspects of gender and mine action and the only 
programme focusing exclusively on this issue
www.gmap.ch
Dubrovnik 
Action Plan 
(2015)
Reasserts and reinforces the concepts presented in the 
Vientiane Action Plan, including gender mainstreaming’s 
importance in collecting and disseminating risk information 
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAss
ets%29/EDCC7B40F1CE5532C1257EB40041239F/$file/
CCM+CONF+2015+WP.3.E.pdf (Draft Action Plan)
ENDNOTES
1 Gender and Mine Action Programme
2 Sexologist John Money introduced the terminological distinction between biological sex and 
gender as a role in 1955. Before his work, it was uncommon to use the word ‘gender’ to refer 
to anything but grammatical categories. However, Money's meaning of the word did not 
become widespread until the 1970s, when feminist theory embraced the distinction. Today, 
the distinction is strictly followed in some contexts, but in many contexts, even in some areas 
of social sciences, the meaning of gender has expanded to include ‘sex’ or even to replace the 
latter word.
3 http://www.gmap.ch/fileadmin/Gender_and_Landmines_from_Concept_to_Practice/SCBL_-_
Gender___Landmines_2008_rev_Sep09.pdf
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ANNEX I
CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS
The Convention was adopted in Dublin by 107 states on 30 May 2008 and 
signed in Oslo on 3 December the same year. The Convention became binding 
international law when it entered into force on 1 August 2010.
Dublin 19-30 May 2008
THE STATES PARTIES TO THIS CONVENTION,
Deeply concerned that civilian populations and individual civilians continue to 
bear the brunt of armed conflict,
Determined to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties caused by 
cluster munitions at the time of their use, when they fail to function as intended 
or when they are abandoned,
Concerned that cluster munition remnants kill or maim civilians, including women 
and children, obstruct economic and social development, including through the loss 
of livelihood, impede post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction, delay or prevent 
the return of refugees and internally displaced persons, can negatively impact on 
national and international peace-building and humanitarian assistance efforts, and 
have other severe consequences that can persist for many years after use,
Deeply concerned also at the dangers presented by the large national stockpiles 
of cluster munitions retained for operational use and determined to ensure their 
rapid destruction,
Believing it necessary to contribute effectively in an efficient, coordinated 
manner to resolving the challenge of removing cluster munition remnants located 
throughout the world, and to ensure their destruction,
Determined also to ensure the full realisation of the rights of all cluster munition 
victims and recognising their inherent dignity,
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Resolved to do their utmost in providing assistance to cluster munition victims, 
including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as 
providing for their social and economic inclusion,
Recognising the need to provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance to cluster 
munition victims and to address the special needs of vulnerable groups,
Bearing in mind the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities which, 
inter alia, requires that States Parties to that Convention undertake to ensure and 
promote the full realisation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
all persons with disabilities without discrimination of any kind on the basis of 
disability,
Mindful of the need to coordinate adequately efforts undertaken in various fora to 
address the rights and needs of victims of various types of weapons, and resolved 
to avoid discrimination among victims of various types of weapons,
Reaffirming that in cases not covered by this Convention or by other international 
agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority 
of the principles of international law, derived from established custom, from the 
principles of humanity and from the dictates of public conscience,
Resolved also that armed groups distinct from the armed forces of a State shall 
not, under any circumstances, be permitted to engage in any activity prohibited 
to a State Party to this Convention,
Welcoming the very broad international support for the international norm 
prohibiting anti- personnel mines, enshrined in the 1997 Convention on the 
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel 
Mines and on Their Destruction,
Welcoming also the adoption of the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, 
annexed to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to 
Have Indiscriminate Effects, and its entry into force on 12 November 2006, and 
wishing to enhance the protection of civilians from the effects of cluster munition 
remnants in post-conflict environments,
Bearing in mind also United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on women, 
peace and security and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1612 on 
children in armed conflict,
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Welcoming further the steps taken nationally, regionally and globally in recent 
years aimed at prohibiting, restricting or suspending the use, stockpiling, 
production and transfer of cluster munitions,
Stressing the role of public conscience in furthering the principles of humanity 
as evidenced by the global call for an end to civilian suffering caused by cluster 
munitions and recognising the efforts to that end undertaken by the United 
Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Cluster Munition 
Coalition and numerous other non-governmental organisations around the world,
Reaffirming the Declaration of the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, by 
which, inter alia, States recognised the grave consequences caused by the use of 
cluster munitions and committed themselves to conclude by 2008 a legally binding 
instrument that would prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of 
cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians, and would establish 
a framework for cooperation and assistance that ensures adequate provision of 
care and rehabilitation for victims, clearance of contaminated areas, risk reduction 
education and destruction of stockpiles,
Emphasising the desirability of attracting the adherence of all States to this 
Convention, and determined to work strenuously towards the promotion of its 
universalisation and its full implementation,
Basing themselves on the principles and rules of international humanitarian law, 
in particular the principle that the right of parties to an armed conflict to choose 
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited, and the rules that the parties 
to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and 
combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly 
direct their operations against military objectives only, that in the conduct of 
military operations constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, 
civilians and civilian objects and that the civilian population and individual 
civilians enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military operations, 
 
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
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ARTICLE 1
General obligations and scope of application
1. Each State Party undertakes never under any circumstances to:
(a) Use cluster munitions;
(b) Develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to 
anyone, directly or indirectly, cluster munitions;
(c) Assist, encourage or induce anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.
2. Paragraph 1 of this Article applies, mutatis mutandis, to explosive 
bomblets that are specifically designed to be dispersed or released 
from dispensers affixed to aircraft.
3. This Convention does not apply to mines.
ARTICLE 2
Definitions
For the purposes of this Convention:
1. ‘Cluster munition victims‘ means all persons who have been killed 
or suffered physical or psychological injury, economic loss, social 
marginalisation or substantial impairment of the realisation of their 
rights caused by the use of cluster munitions. They include those 
persons directly impacted by cluster munitions as well as their affected 
families and communities;
2. ‘Cluster munition‘ means a conventional munition that is designed to 
disperse or release explosive submunitions each weighing less than 
20 kilograms, and includes those explosive submunitions. It does not 
mean the following:
(a) A munition or submunition designed to dispense flares, smoke, 
pyrotechnics or chaff; or a munition designed exclusively for an air 
defence role;
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(b) A munition or submunition designed to produce electrical or 
electronic effects;
(c) A munition that, in order to avoid indiscriminate area effects and the 
risks posed by unexploded submunitions, has all of the following 
characteristics:
(i) Each munition contains fewer than ten explosive submunitions;
(ii) Each explosive submunition weighs more than four kilograms;
(iii) Each explosive submunition is designed to detect and engage a 
single target object;
(iv) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic self-
destruction mechanism;
(v) Each explosive submunition is equipped with an electronic  
self- deactivating feature;
3. ‘Explosive submunition‘ means a conventional munition that in order 
to perform its task is dispersed or released by a cluster munition and is 
designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or 
after impact;
4. ‘Failed cluster munition‘ means a cluster munition that has been fired, 
dropped, launched, projected or otherwise delivered and which should 
have dispersed or released its explosive submunitions but failed to do so;
5. ‘Unexploded submunition‘ means an explosive submunition that has 
been dispersed or released by, or otherwise separated from, a cluster 
munition and has failed to explode as intended;
6. ‘Abandoned cluster munitions‘ means cluster munitions or explosive 
submunitions that have not been used and that have been left behind 
or dumped, and that are no longer under the control of the party that 
left them behind or dumped them. They may or may not have been 
prepared for use;
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7. ‘Cluster munition remnants‘ means failed cluster munitions, 
abandoned cluster munitions, unexploded submunitions and 
unexploded bomblets;
8. ‘Transfer‘ involves, in addition to the physical movement of cluster 
munitions into or from national territory, the transfer of title to and 
control over cluster munitions, but does not involve the transfer of 
territory containing cluster munition remnants;
9. ‘Self-destruction mechanism‘ means an incorporated automatically-
functioning mechanism which is in addition to the primary initiating 
mechanism of the munition and which secures the destruction of the 
munition into which it is incorporated;
10. ‘Self-deactivating‘ means automatically rendering a munition 
inoperable by means of the irreversible exhaustion of a component, for 
example a battery, that is essential to the operation of the munition;
11. ‘Cluster munition contaminated area‘ means an area known or 
suspected to contain cluster munition remnants;
12. ‘Mine‘ means a munition designed to be placed under, on or near 
the ground or other surface area and to be exploded by the presence, 
proximity or contact of a person or a vehicle;
13. ‘Explosive bomblet‘ means a conventional munition, weighing less 
than 20 kilograms, which is not self-propelled and which, in order 
to perform its task, is dispersed or released by a dispenser, and is 
designed to function by detonating an explosive charge prior to, on or 
after impact;
14. ‘Dispenser‘ means a container that is designed to disperse or release 
explosive bomblets and which is affixed to an aircraft at the time of 
dispersal or release;
15. ‘Unexploded bomblet‘ means an explosive bomblet that has been 
dispersed, released or otherwise separated from a dispenser and has 
failed to explode as intended.
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ARTICLE 3
Storage and stockpile destruction
1. Each State Party shall, in accordance with national regulations, 
separate all cluster munitions under its jurisdiction and control from 
munitions retained for operational use and mark them for the purpose 
of destruction.
2. Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of 
all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article as soon 
as possible but not later than eight years after the entry into force of 
this Convention for that State Party. Each State Party undertakes to 
ensure that destruction methods comply with applicable international 
standards for protecting public health and the environment.
3. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to destroy or ensure the 
destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article within eight years of entry into force of this Convention for that 
State Party it may submit a request to a Meeting of States Parties or 
a Review Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the 
destruction of such cluster munitions by a period of up to four years. 
A State Party may, in exceptional circumstances, request additional 
extensions of up to four years. The requested extensions shall not exceed 
the number of years strictly necessary for that State Party to complete its 
obligations under paragraph 2 of this Article.
4. Each request for an extension shall set out:
(a) The duration of the proposed extension;
(b) A detailed explanation of the proposed extension, including the 
financial and technical means available to or required by the State 
Party for the destruction of all cluster munitions referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article and, where applicable, the exceptional 
circumstances justifying it;
(c) A plan for how and when stockpile destruction will be completed;
(d) The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive 
submunitions held at the entry into force of this Convention for 
that State Party and any additional cluster munitions or explosive 
submunitions discovered after such entry into force;
Annexes | 169
(e) The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive 
submunitions destroyed during the period referred to in paragraph 2 
of this Article; and
(f) The quantity and type of cluster munitions and explosive 
submunitions remaining to be destroyed during the proposed 
extension and the annual destruction rate expected to be achieved.
5. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking 
into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 4 of this Article, 
assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of States Parties 
present and voting whether to grant the request for an extension. 
The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension than 
that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as 
appropriate. A request for an extension shall be submitted a minimum 
of nine months prior to the Meeting of States Parties or the Review 
Conference at which it is to be considered.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the 
retention or acquisition of a limited number of cluster munitions 
and explosive submunitions for the development of and training in 
cluster munition and explosive submunition detection, clearance or 
destruction techniques, or for the development of cluster munition 
counter-measures, is permitted. The amount of explosive submunitions 
retained or acquired shall not exceed the minimum number absolutely 
necessary for these purposes.
7. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention, the transfer 
of cluster munitions to another State Party for the purpose of destruction, as 
well as for the purposes described in paragraph 6 of this Article, is permitted.
8. States Parties retaining, acquiring or transferring cluster munitions or 
explosive submunitions for the purposes described in paragraphs 6 
and 7 of this Article shall submit a detailed report on the planned and 
actual use of these cluster munitions and explosive submunitions and 
their type, quantity and lot numbers. If cluster munitions or explosive 
submunitions are transferred to another State Party for these purposes, 
the report shall include reference to the receiving party. Such a report 
shall be prepared for each year during which a State Party retained, 
acquired or transferred cluster munitions or explosive submunitions and 
shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations no 
later than 30 April of the following year.
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ARTICLE 4
Clearance and destruction of cluster munition remnants  
and risk reduction education
1. Each State Party undertakes to clear and destroy, or ensure the 
clearance and destruction of, cluster munition remnants located in 
cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, as 
follows:
(a) Where cluster munition remnants are located in areas under 
its jurisdiction or control at the date of entry into force of this 
Convention for that State Party, such clearance and destruction shall 
be completed as soon as possible but not later than ten years from 
that date;
(b) Where, after entry into force of this Convention for that State 
Party, cluster munitions have become cluster munition remnants 
located in areas under its jurisdiction or control, such clearance and 
destruction must be completed as soon as possible but not later 
than ten years after the end of the active hostilities during which 
such cluster munitions became cluster munition remnants; and
(c) Upon fulfilling either of its obligations set out in sub-paragraphs (a) 
and (b) of this paragraph, that State Party shall make a declaration of 
compliance to the next Meeting of States Parties.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article, each State 
Party shall take the following measures as soon as possible, taking into 
consideration the provisions of Article 6 of this Convention regarding 
international cooperation and assistance:
(a) Survey, assess and record the threat posed by cluster munition 
remnants, making every effort to identify all cluster munition 
contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
(b) Assess and prioritise needs in terms of marking, protection of 
civilians, clearance and destruction, and take steps to mobilise 
resources and develop a national plan to carry out these activities, 
building, where appropriate, upon existing structures, experiences 
and methodologies;
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(c) Take all feasible steps to ensure that all cluster munition 
contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control are perimeter-
marked, monitored and protected by fencing or other means to 
ensure the effective exclusion of civilians. Warning signs based on 
methods of marking readily recognisable by the affected community 
should be utilised in the marking of suspected hazardous areas. 
Signs and other hazardous area boundary markers should, 
as far as possible, be visible, legible, durable and resistant to 
environmental effects and should clearly identify which side of the 
marked boundary is considered to be within the cluster munition 
contaminated areas and which side is considered to be safe;
(d) Clear and destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas 
under its jurisdiction or control; and
(e) Conduct risk reduction education to ensure awareness among 
civilians living in or around cluster munition contaminated areas of 
the risks posed by such remnants.
3. In conducting the activities referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, 
each State Party shall take into account international standards, 
including the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS).
4. This paragraph shall apply in cases in which cluster munitions have 
been used or abandoned by one State Party prior to entry into force of 
this Convention for that State Party and have become cluster munition 
remnants that are located in areas under the jurisdiction or control of another 
State Party at the time of entry into force of this Convention for the latter.
(a) In such cases, upon entry into force of this Convention for both 
States Parties, the former State Party is strongly encouraged to 
provide, inter alia, technical, financial, material or human resources 
assistance to the latter State Party, either bilaterally or through a 
mutually agreed third party, including through the United Nations 
system or other relevant organisations, to facilitate the marking, 
clearance and destruction of such cluster munition remnants.
(b) Such assistance shall include, where available, information on types 
and quantities of the cluster munitions used, precise locations 
of cluster munition strikes and areas in which cluster munition 
remnants are known to be located.
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5. If a State Party believes that it will be unable to clear and destroy or 
ensure the clearance and destruction of all cluster munition remnants 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article within ten years of the entry 
into force of this Convention for that State Party, it may submit a 
request to a Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference for an 
extension of the deadline for completing the clearance and destruction 
of such cluster munition remnants by a period of up to five years. 
The requested extension shall not exceed the number of years strictly 
necessary for that State Party to complete its obligations under 
paragraph 1 of this Article.
6. A request for an extension shall be submitted to a Meeting of States 
Parties or a Review Conference prior to the expiry of the time period 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article for that State Party.  
Each request shall be submitted a minimum of nine months prior  
to the Meeting of States Parties or Review Conference at which it is  
to be considered. Each request shall set out:
(a) The duration of the proposed extension;
(b) A detailed explanation of the reasons for the proposed extension, 
including the financial and technical means available to and required 
by the State Party for the clearance and destruction of all cluster 
munition remnants during the proposed extension;
(c) The preparation of future work and the status of work already 
conducted under national clearance and demining programmes 
during the initial ten year period referred to in paragraph 1 of this 
Article and any subsequent extensions;
(d) The total area containing cluster munition remnants at the time 
of entry into force of this Convention for that State Party and any 
additional areas containing cluster munition remnants discovered 
after such entry into force;
(e) The total area containing cluster munition remnants cleared since 
entry into force of this Convention;
(f) The total area containing cluster munition remnants remaining to be 
cleared during the proposed extension;
(g) The circumstances that have impeded the ability of the State Party 
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to destroy all cluster munition remnants located in areas under its 
jurisdiction or control during the initial ten year period referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article, and those that may impede this ability 
during the proposed extension;
(h) The humanitarian, social, economic and environmental implications 
of the proposed extension; and
(i) Any other information relevant to the request for the proposed 
extension.
7. The Meeting of States Parties or the Review Conference shall, taking 
into consideration the factors referred to in paragraph 6 of this Article, 
including, inter alia, the quantities of cluster munition remnants 
reported, assess the request and decide by a majority of votes of 
States Parties present and voting whether to grant the request for an 
extension. The States Parties may decide to grant a shorter extension 
than that requested and may propose benchmarks for the extension, as 
appropriate.
8. Such an extension may be renewed by a period of up to five years upon 
the submission of a new request, in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 
and 7 of this Article. In requesting a further extension a State Party shall 
submit relevant additional information on what has been undertaken 
during the previous extension granted pursuant to this Article.
ARTICLE 5
Victim assistance
1. Each State Party with respect to cluster munition victims in areas 
under its jurisdiction or control shall, in accordance with applicable 
international humanitarian and human rights law, adequately provide 
age- and gender-sensitive assistance, including medical care, 
rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for their 
social and economic inclusion. Each State Party shall make every effort 
to collect reliable relevant data with respect to cluster munition victims.
2. In fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 1 of this Article each State 
Party shall:
(a) Assess the needs of cluster munition victims;
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(b) Develop, implement and enforce any necessary national laws and 
policies;
(c) Develop a national plan and budget, including timeframes to carry 
out these activities, with a view to incorporating them within 
the existing national disability, development and human rights 
frameworks and mechanisms, while respecting the specific role and 
contribution of relevant actors;
(d) Take steps to mobilise national and international resources;
(e) Not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims, or 
between cluster munition victims and those who have suffered 
injuries or disabilities from other causes; differences in treatment 
should be based only on medical, rehabilitative, psychological or 
socio-economic needs;
(f) Closely consult with and actively involve cluster munition victims 
and their representative organisations;
(g) Designate a focal point within the government for coordination of 
matters relating to the implementation of this Article; and
(h) Strive to incorporate relevant guidelines and good practices 
including in the areas of medical care, rehabilitation and 
psychological support, as well as social and economic inclusion.
ARTICLE 6
International cooperation and assistance
1. In fulfilling its obligations under this Convention each State Party has 
the right to seek and receive assistance.
2. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide technical, material 
and financial assistance to States Parties affected by cluster munitions, 
aimed at the implementation of the obligations of this Convention. 
Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United Nations 
system, international, regional or national organisations or institutions, 
non-governmental organisations or institutions, or on a bilateral basis.
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3. Each State Party undertakes to facilitate and shall have the right to 
participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment and scientific 
and technological information concerning the implementation of this 
Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue restrictions on 
the provision and receipt of clearance and other such equipment and 
related technological information for humanitarian purposes.
4. In addition to any obligations it may have pursuant to paragraph 4 
of Article 4 of this Convention, each State Party in a position to do 
so shall provide assistance for clearance and destruction of cluster 
munition remnants and information concerning various means and 
technologies related to clearance of cluster munitions, as well as lists of 
experts, expert agencies or national points of contact on clearance and 
destruction of cluster munition remnants and related activities.
5. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for 
the destruction of stockpiled cluster munitions, and shall also provide 
assistance to identify, assess and prioritise needs and practical 
measures in terms of marking, risk reduction education, protection of 
civilians and clearance and destruction as provided in Article 4 of this 
Convention.
6. Where, after entry into force of this Convention, cluster munitions 
have become cluster munition remnants located in areas under the 
jurisdiction or control of a State Party, each State Party in a position  
to do so shall urgently provide emergency assistance to the affected 
State Party.
7. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for 
the implementation of the obligations referred to in Article 5 of this 
Convention to adequately provide age- and gender-sensitive assistance, 
including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as 
well as provide for social and economic inclusion of cluster munition 
victims. Such assistance may be provided, inter alia, through the United 
Nations system, international, regional or national organisations or 
institutions, the International Committee of the Red Cross, national Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International Federation, 
non-governmental organisations or on a bilateral basis.
8. Each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance to 
contribute to the economic and social recovery needed as a result of 
cluster munition use in affected States Parties.
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9. Each State Party in a position to do so may contribute to relevant trust 
funds in order to facilitate the provision of assistance under this Article.
10. Each State Party that seeks and receives assistance shall take all 
appropriate measures in order to facilitate the timely and effective 
implementation of this Convention, including facilitation of the 
entry and exit of personnel, materiel and equipment, in a manner 
consistent with national laws and regulations, taking into consideration 
international best practices.
11. Each State Party may, with the purpose of developing a national 
action plan, request the United Nations system, regional organisations, 
other States Parties or other competent intergovernmental or 
non-governmental institutions to assist its authorities to determine,  
inter alia:
(a) The nature and extent of cluster munition remnants located in areas 
under its jurisdiction or control;
(b) The financial, technological and human resources required for the 
implementation of the plan;
(c) The time estimated as necessary to clear and destroy all cluster 
munition remnants located in areas under its jurisdiction or control;
(d) Risk reduction education programmes and awareness activities 
to reduce the incidence of injuries or deaths caused by cluster 
munition remnants;
(e) Assistance to cluster munition victims; and
(f) The coordination relationship between the government of the State 
Party concerned and the relevant governmental, intergovernmental 
or non-governmental entities that will work in the implementation of 
the plan.
12. States Parties giving and receiving assistance under the provisions of 
this Article shall cooperate with a view to ensuring the full and prompt 
implementation of agreed assistance programmes.
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ARTICLE 7
Transparency measures
1. Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations as soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days 
after the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party, on:
(a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9 of this 
Convention;
(b) The total of all cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, 
referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 3 of this Convention, to include 
a breakdown of their type, quantity and, if possible, lot numbers of 
each type;
(c) The technical characteristics of each type of cluster munition 
produced by that State Party prior to entry into force of this 
Convention for it, to the extent known, and those currently owned or 
possessed by it, giving, where reasonably possible, such categories 
of information as may facilitate identification and clearance of 
cluster munitions; at a minimum, this information shall include the 
dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic content, colour 
photographs and other information that may facilitate the clearance 
of cluster munition remnants;
(d) The status and progress of programmes for the conversion or 
decommissioning of production facilities for cluster munitions;
(e) The status and progress of programmes for the destruction, in 
accordance with Article 3 of this Convention, of cluster munitions, 
including explosive submunitions, with details of the methods that 
will be used in destruction, the location of all destruction sites and 
the applicable safety and environmental standards to be observed;
(f) The types and quantities of cluster munitions, including explosive 
submunitions, destroyed in accordance with Article 3 of this 
Convention, including details of the methods of destruction used, 
the location of the destruction sites and the applicable safety and 
environmental standards observed;
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(g) Stockpiles of cluster munitions, including explosive submunitions, 
discovered after reported completion of the programme referred 
to in sub-paragraph (e) of this paragraph, and plans for their 
destruction in accordance with Article 3 of this Convention;
(h) To the extent possible, the size and location of all cluster munition 
contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control, to include as 
much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type 
of cluster munition remnant in each such area and when they were 
used;
(i) The status and progress of programmes for the clearance and 
destruction of all types and quantities of cluster munition remnants 
cleared and destroyed in accordance with Article 4 of this 
Convention, to include the size and location of the cluster munition 
contaminated area cleared and a breakdown of the quantity of each 
type of cluster munition remnant cleared and destroyed;
(j) The measures taken to provide risk reduction education and, in 
particular, an immediate and effective warning to civilians living in 
cluster munition contaminated areas under its jurisdiction or control;
(k) The status and progress of implementation of its obligations under 
Article 5 of this Convention to adequately provide age- and gender-
sensitive assistance, including medical care, rehabilitation and 
psychological support, as well as provide for social and economic 
inclusion of cluster munition victims and to collect reliable relevant 
data with respect to cluster munition victims;
(l) The name and contact details of the institutions mandated to 
provide information and to carry out the measures described in this 
paragraph;
(m) The amount of national resources, including financial, material or in 
kind, allocated to the implementation of Articles 3, 4 and 5 of this 
Convention; and
(n) The amounts, types and destinations of international cooperation 
and assistance provided under Article 6 of this Convention.
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2. The information provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article 
shall be updated by the States Parties annually, covering the previous 
calendar year, and reported to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations not later than 30 April of each year.
3. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such 
reports received to the States Parties.
ARTICLE 8
Facilitation and clarification of compliance
1. The States Parties agree to consult and cooperate with each other 
regarding the implementation of the provisions of this Convention and 
to work together in a spirit of cooperation to facilitate compliance by 
States Parties with their obligations under this Convention.
2. If one or more States Parties wish to clarify and seek to resolve questions 
relating to a matter of compliance with the provisions of this Convention 
by another State Party, it may submit, through the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, a Request for Clarification of that matter to that 
State Party. Such a request shall be accompanied by all appropriate 
information. Each State Party shall refrain from unfounded Requests for 
Clarification, care being taken to avoid abuse. A State Party that receives 
a Request for Clarification shall provide, through the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations, within 28 days to the requesting State Party all 
information that would assist in clarifying the matter.
3. If the requesting State Party does not receive a response through 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations within that time 
period, or deems the response to the Request for Clarification to be 
unsatisfactory, it may submit the matter through the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations to the next Meeting of States Parties. The 
Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit the submission, 
accompanied by all appropriate information pertaining to the Request 
for Clarification, to all States Parties. All such information shall be presented 
to the requested State Party which shall have the right to respond.
4. Pending the convening of any Meeting of States Parties, any of the 
States Parties concerned may request the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to exercise his or her good offices to facilitate the 
clarification requested.
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5. Where a matter has been submitted to it pursuant to paragraph 3 of 
this Article, the Meeting of States Parties shall first determine whether 
to consider that matter further, taking into account all information 
submitted by the States Parties concerned. If it does so determine, 
the Meeting of States Parties may suggest to the States Parties 
concerned ways and means further to clarify or resolve the matter 
under consideration, including the initiation of appropriate procedures 
in conformity with international law. In circumstances where the 
issue at hand is determined to be due to circumstances beyond the 
control of the requested State Party, the Meeting of States Parties may 
recommend appropriate measures, including the use of cooperative 
measures referred to in Article 6 of this Convention.
6. In addition to the procedures provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 of 
this Article, the Meeting of States Parties may decide to adopt such 
other general procedures or specific mechanisms for clarification 
of compliance, including facts, and resolution of instances of 
non-compliance with the provisions of this Convention as it deems 
appropriate.
ARTICLE 9
National implementation measures
Each State Party shall take all appropriate legal, administrative and other measures 
to implement this Convention, including the imposition of penal sanctions to 
prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention 
undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.
ARTICLE 10
Settlement of disputes
1. When a dispute arises between two or more States Parties relating to 
the interpretation or application of this Convention, the States Parties 
concerned shall consult together with a view to the expeditious 
settlement of the dispute by negotiation or by other peaceful means 
of their choice, including recourse to the Meeting of States Parties 
and referral to the International Court of Justice in conformity with the 
Statute of the Court.
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2. The Meeting of States Parties may contribute to the settlement of the 
dispute by whatever means it deems appropriate, including offering 
its good offices, calling upon the States Parties concerned to start the 
settlement procedure of their choice and recommending a time-limit for 
any agreed procedure.
ARTICLE 11
Meetings of States Parties
1. The States Parties shall meet regularly in order to consider and, where 
necessary, take decisions in respect of any matter with regard to the 
application or implementation of this Convention, including:
(a) The operation and status of this Convention;
(b) Matters arising from the reports submitted under the provisions of 
this Convention;
(c) International cooperation and assistance in accordance with Article 
6 of this Convention;
(d) The development of technologies to clear cluster munition 
remnants;
(e) Submissions of States Parties under Articles 8 and 10 of this 
Convention; and
(f) Submissions of States Parties as provided for in Articles 3  
and 4 of this Convention.
2. The first Meeting of States Parties shall be convened by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations within one year of entry into force of this 
Convention. The subsequent meetings shall be convened by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations annually until the first Review Conference.
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, other 
relevant international organisations or institutions, regional organisations, 
the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and relevant 
non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend these meetings 
as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of procedure.
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ARTICLE 12
Review Conferences
1. A Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this 
Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested by one or more 
States Parties, provided that the interval between Review Conferences 
shall in no case be less than five years. All States Parties to this 
Convention shall be invited to each Review Conference.
2. The purpose of the Review Conference shall be:
(a) To review the operation and status of this Convention;
(b) To consider the need for and the interval between further Meetings 
of States Parties referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 11 of this 
Convention; and
(c) To take decisions on submissions of States Parties as provided for in 
Articles 3 and 4 of this Convention.
3. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, 
other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional 
organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and 
relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each 
Review Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed rules of 
procedure.
ARTICLE 13
Amendments
1. At any time after its entry into force any State Party may propose 
amendments to this Convention. Any proposal for an amendment shall 
be communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 
who shall circulate it to all States Parties and shall seek their views on 
whether an Amendment Conference should be convened to consider 
the proposal. If a majority of the States Parties notify the Secretary-
General of the United Nations no later than 90 days after its circulation 
that they support further consideration of the proposal, the Secretary-
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General of the United Nations shall convene an Amendment Conference to 
which all States Parties shall be invited.
2. States not party to this Convention, as well as the United Nations, 
other relevant international organisations or institutions, regional 
organisations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the 
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and 
relevant non-governmental organisations may be invited to attend each 
Amendment Conference as observers in accordance with the agreed 
rules of procedure.
3. The Amendment Conference shall be held immediately following a 
Meeting of States Parties or a Review Conference unless a majority of 
the States Parties request that it be held earlier.
4. Any amendment to this Convention shall be adopted by a majority of 
two-thirds of the States Parties present and voting at the Amendment 
Conference. The Depositary shall communicate any amendment so 
adopted to all States.
5. An amendment to this Convention shall enter into force for States Parties 
that have accepted the amendment on the date of deposit of acceptances 
by a majority of the States which were Parties at the date of adoption of 
the amendment. Thereafter it shall enter into force for any remaining State 
Party on the date of deposit of its instrument of acceptance.
ARTICLE 14
Costs and administrative tasks
1. The costs of the Meetings of States Parties, the Review Conferences and 
the Amendment Conferences shall be borne by the States Parties and 
States not party to this Convention participating therein, in accordance 
with the United Nations scale of assessment adjusted appropriately.
2. The costs incurred by the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
under Articles 7 and 8 of this Convention shall be borne by the States 
Parties in accordance with the United Nations scale of assessment 
adjusted appropriately.
3. The performance by the Secretary-General of the United Nations of 
administrative tasks assigned to him or her under this Convention is 
subject to an appropriate United Nations mandate.
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ARTICLE 15
Signature
This Convention, done at Dublin on 30 May 2008, shall be open for signature 
at Oslo by all States on 3 December 2008 and thereafter at United Nations 
Headquarters in New York until its entry into force.
ARTICLE 16
Ratification, acceptance, approval or accession
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by the 
Signatories.
2. It shall be open for accession by any State that has not signed the 
Convention.
3. The instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall 
be deposited with the Depositary.
ARTICLE 17
Entry into force
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth 
month after the month in which the thirtieth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.
2. For any State that deposits its instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession after the date of the deposit of the thirtieth 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, this 
Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month after 
the date on which that State has deposited its instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession.
ARTICLE 18
Provisional application
Any State may, at the time of its ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, 
declare that it will apply provisionally Article 1 of this Convention pending its 
entry into force for that State.
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ARTICLE 19
Reservations
The Articles of this Convention shall not be subject to reservations.
ARTICLE 20
Duration and withdrawal
1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each State Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the 
right to withdraw from this Convention. It shall give notice of such 
withdrawal to all other States Parties, to the Depositary and to the 
United Nations Security Council. Such instrument of withdrawal shall 
include a full explanation of the reasons motivating withdrawal.
3. Such withdrawal shall only take effect six months after the receipt of 
the instrument of withdrawal by the Depositary. If, however, on the 
expiry of that six-month period, the withdrawing State Party is engaged 
in an armed conflict, the withdrawal shall not take effect before the end 
of the armed conflict.
ARTICLE 21
Relations with States not party to this Convention
1. Each State Party shall encourage States not party to this Convention  
to ratify, accept, approve or accede to this Convention, with the goal  
of attracting the adherence of all States to this Convention.
2. Each State Party shall notify the governments of all States not party 
to this Convention, referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, of its 
obligations under this Convention, shall promote the norms it establishes 
and shall make its best efforts to discourage States not party to this 
Convention from using cluster munitions.
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1 of this Convention and 
in accordance with international law, States Parties, their military 
personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and 
operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage 
in activities prohibited to a State Party.
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4. Nothing in paragraph 3 of this Article shall authorise a State Party:
(a) To develop, produce or otherwise acquire cluster munitions;
(b) To itself stockpile or transfer cluster munitions;
(c) To itself use cluster munitions; or
(d) To expressly request the use of cluster munitions in cases where the 
choice of munitions used is within its exclusive control.
ARTICLE 22
Depositary
The Secretary-General of the United Nations is hereby designated as the 
Depositary of this Convention.
ARTICLE 23
Authentic texts
The Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of this 
Convention shall be equally authentic.
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ANNEX II
LIST OF STATES PARTIES AND SIGNATORIES 
Convention on Cluster Munitions
As of 19 April 2016, a total of 119 states have joined the Convention, as 100 States 
parties and 19 Signatories.
A
Afghanistan
Albania
Andorra
Antigua and Barbuda
Australia
Austria
B
Belgium
Belize
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana 
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
C
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Chad
Chile
Colombia
Comoros
Congo
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Cote d’Ivoire
Croatia
Cuba
Czech Republic
D
Denmark
Dominican Republic
E
Ecuador
El Salvador
F
Fiji
France
G
Germany
Ghana
Grenada
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bissau
Guyana
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H
Holy See
Honduras
Hungary
I
Iceland
Iraq
Ireland
Italy
J
Japan
L
Lao PDR
Lebanon
Lesotho
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
M
Malawi
Mali
Malta
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Monaco
Montenegro
Mozambique
N
Nauru
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Norway
P
Palau
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Portugal
R
Rwanda
S
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Vincent and  
the Grenadines
Samoa
San Marino
Senegal
Seychelles
Sierra Leone
Slovakia
Slovenia
Somalia
South Africa
Spain
State of Palestine
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
T
The FYR of Macedonia
Togo
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
U
United Kingdom
Uruguay
Z
Zambia
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Signatories (as at 19 April 2016)
A
Angola
B
Benin
C
Central African Republic
Cyprus
D
Democratic Republic  
of Congo
Djibouti
G
Gambia
H
Haiti 
I
Indonesia
J
Jamaica
K
Kenya
L
Liberia
M
Madagascar
N
Namibia
Nigeria
P
Philippines
S
Sao Tome and Principe
U
Uganda
United Republic  
of Tanzania
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ANNEX III
DUBROVNIK ACTION PLAN
At the First Review Conference of the Convention held in September 2015, States 
Parties adopted the Dubrovnik Action Plan (DAP) which seeks to carry forward 
the aim of ensuring effective implementation of the provisions of the CCM from 
the First to the Second Review Conference of the Convention scheduled be held 
in 2020. The DAP will serve as the blueprint by which the Convention’s objectives 
for the 5-year period will seek to be achieved.
INTRODUCTION
1. In 2010, at the First Meeting of States Parties in Vientiane, Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, the Vientiane Action Plan was adopted by States 
parties to the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). Developed in 
consultation with partners with the objective to ensure effective and 
timely implementation of the provisions of the treaty following the First 
Meeting of States Parties, the Vientiane Action Plan set out concrete and 
measurable steps, actions and targets aimed to be completed within 
specific time frames over the next five-year period and with defined roles 
and responsibilities.
2. Drawing from the provisions of the Convention, the actions contained in 
the Vientiane Action Plan were not in themselves normative requirements, 
but designed to gather momentum, guide and assist States parties and 
other relevant actors in the practical implementation of the Convention. 
It was argued that with such guidance States parties, together with 
partners, could ensure that the Convention would have an immediate 
impact on the ground, address current implementation challenges, react 
to future developments, and reflect changes in the implementation work. 
As such, the overall aim of the Action Plan was to support States parties in 
meeting their obligations. With the adoption of the Vientiane Action Plan, 
States parties sent a strong message on their commitment to the rapid 
implementation of the Convention.
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3. With the objective to facilitate the preparatory process in advance of the 
First Review Conference of the Convention, Costa Rica in its capacity 
as President of the Fifth Meeting of States Parties initiated the Vientiane 
Action Plan Review in close cooperation with Coordinators and with the 
support of the interim Implementation Support Unit at UNDP. Together 
with the four annual progress reports to date monitoring progress in 
implementing the Vientiane Action Plan, the Review serves as a means 
to gauge the status of practical implementation of the Convention and 
thereby also as an opportunity to document to what extent the Convention 
has made a difference on the ground. As such, it contributes to the first 
Review Conference of the CCM in guiding the content for a new five-year 
action plan.
4. To this end, building on the Vientiane Action Plan and the recommen-
dations of the Review, the Dubrovnik Action Plan (DAP) seeks to carry 
forward the aim of ensuring effective implementation of the provisions 
of the CCM from the First to the Second Review Conference of the 
Convention.
5. Elaborated under the guidance of the President-designate of the First 
Review Conference, and in the capable hands of thematic coordinators 
and support from UNDP, the Dubrovnik Action Plan has been developed in 
line with the expressed desire among States parties to further strengthen 
results by operationalizing actions, with targets aimed to be completed 
within specific time frames over the next five-year period, and with defined 
roles and responsibilities. Working groups of experts consisting of partners 
in the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the 
Cluster Munition Coalition and other stakeholders have been consulted.
6. The actions contained in the Action Plan are not in themselves normative 
or legal requirements, but designed to gather momentum, guide and assist 
States parties and other relevant actors in the practical implementation of 
the Convention. The aim of the new Action Plan remains unchanged: to 
support States parties in meeting their obligations. Building on the many 
achievements to date and with the adoption of the Dubrovnik Action Plan, 
States parties will reaffirm the strong message on their commitment to the 
rapid implementation of the Convention.
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7. The Dubrovnik Action Plan establishes a list of priorities for both States 
parties and other implementation actors, and also serves as a tool to 
monitor progress. Substantively, some actions are designed as milestones 
to ensure timely implementation of comprehensive and resource intensive 
tasks. Others are designed to assist States parties in structuring their 
response to their commitments under the Convention.
8. In the next five years many States parties will face their respective legally 
stipulated deadlines on stockpile destruction and clearance of cluster 
munition remnants in affected areas. In 2016, States will also celebrate 
the ten-year anniversary of the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities. These important milestones underline the imperative of 
renewed energy in the implementation of the Convention enabled by a 
strong Vientiane Action Plan.
I. UNIVERSALISATION
9. One hundred and sixteen (116) States have committed to the goals of 
the Convention. Ninety-two (92) of them have ratified or acceded to the 
Convention, while twenty-four (24) still need to ratify. Seventy-nine (79) 
Member States of the United Nations are neither signatories nor parties 
to the Convention.
Action 1.1 – Increase adherence with the Convention
10. Aiming to increase the number of States parties to 130 by the Second 
Review Conference, States parties will: 
(a) Seize opportunities in all relevant forums including, but not limited to, 
the United Nations Security Council, its General Assembly, Human 
Rights and Economic and Social Councils, parliamentary meetings, high 
level, global and regional multilateral and bilateral meetings and other 
similar events, to engage States not yet party and promote adherence 
to the Convention as soon as possible. 
(b) Continue outreach and engagement with States not parties in all 
appropriate fora, including capitals, to encourage their accession and 
work with signatory States to encourage prompt ratification.
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Action 1.2 – Promote the universalisation of the Convention
11. In cooperating with and assisting other States in joining the Convention, 
States parties commit to: 
(a) Enhance cooperation and partnerships among States and with other 
relevant partners including the United Nations, the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, and other international organisations, the 
Cluster Munition Coalition and other civil society and non-governmental 
organisations to promote the universalisation of the Convention and its 
norms.
(b) Promote relevant models of legislation and provide targeted assistance 
to States requiring support in the development of new national 
legislation to enable ratification of, or accession to, the Convention. 
(c) Encourage and support States not party to join the Convention as soon 
as possible, including by helping States not party to find solutions to the 
potential obstacles and challenges they face in joining the Convention 
so as to facilitate their eventual adherence, as well as exchanging 
information on how such obstacles can be overcome.
(d) Support the efforts of States not party that share the humanitarian 
imperative and concerns caused by cluster munitions, in participating 
in formal and informal meetings in order to encourage them to become 
States parties to the Convention.
(e) Support efforts of signatory States in their ratification process and help 
to find solutions to potential obstacles and challenges they may face in 
the process in order to facilitate their prompt ratification.
(f) Engage producer States not party in activities related to the 
implementation of the CCM including stockpile destruction, clearance 
and risk reduction, and victims assistance – to present and introduce 
them to the benefits of the implementation of the Convention with the 
aim to foster interest and eventual adherence.
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Action 1.3 – Reinforce the norms being established  
by the Convention
12. States parties will continue to promote compliance, reinforcing the norms 
being established by the CCM that stigmatizes cluster munitions and 
promote their non-use by:
(a) Ensuring compliance through bilateral discussions, the use of the good 
offices of the President, and any other means consistent with Article 8, 
in a cooperative manner, to clarify and seek to resolve questions related 
to any matters of compliance. 
(b) Discouraging, in every way possible use, development, production, 
stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions.
(c) Calling upon those who continue to use, develop, produce, stockpile 
and transfer cluster munitions to cease now. 
(d) In conformity with Article 21, raising concern about any alleged use and 
condemning any instances of documented use by any actor, effectively 
calling on all States not party to accede to the Convention. 
(e) Working as appropriate, with other stakeholders, including States not 
party to the Convention that have condemned or otherwise expressed 
concern over the use of cluster munitions generating the stigmatization 
of cluster munitions and promoting its non-use by any actors.
Result – Universalisation
13. By the Second Review Conference, these efforts will result in
• an increased number of States parties to the Convention;
• a decreased number of reported alleged and confirmed instances of use, 
with the aim to put an end for all time to the suffering and casualties 
caused by cluster munitions.
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II. STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION
14. Thirty-seven (37) States parties have reported that they have, or previously 
had cluster munition stockpiles and thereby have or had obligations under 
Article 3. Fourteen (14) States parties remain with obligations under Article 
3. States parties have collectively destroyed over 80 per cent of reported 
stockpiles, well on track to complete all destruction in conformity with their 
respective deadlines stipulated by the Convention.
Action 2.1 – Develop a resourced plan
15. States parties with cluster munition stockpiles that have not yet done so will:
(a) Ensure to have a plan in place as soon as possible for the destruction of 
stocks, including an estimated completion date, national resources to 
be attributed, and any requirements for international support, and begin 
physical destruction as soon as possible.
(b) Fulfil their obligations within the deadlines provided by the Convention 
and ensure that the plan is in compliance with international standards 
relating to the protection of public health and environment.
(c) Highlight these plans in annual transparency reports and if deemed 
necessary, at meetings of the Convention as a measure of promoting 
transparency and confidence building and maintaining transparency 
as an important element for the full implementation of Article 3 by 
providing clear information on the status and progress of stockpile 
destruction programmes.
(d) Request support and any need of international assistance and 
cooperation in order to comply with obligations under Article 3 through 
relevant partners.
Action 2.2 – Increase exchanges of promising practices
16. States parties and signatory States that have already started, or finished the 
destruction of stocks are encouraged to: 
 
Increase the exchange of information amongst themselves and expert 
organisations of good and cost effective stockpile destruction practices 
including on safety, environmental impact and efficiency. This could also 
include tasking the implementation support unit to draft, in consultation 
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with States, a template for the declaration of compliance under Article 3 to 
be used on a voluntary basis and to maintain a list of states with practices 
to share.
Action 2.3 – Apply an appropriate approach to retention
17. States parties that retain or acquire cluster munitions and explosive 
sub-munitions under Article 3.6 will: 
 
Ensure the amount of explosive sub-munitions does not exceed the 
number absolutely necessary for said purposes and shall, in accordance 
with Article 3.8, report regularly on the past and planned use of retained 
munitions.
Action 2.4 – Announce declaration of compliance on  
stockpile destruction
18. States parties that have fulfilled obligations under Article 3 are encouraged 
to:
  Make an official declaration of compliance with Article 3 obligations to 
meetings of States parties or review conferences of the Convention and in 
annual submissions of transparency reports under Article 7.
Action 2.5 – Act upon unexpected developments
19. States parties which may identify new, previously unknown stockpiles 
of cluster munitions after a declaration of compliance has been made, 
commit to:
(a) Report such findings without delay to meetings of the Convention and 
in Article 7 reports as suggested in form C. 
(b) Develop without delay, plans for their destruction and destroy them as a 
matter of urgent priority.
Results – Stockpile destruction
20. By the Second Review Conference, these efforts will result in
• an increased number of States parties that finished stockpile destruction;
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• increased levels of reporting on matters pertaining to Article 3 
implementation, including information on the amount and planned use of 
sub-munitions retained;
• increased exchange of information of good and cost effective stockpile 
destruction practices including on safety, environmental impact and 
efficiency.
III. CLEARANCE AND RISK REDUCTION EDUCATION
21. Sixteen (16) States parties have reported to have or had obligations under 
Article 4. Among them, five (5) have declared compliance with Article 4 
and eleven (11) remain with obligations under Article 4.
Action 3.1 – Assess the extent of the problem
22. Affected States parties subject to obligations under Article 4 will:
(a) Endeavour to, within two years of the First Review Conference or 
two years after entry into force of the Convention for that State party, 
make every effort to promote clarity on the location, scope and extent 
of cluster munition remnants in areas under its jurisdiction or control, 
drawing on survey approaches (technical and non-technical) as 
appropriate and needed.
(b) Note, to the extent possible, the location, scope and extent of any 
contamination where contaminated land is identified, allowing national 
authorities to make evidence-based decisions, using appropriate risk-
analysis and allow for effective prioritisation of ongoing clearance 
activities, taking into account needs, vulnerabilities as well as realities 
and different priorities on local and national levels, and
(c) Release land through cancellation, where no confirmed evidence of 
contamination is found on land previously recorded and classified as 
contaminated, taking into account existing standards, best practices 
and principles for land release. Otherwise, only confirmed hazardous 
areas should be recorded.
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Action 3.2 – Protect people from harm
23. Affected States parties will, as soon as areas under its jurisdiction or 
control are known to be affected:
(a) Take all feasible steps to prevent civilian casualties by immediately 
developing and providing targeted and focused age, gender and ethnic 
sensitive risk reduction education programmes that are based primarily 
on an assessment of need and vulnerability and an understanding of 
risk-taking behaviour.
(b) Mark and fence, to the extent possible, confirmed hazardous areas as 
soon as possible and enforce legislation that protects the marking.
Action 3.3 – Develop a resourced plan
24. Affected States parties will endeavour to:
(a) Develop, within one year of the Review Conference or entry into force 
of the Convention for that State party, and start the implementation of 
Article 4 compliant national clearance strategies and plans based on 
survey results and clearance rates, taking into account best practices, 
international and national standards and methods.
(b) Develop and implement national clearance plans including transparent 
and consistent criteria for developing clearance priorities and for 
utilising the most appropriate survey and clearance methodologies and 
technologies.
(c) Identify the national resources that could be allocated to implement 
plans and relevant activities and explore the need to request 
international assistance and cooperation from the United Nations 
system, donor States, non-governmental organizations or other relevant 
entities.
Action 3.4 – Be inclusive when developing the response
25. Affected States parties will endeavour to, where appropriate and 
applicable,
(a) include affected communities in the development and implementation 
of national clearance plans;
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(b) mainstream gender and age sensitiveness in the development of plans 
and programmes, as well as in the conduct of survey, clearance and 
risk reduction education and other relevant activities;
(c) involve as far as feasible, affected communities in all appropriate 
activities related to clearance and destruction of cluster munitions 
remnants, and to risk reduction education.
Action 3.5 – Manage information for analysis, decision-making 
and reporting
26. Affected States parties will, based on functioning databases and 
comparable data, record and provide information to the extent possible 
on the scope, extent and nature of all cluster munition contaminated areas 
under its jurisdiction or control, and where applicable, report on the size 
and location of land released through cancellation where no confirmed 
evidence of contamination is found on land previously recorded as 
contaminated.
Action 3.6 – Provide support, assist and cooperate
27. States parties that have used or abandoned cluster munitions prior to the 
entry into force of the CCM, will endeavour to:  
 
Provide technical, financial, material and human resources assistance, as 
well as other relevant information, where available, to facilitate clearance, 
when cluster munitions are located under the control or jurisdiction of 
another State party at the time of the CCM’s entry into force for the latter.
Action 3.7 – Apply practice development
28. States parties will promote and continue to:  
 
Explore methods and technologies which will allow clearance operators 
to work more efficiently with the right technology to achieve better results 
as we all strive to attain as quickly as possible the strategic goal of a world 
free of cluster munitions and its remnants, while also making full use of 
existing methods and technologies that have proven to be effective.
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Action 3.8 – Promote and expand cooperation
29. All States parties will:
(a) Monitor and actively promote the achievement of survey and clearance 
goals as well as humanitarian and developmental needs by affected 
States parties.
(b) Identify possible means to cooperate and assist affected States parties 
in need.
(c) Provide international cooperation and assistance when in a position to 
do so, either bilaterally to affected States, organizations undertaking 
survey, clearance, and risk reduction education, or through the United 
Nations and other international organizations, and non-governmental 
organizations, including sufficient and predictable funding, to enable 
affected States parties to complete implementation of Article 4 as 
soon as possible and no later than their respective clearance deadlines. 
Cooperation and assistance among affected States parties is equally 
encouraged. When funding is committed or pledged, consider the 
possibility of multi-year funding.
(d) Coordinate efforts in support of cluster munitions survey and 
clearance in affected States parties, with the aim of ensuring that 
allocation of funds is more effective at country level (bearing in 
mind the level of the problem, the needs and the humanitarian and 
development requirements); and appropriately distributed among the 
affected countries. Involve, as appropriate, relevant international and 
non-governmental organizations actively engaged in mine action.
Results – Clearance and risk reduction education
30. By the Second Review Conference, these efforts will result in
•  a decreased number of new victims, with the aim of zero;
•  increased amounts of suspected land released for subsistence, cultural, 
social and commercial purposes;
•  better targeting of scarce clearance resources;
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•  larger freedom and safer movement;
•  increased exchange of information of good and cost effective clearance 
practices including on safety, environmental impact and efficiency.
IV. VICTIM ASSISTANCE
31. Twelve (12) States parties have reported that they have, or have been 
reported to have, obligations under Article 5.
Action 4.1 – Strengthen national capacity
32. States parties with cluster munition victims in areas under their jurisdiction 
or control will:
(a) Strengthen their national capacity to provide assistance to cluster 
munition victims, without discrimination against those who have 
suffered injuries or impairments from other causes, and accordingly, 
mobilizing adequate national and international resources through 
existing and innovative sources of financing, bearing in mind the 
immediate and long-term needs of cluster munition victims. Concrete 
actions to that effect are:
•  Designating a focal point within the government to coordinate victim 
assistance, if States parties have not yet done so as required by 
Article 5, paragraph 2, by the end of 2016.
• Ensuring that designated focal point has authority, expertise and 
adequate resources to develop, implement, and monitor actions to 
promote inclusion of victims in all relevant national policies, plans 
and programs.
• Collecting all necessary data, on an ongoing basis, disaggregated by 
sex and age, assessing the needs and priorities of cluster munition 
victims, establishing mechanisms to refer victims to existing services, 
and identifying any methodological gaps in the collection of data. 
Such data and needs assessment should be made available to all 
relevant stakeholders and be integrated into or contribute to national 
injury surveillance and other relevant data collection systems for use 
in programme planning.
Annexes | 203
(b) Review the availability, accessibility and quality of existing services in 
the areas of medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, 
education, economic and social inclusion, and identify the barriers that 
prevent access.
(c) Ensure that existing national policies, plans and legal frameworks 
related to people with similar needs, such as disability and poverty 
reduction frameworks, address the needs and human rights of cluster 
munition victims, or adapt such plans accordingly. States parties that 
have not yet developed a national disability action plan should do so as 
soon as possible, or develop a national action plan on victim assistance, 
by no later than the end of 2018. This includes, inter alia:
• Coordination of actions relevant for victim assistance within existing 
coordination systems created under relevant Conventions including 
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In the 
absence of such mechanisms, the establishment of a comprehensive 
coordination mechanism, actively involving cluster munition victims 
and their representative organizations, as well as relevant health, 
rehabilitation, psychological, psycho-social services, education, 
employment, gender and disability rights experts.
• Development and implementation of existing international standards, 
guidelines, best practices, and recommendations in the areas of 
medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support as well 
as social and economic inclusion, recognizing in particular the 
vulnerability of women and children with disabilities.
• Identification and consideration of the needs and rights of victims 
other than survivors.
(d) Monitor and evaluate the implementation of victim assistance as 
integrated into national laws, policies, and plans, related to people with 
similar needs, or as a part of a national action plan, and ensure that such 
frameworks do not discriminate against or among cluster munition victims 
and those who have suffered injuries or impairments by other causes, and 
that cluster munition victims have access to specialized services.
• Raising awareness among cluster munition victims about their rights 
and available services, as well as within government authorities, service 
providers and the general public to foster respect for the human rights 
and dignity of victims, and other persons with disabilities. 
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• Increasing the availability and accessibility of services also in 
remote and rural areas so as to remove the identified barriers and to 
guarantee the implementation of quality services.
(e) Increase the economic inclusion of victims of cluster munitions through 
self- or waged employment, as well as social protection measures. This 
could include, for example:
• Education, training and employment incentive programs of persons 
with disabilities in both public and private sectors, as well as through 
the micro-crediting possibilities;
•  Developing national capacity building programs which promote the 
economic inclusion of victims;
•  Increasing opportunities for victims, particularly in remote and rural 
areas, to access appropriate employment and training initiatives, and 
to engage in productive work that delivers a fair income and security;
•  Creating employer incentives that support the employment of 
victims and other persons with disabilities, while enhancing social 
protection measures to ensure stability during the process of gaining 
employment;
•  Promoting the inclusion of quotas for employment of cluster 
munitions victims, as well as those who have suffered injuries or 
impairments from other causes.
Action 4.2 – Increase the involvement of victims
33. States parties with cluster munition victims in areas under their jurisdiction 
or control will:
(a) Include cluster munitions victims and their representative organizations 
actively in policy-making and decision-making in the work under Article 
5 of the Convention in a manner that is gender and age sensitive, 
sustainable, meaningful and non-discriminatory.
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(b) Include relevant experts to be part of their delegations in all 
convention related activities (including cluster munitions victims, and 
representatives of disabled person’s organizations).
(c) Promote and enhance the capacity of organisations representing 
women, men and survivors and persons with disabilities as well 
as national organizations and institutions delivering relevant 
services, including financial and technical resources, leadership 
and management training and exchange programmes, with a view 
to strengthen ownership, the effective delivery of services, and 
sustainability.
Action 4.3 – Share information
34. States parties will:  
 
Make best use of Article 7 reports, drawing on reports submitted under the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities as appropriate, and 
formal and informal fora to provide updates on these actions.
Action 4.4 – Provide support, assist and cooperate
35. States parties, in support of the implementation of Article 5, will seek to:
(a) Promote further cooperation and assistance for projects relevant to 
cluster munition victims through existing mechanisms, as well as 
increasing south-south, regional and triangular cooperation, and in 
accordance to Article 6 of the Convention. 
(b) Facilitate the sharing of information among victim assistance focal 
points and other key actors, with a view to exchanging experiences and 
good practices.
(c) Develop, by the Second Review Conference, guidance on the 
implementation of Article 5 by a State party in response to any new 
cluster munition victims that may occur in future in areas under their 
jurisdiction or control, with a view to preventing additional victims.
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Results – Victim Assistance
36. By the Second Review Conference, these efforts will result in
•  An improvement in the quality and quantity of assistance provided to 
persons with disabilities;
•  Strengthened respect for human rights to all persons;
•  Increased exchange of information of good and cost effective practices;
•  Increased involvement of victims in consultations and policy-making and 
decisions-making processes on issues that concern them;
•  Increased cooperation assistance for victim assistance programmes, 
through traditional mechanisms, and south-south, regional and triangular 
cooperation and in linking national focal points and centres;
•  Increased demonstration of results achieved and/or expected results in 
Article 7 transparency reports.
V. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE
37. Of sixteen (16) States parties that have reported to have or had obligations 
under Article 4, eight have highlighted assistance needs in clearance and/or 
risk reduction. Of thirty-seven (37) States parties that have reported to have 
or had obligations under Article 3, eight have highlighted assistance needs 
in stockpile destruction. Of twelve (12) States parties that have reported 
to have obligations under Article 5, seven (7) have highlighted assistance 
needs to address the needs of victims.
Action 5.1 – Strengthen partnerships at all levels
38. States parties and expert organisations engaging in cooperation and 
assistance will:
(a) Develop and strengthen their partnerships at all levels, including south-
south and triangular cooperation, including among and between states, 
the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and their International 
Federation, international and regional organisations, the Cluster 
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Munition Coalition, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining and other civil society organisations, survivors and their 
representatives organisations.
(b) Share information and good practices, technologies, resources and 
expertise to implement the Convention effectively and efficiently, 
maximize opportunities and avoid duplications.
Action 5.2 – Communicate challenges and seek assistance
39. States parties seeking assistance according to the right under Article 6 for 
the fulfilment of obligations under the CCM, in particular as it pertains to 
Article 3, 4, 5, 7 and 9, will:  
 
Communicate challenges and needs for cooperation and assistance for the 
full implementation of these obligations at the earliest possible opportunity, 
in meetings of the Convention and through Article 7 transparency 
reporting, as well as through bilateral and regional channels, and 
engage with States parties, and other relevant expert organizations and 
stakeholders, that may be in a position to assist in addressing these needs 
and overcoming these challenges.
Action 5.3 – Evidence base needs for better results
40. States parties seeking assistance should:
(a) Ensure that requests for cooperation and assistance are based on 
appropriate surveys, needs assessments and analysis, including an 
emphasis on gender and age specific requirements.
(b) Ensure that requests for cooperation and assistance include a focus 
on capacity building, at national and local level, based on appropriate 
identification of needs, are clearly embedded in broader national policy 
and legal frameworks and consistent with international obligations.
(c) Ensure that requests for cooperation and assistance are clearly 
embedded in broader national policy and legal frameworks.
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Action 5.4 – Take ownership
41. States parties seeking cooperation and assistance will do their utmost to:  
 
Demonstrate high-level national ownership in fulfilling the Convention’s 
obligations and to this end empower and provide relevant state entities 
with the necessary human, financial and material capacities and resources 
to implement these obligations.
Action 5.5 – Respond constructively to request for assistance
42. States parties and expert organizations in a position to do so, including the 
private sector where feasible, will:
(a) Respond promptly to requests for assistance and will identify and 
mobilise the necessary technical, material and financial resources and 
means of cooperation and assistance, at the community, the national 
and international level. 
(b) Use all possible channels to support States parties seeking assistance 
and will ensure that such assistance is carried out in line with their 
humanitarian and development-related strategies and programming 
in a way to provide predictability and ensure sustainability. Multi-year 
partnerships of cooperation should be fostered. 
(c) Develop, share and promote cost-effective, innovative and successful 
practices of cooperation and assistance and promote results-based 
programming with increased monitoring and evaluation and a closer 
and more systematic interaction between the donor and the recipient.
Action 5.6 – Make use of existing tools, cost efficiency  
and effectiveness
43. States parties seeking or in a position to provide assistance and expert 
organizations will aim to:
(a) Make most use of existing tools, especially Article 7 transparency 
reports, to present requests or offers for cooperation and assistance. 
Special attention should be paid to ensure that needs for and assistance 
available are clearly communicated.
(b) Strive for synergies, where appropriate, with other relevant instruments 
of international humanitarian and human rights law.
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Action 5.7 – Support implementation support
44. States parties will do their utmost to:  
 
Ensure the provisions of adequate resources for cooperation and 
assistance including for support provided by the Implementation Support 
Unit to facilitate implementation of the Dubrovnik Action Plan.
Results – Cooperation and Assistance
45. By the Second Review Conference, these efforts will result in:
•  A decrease in the number of new victims and a better quality of life for 
victims;
•  An increased number of States parties that finish stockpile destruction in 
advance of their eight-year deadlines;
•  A better targeting of scarce resources;
•  Increased technical and material assistance, transfer of skills and good 
practices;
•  Increased and improved reporting on challenges and needs for 
assistance;
•  An increase of multi-year partnerships for cooperation including multi-
year funding arrangements;
•  An increase in the exchange of information of good and cost effective 
clearance and stockpile destruction practices including on safety, 
environmental impact and efficiency;
•  An increase in cooperation and assistance for victim assistance 
programming, with the aim to ensure that victims can participate in all 
aspects of life on an equal basis.
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VI. TRANSPARENCY MEASURES
46. Sixty-seven (67) initial transparency reports of the required 84 have 
been received. One (1) State party has submitted its initial and annual 
transparency report in advance of the CCM’s deadline. Seventeen (17) 
States parties have yet to submit their initial Article 7 transparency report. 
Fifty-six (56) States parties of the required 84 have submitted one or more 
annual report. Twenty-eight (28) States parties have yet to submit one or 
more annual Article 7 transparency reports.
Action 6.1 – Report in time, initially and annually
47. States parties will fulfil their obligation to:
(a) Provide initial transparency reports under Article 7 within the timeframe 
stated by the Convention, especially as the initial reports are key for 
establishing the benchmark against which progress will be measured.
(b) Provide annual transparency reports, taking full advantage of the 
reporting process maximizing their potential as a tool for assistance and 
cooperation in implementation of the Convention, particularly where 
States parties must take action to destroy stockpiled cluster munitions, 
clear cluster munitions remnants and assist victims or take national 
implementation measures referred to in Article 9.
Action 6.2 – Make practical use of reporting
48. States parties will use formal and informal fora to:
(a) Provide updates on the implementation of provisions of the 
Convention, ensuring that updates are clearly reflected in formal annual 
transparency reports and in promoting these reports as practical tools 
for cooperation and assistance; including detailed information on 
time-bound plans towards treaty compliance, with special emphasis 
regarding obligations under Articles 3, 4 and 5.
(b) Seek support from relevant partners if in need of international 
cooperation and assistance to fulfil their obligations under Article 7.
Annexes | 211
Results – Transparency measures
49. By the Second Review Conference, these efforts will result in:
• An increase in the rate of submissions of transparency reports provided 
under Article 7;
• Improved quality in reporting;
• Increased exchange of information of good and cost effective reporting 
practices;
• Increased use of the reporting guide that reflects the actual need for 
qualitative information and represents a useful tool for States parties to 
submit initial reports and annual updates.
VII. NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES
50. Forty-eight (48) or 52 per cent of all States parties have adopted legislation 
specifically aimed at the implementation of the Convention or have 
indicated that their existing laws and regulations are sufficient to implement 
it. Twenty-three (23), or twenty-five (25) per cent of States parties have 
reported that they are currently in the process of adopting legislation and 
other implementing measures. A number of States parties have not yet 
shared detailed information on their implementation of the Convention in 
this area either through their initial and/or annual transparency reports or at 
formal and informal meetings.
Action 7.1 – Enact national legislation to implement the CCM
51. States parties that have not yet done so will, as a matter of priority,  
review existing national legislation, regulations and administrative 
measures to ensure that they have appropriate measures in place to fully 
implement the Convention.
52. States parties will:
(a) Prioritise, where necessary, the development and adoption of new 
comprehensive legislative, administrative or other implementing 
measures in accordance with Article 9. 
212 | Annexes
(b) Share information on any reviews as well as on the content and 
application of implementing measures in their annual transparency 
reports and at meetings of the Convention with the aim to share good 
practice and lessons learnt and as a measure of transparency.
53. States parties may wish to consider enacting national legislation prohibiting 
investments in producers of cluster munitions.
Action 7.2 – Highlight challenges and request assistance
54. States parties are encouraged to:
(a) Highlight factors and challenges that may be preventing progress in the 
revision/adoption of national legislation in transparency reports and at 
meetings of the Convention. 
(b) Make their needs known to States parties, the Implementation Support 
Unit, and other relevant actors in instances when assistance would be 
welcomed in the development/revision of implementing measures.
Action 7.3 – Raise awareness of national implementation measures
55. States parties will, as a matter of priority, take steps to:
(a) Increase awareness among all relevant stakeholders of obligations 
under the Convention, and of their national implementation measures. 
(b) Ensure that the obligations of the Convention and their national 
implementation measures are disseminated to their armed forces and, 
as necessary, reflected in military doctrine, policies and training. 
(c) Report on progress in this area in their Article 7 reports and to meetings 
of the Convention.
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Results – National implementation measures
56. By the Second Review Conference, these efforts will result in:
•  All States parties being in compliance with Article 9 and have reported 
on national implementation in formal meetings of the Convention and 
through Article 7 transparency reports;
• All relevant national actors, including armed forces being informed 
of obligations under the Convention and of national implementation 
measures including as a result of their reflection, where necessary in 
military doctrine, policies and training.
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ANNEX IV
STATE ADHERENCE TO AND 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION  
ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS – ICRC 
RATIFICATION KIT
The Convention on Cluster Munitions provides a comprehensive framework 
for addressing the long-standing humanitarian issues associated with these 
weapons. Ensuring that the Convention fulfils its promises requires the widest 
possible adherence and implementation among States. This paper describes 
the procedures that most States have to follow in order to ratify or accede to 
this treaty. It also contains model instruments of adherence to be filed with the 
depositary. These instruments have been prepared in consultation with the Treaty 
Section of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs in New York.
1. SIGNATURE
The Convention opened for signature on 3 December 2008 at a ceremony in Oslo, 
Norway. Thereafter, and until its entry into force, it can be signed at United Nations 
Headquarters in New York (contact: Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs). Once 
the Convention enters into force, the period allowed for signatures will be closed. 
By signing the Convention, a State is signaling its intention to become a party to 
the instrument in the future. Once it has signed, a State must not take any action 
that would undermine the object and purpose of the Convention (see Article 18, 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969). 
Signing the Convention does not make the State a party to the agreement, legally 
bind it or require it to begin to implement all the provisions of the Convention. 
To become formally bound by the Convention’s provisions, a signatory State must 
subsequently ratify the instrument. States that do not sign the instrument may also 
agree to be bound by the Convention through the act of accession. 
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2. RATIFICATION AND ACCESSION
To become party to the Convention on Cluster Munitions a State must formally 
declare its consent to be bound by the agreement. This will normally involve 
two principal steps: action by the national government and a notification to the 
depositary. 
a. Action by the national government
At the national level, a State must agree to adhere to the Convention in accordance 
with domestic procedures for becoming party to international agreements. This 
usually requires discussion within the country and action by its parliament and/
or its executive. 
b. Notification to the depositary
After domestic procedures have been followed and the decision to be bound by 
the Convention taken, a State will need to prepare an instrument of ratification 
or accession. 
A State that has signed the Convention will generally declare its consent to be 
bound by preparing an instrument of ratification. 
A State that has not signed the Convention will usually declare its consent to be 
bound by preparing an instrument of accession. 
For constitutional reasons, certain States use the terms 'acceptance' or 'approval' 
to describe their adherence to international treaties. These terms have the same 
legal effect as ratification and consequently express a State's consent to be bound 
by a treaty. 
Instruments of ratification (acceptance, approval or accession) must be deposited 
with the treaty's depositary, in this case the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations (contact: Treaty Section, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, New 
York, NY 10017). The filing of this instrument with the depositary is the action 
which activates a State's commitments under the Convention and giving them 
international legal force. Once the Convention is in force, the deposit of an 
instrument with the UN Secretary-General also creates treaty relations, including 
rights and obligations, with respect to other States Parties. The Convention does 
not allow for reservations.
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The Convention enters into force six months after 30 States have deposited their 
instruments of ratification (acceptance, approval or accession). The specific date 
on which the Convention becomes binding on an individual State is determined 
as follows: 
(a)  For the first 30 States to deposit instruments with the UN Secretary-
General, the Convention will enter into force on the first day of the sixth 
month after the 30th instrument of ratification (acceptance, approval or 
accession) is received.
(b)  For all other States, the Convention will enter into force on the first day of 
the sixth month after the date on which that State deposited its instrument 
of ratification (acceptance, approval or accession) with the UN Secretary-
General. 
In order to reinforce the basic norms laid down in the Convention, Article 18 invites 
States upon ratification (acceptance, approval or accession) to declare that they 
intend provisionally to apply its general obligations (contained in Article 1) pending 
its entry into force. The ICRC encourages States to make such a declaration. 
3. NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
The Convention (Article 9) requires that States take appropriate legal, administrative 
and other measures to implement its provisions. This includes the imposition 
of penal sanctions to prevent and punish any prohibited activity committed by 
persons or on territory under their jurisdiction or control. Depending on domestic 
law or procedures, specific criminal legislation to impose legal sanctions may 
be needed. The ICRC's delegations and its Legal Division in Geneva are available 
for guidance on preparing such legislation.
Administrative measures – including changes in military doctrine and operating 
procedures and the notification of companies and entities involved in the 
development, production and transfer of arms – may also be needed to ensure 
that violations do not occur.
Besides the prevention and punishment of violations, States need to consider a 
range of positive measures to ensure implementation of the Convention. These 
may include:
(a) Development and implementation of plans for the destruction of stockpiled 
cluster munitions
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(b) Development and implementation of plans for the clearance of cluster 
munition remnants
(c) Development and implementation of plans for risk education and victim-
assistance programmes
(d) Development and implementation of assistance programmes for a, b and c 
above in support of other States Parties (Article 6)
(e) Preparation and submission to the depositary of annual reports on 
implementation and other confidence-building measures (Article 7), the 
first of which is required 180 days after entry into force of the Convention 
for the State Party concerned
4. MODEL INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE, 
APPROVAL OR ACCESSION
Model instruments to be filed with the depositary are attached. Also attached is a 
model declaration regarding provisional application, which the ICRC encourages 
States to consider submitting to the depositary at the time of ratification 
(acceptance, approval or accession). 
The ICRC's delegations throughout the world and its Legal Division in Geneva are 
available to provide any further information or clarification that may be required.
December 2008
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MODEL A
For States Signatories
MODEL INSTRUMENT OF RATIFICATION  
[ACCEPTANCE OR APPROVAL]  
OF THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS
WHEREAS the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted at Dublin on 30 May 
2008 and opened for signature at Oslo on 3 December 2008,
WHEREAS the said Convention has been signed on behalf of the Government of
 on  ,
NOW THEREFORE I, [name and title of the Head of State, Head of Government 
or Minister of Foreign Affairs], declare that the Government of  , 
having considered the above-mentioned Convention, ratifies [accepts, approves] 
the same Convention and undertakes faithfully to perform and carry out the 
stipulations therein contained.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have signed this instrument of [ratification, acceptance, 
approval] at  on  .
 [signature] + [seal] 
This instrument must be signed by the Head of State, Head of Government or 
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
220 | Annexes
MODEL B
For non-signatory States
MODEL INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION 
TO THE 
CONVENTION ON CLUSTER MUNITIONS
WHEREAS the Convention on Cluster Munitions was adopted at Dublin on 30 
May 2008,
NOW THEREFORE I, [name and title of the Head of State, Head of Government 
or Minister of Foreign Affairs], declare that the Government of  , 
having considered the above-mentioned Convention, accedes to the same 
Convention and undertakes faithfully to perform and carry out the stipulations 
therein contained.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have signed this instrument of accession at 
 on  .
 [signature] + [seal] 
This instrument must be signed by the Head of State, Head of Government or 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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MODEL C
For both signatory and non-signatory States
MODEL DECLARATION OF INTENT  
TO APPLY THE CONVENTION PROVISIONALLY
Optional Declaration
I [name and title of the Head of State, Head of Government or Minister of Foreign 
Affairs] declare herewith that the Government of  will provisionally 
apply Article 1 of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, pending its entry into force.
 [signature] + [seal] 
This declaration may be submitted to the depositary at the same time as the 
instrument of ratification or accession to the said Convention.
This declaration must be signed by the Head of State, Head of Government or 
Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
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ANNEX V
LEGISLATE THE CONVENTION ON CLUSTER 
MUNITIONS
New Zealand, in its capacity as CCM Coordinator on National Implementation 
Measures, has developed a Model Legislation template for possible use by 
non-possessor and non-contaminated States Parties to assist them meet their 
Article 9 obligations. Article 9 implementation is critical in ensuring that the CCM 
lives up to its humanitarian objectives.
1. TITLE
This Act is the Cluster Munitions Act [INSERT YEAR].
2. COMMENCEMENT
This Act comes into force on [INSERT DATE/PROCEDURE].
3. PURPOSE
The purpose of this Act is to implement the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
(2008) in [INSERT COUNTRY NAME].
4. INTERPRETATION
(1) In this Act: ‘Convention’ means the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions (the 
English text of the Convention is set out in the Schedule to this Act); ‘Minister’ 
means the Minister of State who is responsible for the administration of this Act; 
‘Officer’ means a person authorized by the Minister to give effect to this Act;
‘Transfer’ involves, in addition to the physical movement of cluster munitions into 
or from [INSERT COUNTRY NAME], the transfer of title to, and control over, cluster 
munitions. (2) Terms and expressions not defined in this Act but defined in the 
Convention have the same meaning as in the Convention.
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5. OFFENCES RELATING TO CLUSTER MUNITIONS:  
PROHIBITED CONDUCT
(1) A person who does any of the following commits an offence:
(a)  Uses a cluster munition;
(b)  Develops, produces or otherwise acquires a cluster munition;
(c)  Possesses, retains or stockpiles a cluster munition;
(d)  Transfers a cluster munition, directly or indirectly, to another person;
(e)  Assists, encourages or induces another person to engage in any 
conduct described in paragraphs (1) (a) to (d) of this section.
(2)  A person commits an offence who provides or invests funds with the 
intention that those funds be used, or knowing that they are to be used, in 
the development or production of cluster munitions.
6. SEIZURE AND DESTRUCTION OF CLUSTER MUNITIONS
Any cluster munition connected with the commission of an offence under 
paragraphs (1) (a) to (d) of section 5 may be seized without warrant and must be 
destroyed by an officer.
7. EXCEPTIONS TO OFFENCES IN SECTION 5: PERMITTED 
CONDUCT
Despite section 5, an officer does not commit an offence by seizing, receiving 
or acquiring a cluster munition if he or she is doing so in the course of his or her 
employment and for the purposes of:
(a) Destroying it; or
(b) Retaining it pending its destruction; or
(c) Transferring it so that it can be destroyed.
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8. PENALTIES
Any person who contravenes section 5 shall be guilty of an offence and liable 
upon conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding [ ] years or to a fine 
not exceeding [ ] or both.
9. APPLICATION OF ACT
(1) This Act applies to all acts done or omitted in [INSERT COUNTRY NAME].
(2) This Act also applies to all acts done or omitted outside [INSERT COUNTRY 
NAME] by a citizen of [INSERT COUNTRY NAME] or by a company 
incorporated in [INSERT COUNTRY NAME].
10. CONSEQUENTIAL AMENDMENTS
[If required, for example, to customs legislation dealing with prohibited imports 
and exports.]
11. ACT BINDING ON THE STATE
This Act binds the State.
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